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Abstract  
This thesis introduces an inclusive framework of road safety project implementation 
methodology, the project management, stakeholder engagement, and change facilitation 
approach (PSC). This organises the elements of project management, stakeholder 
engagement and change facilitation into a framework which, given the right conditions, can 
promote the emergence of synergies. Searches for pre-existing relevant literature on a 
system like the PSC confirm a methodological gap which the PSC has the potential to fill. 
Two case studies are included to underpin the PSC methodology. The first is of a road safety 
project in Mount Isa, designed on PSC principles to raise awareness amongst the Aboriginal 
population about the dangers of sleeping on the roadway that runs parallel to a traditional 
riverbed camping ground and to actualise Indigenous elders into becoming change 
facilitators. 
The second study is a retrospective multi-focal review of the Queensland Road Safety Audit 
Policy (RSAP), and considers the policy document and supporting documentation as well as 
the views of personnel involved in its implementation. For a comprehensive review the 
operational environment of the policy was scrutinised utilising King’s Road Safety Space 
(RSS) criteria. In contract with PSC, RSAP was conducted utilising traditional Queensland 
Main Roads Department (QDMR) ‘top’ down methodology, with little consideration for 
stakeholders or change facilitation. In this case study the PSC is used as a gap-analysis tool, 
with the rationale that those PSC elements not included in RSAP would have contributed to 
a more ideal enactment. Many undesirable contributory factors uncovered during the study 
are still operational, and if not mitigated are likely to have an adverse influence on Safe 
System implementation 
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Chapter 1 Introduction to thesis 
1.1 The PSC 
This thesis introduces the project management, stakeholder engagement, and change-
facilitation approach (PSC), which organises the elements of project management, 
stakeholder engagement and change facilitation into an inclusive framework of road safety 
project implementation methodology, a framework which, given the right conditions, can 
promote the emergence of synergies.   
1.2  Research considerations 
It is emphasised that this thesis is Queensland-centric, that is understandings acquired are 
primarily based on research conducted and experiences gained in Queensland. It is also 
oriented towards projects involving road infrastructure issues, reflecting the author’s 
experience, although the roles of community and other stakeholders feature strongly. 
The conceptual development of the PSC was initially stimulated by the author’s 
experiences with and concerns about the interface between stakeholders and road 
authorities in the auditing of safety on roads. Traditionally road safety auditing has been 
executed as an engineering check of the safety of the road environment. However, road 
safety is not an ‘engineering only issue’, since it is now recognised that there are many 
professions contributing to road safety – in fact -, every road user is a stakeholder in the 
safety of our roads. This new realisation is reflected in advanced road safety paradigms like 
the Safe System and has been practised in the development of the 2011–2020 National 
Road Safety Strategy (Australian Transport Council, 2011), which is based on the 
collaborative effort of more than 100 different stakeholder groups. 
While a great number of community-based projects are considered successful, the 
Queensland Road Safety Audit Policy (RSAP) seemed to be less than ideally implemented in 
spite of the wealth of intellectual and material resources at the state government 
departments’ disposal. Over time the author became aware of relevant surveys and gained 
additional insights into RSAP implementation. Part of this thesis focuses on those insights 
and presents further research, including a review of the policy documents, implementation 
personnel and associated staff, and an investigation of the RSAP operational milieu utilising 
King’s theory of road safety space (RSS). 
In 2009 the author secured ‘Safer Roads Sooner’ funding for the upgrading of a four-lane 
divided road running parallel to the Leichardt River in Mount Isa City. Itinerant Aboriginals 
liked to camp in the dry parts of the riverbed, and there had been two fatalities in 
preceding winters when campers had gone to sleep on the warm bitumen-surfaced 
carriageway. Funding was granted for road-based upgrading such as improving lighting, 
clearing vegetation from footpaths and median, and enhancing signage; some of the 
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funding was approved for a behavioural project in which the author acted as project 
designer and an Indigenous consultant as advisor and project manager. The scheme was 
designed on PSC principles and this thesis includes an implementation review of that 
project. 
This thesis seeks to evaluate the application of the PSC approach through the above 
mentioned two case studies: 
 Case Study 1. The study of the application of the PSC in the Mount Isa Pedestrian 
behavioural project is an instrumental and explanatory case study of the PSC (see 
visualisation tool, Figure 3.1).  
 Case Study 2. The study of the RSAP can be described as an instrumental and 
exploratory case study. The RSAP is reviewed through a number of different data 
sources and perspectives. This is to explore how traditional departmental ‘top’ 
down project implementation methodologies stimulate stakeholder engagement 
and change facilitation. In addition the PSC is applied as a gap analysis tool to 
expose those elements of RSAP enactment which would have benefited from use 
of the PSC as an implementation tool.  
A continuing focus of this thesis, both within the case studies and in general discussion, will 
be the fit, which the PSC approach facilitates with stakeholder driven groups, like the North 
West Road Safety Alliance, and its synergy with the Safe System philosophy and 
stakeholder driven initiatives like the National Road Safety Strategy. 
 
1.3 Some of the answers 
The thesis brings to light shortcomings of the traditional ‘top-down engineering only’ 
project implementation methods utilised by road authorities.  
By contrast the PSC approach seeks to enable holistic engagement of multi-skilled 
stakeholders, helping them to define and address their perspectives of concern. The PSC 
approach is suited to a diversity of projects within and outside the infrastructure area. 
Further trials will help to refine its methodology and develop a knowledge base for its 
extended application. 
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Chapter 2 Background and literature review  
2.1 Background 
It needs to be recognised that this thesis is Queensland-centric, and the insights offered are 
based on understanding and experiences gained in Queensland. The research includes 
some sensitive and contentious material, whose exclusion would have limited scope of 
discussion and depth of reasoning. 
In 2005/2006, the author conducted a survey with the cooperation of the Queensland 
Department of Main Roads (QDMR), where he was an employee (see Attachment 1). The 
resulting report, ‘Challenges and perceived needs: a survey of road safety auditors working 
for the Queensland Department of Main Roads’, offered an insight into road safety through 
the eyes of departmental colleagues, and specifically into the conduct of road safety audits 
within QDMR and the way auditors felt about it. Some of the findings raised concerns 
about how the process was being applied and about the management of audit processes. 
These were discussed with the relevant regional director. Since the investigation coincided 
with a confidential state-wide survey by Ernst1 and Young in 2005/06, set up to investigate 
the conduct of road safety audits in each Main Roads district and region, the regional 
director kindly provided the results of that survey for comparison. The Ernst and Young 
survey was more comprehensive than the QDMR survey in that it focused on every district 
and region, investigating quality and consistency in undertaking road safety audits, their 
documentation, their output and implementation. Districts varied in their ratings with 
many receiving poor scores or worse, and this stimulated the development in Queensland 
of the Road Safety Audit Policy of 2006 (RSAP). Many of the inadequacies and 
inconsistencies uncovered by Ernst and Young were confirmed in the author’s survey. 
At that time the author became involved in a retrospective analysis of the Townsville City 
Safe Project, a cooperative effort between sections of the business community, the 
defence forces, state and local government departments, charity organisations and other 
interest groups. The project achieved exceptional outcomes and was replicated in other 
Australian cities. The City Safe analysis and information on other successful stakeholder-
based projects led to the realisation that such projects often accomplished extraordinary, 
even synergistic, outcomes through good project management, the engagement of 
stakeholders and community groups, vicarious experience and the participation of 
community-based change facilitators. These insights led to the genesis of the Project 
Management, Stakeholder Engagement, and Change Facilitation (PSC) approach, which has 
the potential to recreate such synergistic project environments. 
                                                          
1 The author is not related to this Ernst in any way 
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2.2 A broader approach to road safety  
The Townsville City Safe Program and other community-based projects proved that a more 
inclusive methodology for road safety can help build efficiencies when engaging in road 
safety projects. The more that can be accomplished with limited funding, the more 
effectively is the cause of road safety served. Some road safety projects have achieved 
outcomes beyond expectations by creating project environments that allowed enhanced 
efficiencies—even synergies—to emerge. This realisation, when studying the Townsville 
project and other community based road safety action, formed the basis for the 
development of the PSC.  
PSC combines parameters of project management, stakeholder engagement and change 
facilitation. It is designed to provide a project environment conducive to the emergence of 
synergy. The definition of synergy within the context of this thesis has been adopted from a 
definition by Schoech (n.d.), that ‘systems working well experience synergy where the total 
system outputs are greater than the sum of all inputs’.  For synergy to occur, subsystems 
must not maximize, but sacrifice optimization, and cooperate for the good of the overall 
system, e.g., Teamwork.’  
2.3 Research objectives  
The primary aim of this research is to explore how the concept of synergy applies to road 
safety policy and program implementation. The secondary aim is to explore the potential 
benefits of the PSC. 
These aims are addressed by undertaking research with the following objectives: 
 Establishing the role of a synergistic approach to road safety policy and program 
implementation, focusing on road environment safety 
 Presenting the PSC as a model which promotes synergy in the context of current 
strategic drivers, such as the Safe System approach 
 Assessing the value of the model based on a case study of the PSC application in the 
Mount Isa Pedestrian Project (Case Study 1, Chapter 4) 
 Assessing the explanatory value of the model by conducting a retrospective case study 
of the implementation of the Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads 
Road Safety Audit Policy (Case Study 2, Chapters 5-7) 
 Comparing and contrasting the findings of the two case studies to assess the potential 
of the PSC approach, any limitations, and future directions for research and 
implementation.   
 
Explanatory and exploratory case study research will facilitate identification of new 
conceptual relationships. Some of the consequential insights conveyed by this research 
approach will relate to the alignment of the PSC with ‘Safe System philosophy’ (Section 
7.5.2), the concepts of corporate social responsibility and professional advocacy Sections 
5.3.5, 6.4.2, 6.4.7, and 6.5. Also refer section 3.2 ‘Justification of case study approach’. 
An additional insight anticipated is the importance of a suitable project environment, when 
attempting to evolve synergistic collaboration (Section 7.3).  
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2.3.1 Research questions  
Current road safety philosophy in Australia is expressed by the Safe System, a participatory 
approach in which stakeholders from all genres of road safety contribute to support road 
users and their physical frailty. This is in contrast to the traditional Main Roads Department 
perspective, which acts on the premise that appropriate road user education, proper 
engineering and rigorous enforcement are all that are needed to guarantee road user 
safety (see Chapter 2.5.1).
This thesis seeks to investigate the complexities of improving road safety implementation 
in public service guided road safety project environments as well as prerequisites for 
synergy driven project outcomes. Both case studies included in this thesis will provide 
answers to specific questions which are conveyed in the case descriptions. 
There are challenges involved in addressing lessons learned from the two case studies 
within the framework of a participatory Safe System Approach. As those challenges 
become more distinct during the course of this study, the role of the PSC as a Safe System 
tool will become more obvious. 
2.4 The definition of road safety  
‘Road safety’ refers first to the appropriate engineering of roads to provide a safe and 
forgiving environment for all users (Austroads, 2009b, p. 6), but a more inclusive 
interpretation acknowledges that road safety is dependent not only on the quality of the 
roads, but also on user behaviour, vehicles, speeds (Austroads, n.d. part5, p. ii)  and (a 
point not yet widely acknowledged) the multi-faceted road safety operational 
environment, the dynamics of which have the potential to nurture or stifle its own 
processes (King, 2005).This topic will be explored in this thesis by examining how conflicting 
needs are negotiated in the design of roads and the appropriation of funds; and how ideal 
conditions may be sacrificed for vested interests. King’s Model of the road safety space 
(RSS) of contextual factors will be deployed (Chapter 7.3) for a visual representation of the 
supportive parameters and constraints of road safety space. 
2.4.1 Engineering safe roads 
In the history of road construction the provision of safe roads has been an evolving 
challenge of design and engineering. Guidelines and specifications have been used, 
modified and applied at state-wide and nation-wide levels to provide consistently safe 
roads across networks to accommodate a variety of users. Today’s designers and engineers 
use guides like the Queensland Road Planning and Design Manual (Transport and Main 
Roads, 2014) and its predecessors, as well as a range of Austroads documents to set 
consistent vertical and horizontal alignment standards, provide sight distance 
commensurate with design speed, and post speed limits. Chapter 5.4 provides a more 
detailed insight into this subject. The key term here is ‘consistent’—for a road user, any 
unexpected road safety issue is a crash waiting to happen.    
Chapter 2    Background and literature review 
6 
 
2.4.2 Stakeholders in road safety 
Parallel to the evolution of road safety standards has been a rising awareness of the 
number of stakeholders involved in road safety. All levels of government and their road 
network management organisations, corporate entities, and religious, social and cultural 
organisations have a stake in the safety of our road networks. In fact, every citizen who 
uses roads, or has relatives or friends who use roads, can be regarded a stakeholder in road 
safety (Australian Transport Council, 2011). 
Traditionally, stakeholder interests have been managed through the implementation of 
engineering standards that include formal design and construction review processes; these 
are the forerunners of today’s discipline of road safety auditing. Traditionally, too, the 
focus has been on managing stakeholders as part of overall project risk (Australian and 
New Zealand Standard AS/NZS 4360, 2004). In 2009 this standard was superseded by the 
more comprehensive AS/NZS ISO 31000, 2009. Both practices, managing stakeholders 
interests and managing stakeholders, are appropriate, particularly within the framework of 
an ever more inclusive and holistic approach to road safety. 
However, for synergies to emerge we need to seek out and engage stakeholders whose 
interests resonate with the issues at hand in a project environment conducive to the 
emergence of synergies. Single origin ‘top’ down policies and directives are unlikely to 
engage stakeholders in a way to result in synergies. 
2.4.3 Road safety auditing  
A road safety audit is a formal examination of a future road or traffic project or an 
existing road, in which an independent, qualified team reports on the project’s 
crash potential and safety performance. The road safety audit process concerns the 
safety of all road users… 
The essential elements of the definition are that it is:  
 a formal process and not an informal check 
 carried out by people who are independent of the design or the road 
authority if an existing road 
 carried out by people with appropriate experience and training 
 restricted to road safety issues.  (Austroads, 2009 b, p. 7)  
A road safety audit is a proactive process to check the safety of existing roads and ensure 
that safety is applied in the design and construction of new projects. New projects are 
checked at pre-determined milestones during concept, design, construction and 
finalisation; existing roads are checked at midblock or intersections to identify elements 
which may increase the risk or severity of collision for road users, including drivers, 
passengers, motorcyclists, pedestrians and cyclists. Road safety audits are generally 
undertaken by trained and certified Road Safety Auditors using Austroads standard 
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checklists, and are written up in reports which suggest remedial measures and provide a 
risk rating to help prioritise identified road safety issues for rectification (QDMR, 2006a, 
2006b). Although a road safety audit is a quite specific tool, its purpose and management is 
best understood within the broader context of road safety. 
2.5 Road safety paradigms  
Throughout the existence of motorised transport there have been attempts to construct 
models to describe the conditions necessary for safe vehicular transport. It was considered 
that if a scientific model to explain crash causes could be designed, it would become 
possible to eliminate these causes and thereby prevent crashes. There has been an 
evolution through three basic models of road safety, each with variants: the 3 Es, Haddon 
Matrix and Safe Systems (OECD, 1997). 
 The models have taken a variety of forms: simple to intricate, as cyclic, review-based, or 
detailed schemata, to help visualise and comprehend complex scientific relationships. At 
their present level of evolution, leading-edge models may all be termed ‘Safe Systems’. 
They include:  
 Vision Zero, the Swedish model  
 Tomorrow’s Roads—Safer for Everyone, the British model 
 Sustainable Safety, the Dutch model. 
The 3 Es and the Haddon Matrix are still relevant for specific purposes; however they are 
no longer considered the perfect example of road safety paradigms. 
Table 2.1 below shows that already in 1997 there was an international move towards what 
are known as Safe Systems.  
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Table 2.1 Road safety principles and models  
 
(OECD, 1997, p. 17) 
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2.5.1 The three Es: engineer, educate, enforce 
The three Es paradigm underlies current road safety models in Australia. It focuses heavily 
on the road user as an entity who, through education, engineering and enforcement, will 
become a skilful and compliant driver. The premise concerning safety during the heyday of 
the three Es was presented in Individual problems, inadequate morals and skills (OECD, 
1997), where typical safety measures included the screening of accident-prone drivers. 
(OECD, 1997). The behaviour of the general driver was controlled by legislation and 
enforcement, both intended to deter drivers from offences related to safety. The 
effectiveness of deterrence was researched by Watson in 2004, in how effective is 
deterrence theory in explaining driver behaviour: a case study of unlicensed driving:  
The traditional or classical form of this theory asserts that the effectiveness of a legal 
threat is a function of the perceived certainty, severity and swiftness of 
punishment...It is proposed that deterrence operates through two processes: specific 
and general deterrence...Traditionally, specific deterrence is conceptualised as the 
process by which an offender is deterred from reoffending through direct exposure to 
sanctions, whilst general deterrence concerns the deterring of the general community 
through the threat of sanctions ...While a full discussion of the empirical evidence 
relating to classical deterrence theory is beyond the scope of this paper, it is 
important to note that mixed results have been obtained from a variety of fields, 
including road safety. For example, research into the specific and general deterrent 
effects of road safety policies suggests that they are most effective when they 
increase the certainty and swiftness of punishment, but not necessarily the severity. 
(Watson, 2004, p. 2) 
The idea was that enforcement would work most effectively if there was a perceived 
certainty of being caught sooner rather than later. Maintaining such a belief required 
regular enforcement, a high-cost, high-profile chore. 
There are variations of the Three Es, generally in the form of Four Es, with the fourth E 
often standing for ‘Emergency Services’ (Roche, 2000),  ‘Encouragement’(Chen,2011), or 
other words starting with the letter E.    
The three Es paradigm still has a place as part of modern remedial road safety reasoning, 
although it is no longer accepted as an all-encompassing safety model. In Australia, road 
safety paradigms have evolved from the three Es to the use of the Haddon Matrix as a tool 
for research into road crash prevention; the current model is the Austroads Safe System 
approach, which is being implemented now. 
2.5.2 The Haddon Matrix 
During the 1970s William Haddon introduced a new paradigm to the quest for road crash 
injury prevention. The Haddon Matrix acknowledges that there are many dynamics other 
than the three Es contributing to crashes. Crashes are viewed as multi-faceted events, with 
generally more than one causal factor (Refer table 2.2 below, from Langford, 2006).  
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Figure 2.1 Road Fatalities in Australia 1950 – 2004 (Langford, 2006) 
Figure 2.1 and Table 2.2 are related in that the effectiveness of particular road safety 
countermeasures, which have been categorised and dated in the Haddon Matrix below, are 
suggested by Austroads to be reflected in the numeric reductions of road deaths in the 
column diagram above (Austroads, 2005, p. 2, 3). 
Table 2.2 Principal Road Safety Countermeasures in Australia, 1970 onwards, arranged in 
the Haddon Matrix  
 
Source: Langford, 2006 
As a tool in the quest for road safety, the Haddon Matrix considers the road user, the 
vehicle and environments (road and social) through the temporal sequence of pre-, during 
and post-crash. It helps categorise potential safety interventions by attempting to find 
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means of preventing the crash or mitigating its outcomes. Variations of the Haddon Matrix 
have been used as an injury epidemiological tool and   to analyse causes and prevention of 
aircraft crashes, terrorist attacks and pandemics. Haddon devised ten generic 
countermeasures, listed in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 Haddon’s countermeasures  
Countermeasure 
1 Prevent the creation of the hazard 
2 Reduce the amount of the hazard 
3 Prevent the release of hazards that already exists 
4 Modify the rate or spatial distribution of the hazard from its source 
5 Separate by time or space the hazard from that which can be protected 
6 Separate the hazard and what is to be protected by a material barrier 
7 Modify relevant basic qualities of the hazard 
8 Make what is to be protected more resistant to damage from the hazard 
9 Move rapidly to detect and evaluate the damage that has occurred and counter 
its continuation and extension 
10 Stabilise, repair and rehabilitate the damage or injured person 
Source: Queensland Health, 2007 
The Haddon Matrix is more inclusive than the Three Es model, and in addition to being a 
road crash injury epidemiological tool can be expanded into a three-dimensional decision 
criteria model for testing a specific road safety intervention, by applying filters like 
effectiveness, cost, feasibility or any other identified criteria (Runyan, 1998). It shares the 
base values of safe vehicles, a safe road environment and safe and compliant road users 
with Safe Systems. 
2.5.3 International moves towards Safe Systems 
One of the early national road safety systems was established in Chile. In 1993 the Chilean 
government created CONASET, the National Commission of Road Safety, an inter-
ministerial organisation to advise the president on the social and economic impact of road 
traffic accidents and to make recommendations to address the problem holistically. Alfredo 
Del Valle, an early Road Safety System visionary who conceived the Action Map used in 
Chile (see Table 2.4), considers Road Safety a social system, not a mechanical one. At a 
presentation at the 2010 Road Safety on Four Continents Conference in Abu Dhabi, del 
Valle noted that the initial cost of CONASET was $20 million and that estimated benefits 
had been $10 billion since the inception of the project (Del Valle, 2010). In his presentation 
Del Valle offered perspectives on impediments to road safety, that he had experienced 
during his career, and which have relevance to the current introduction of the Safe System 
in Australia.  Shown below is a copy of Del Valle’s 1983 ‘Action Map of the National Road 
Safety Management Map’, which presents a categorisation of system elements (Del Valle, 
2010).  
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Table 2.4 1993 National Road Safety System of Chile (Del Valle, 2010) 
1993 Action Map of the Chilean Road Safety Management System 
A Drivers, Training and Licensing  
A-1 Training of professional drivers 
A-2 Training of car drivers 
A-3 Drivers testing 
A-4 Training of driving instructors 
A-5 Licensing of instructors 
A-6 Licensing of practical examiners 
A-7 Driving schools supervision 
A-8 Permanent grading of drivers 
E Enforcement 
E-1 Drivers enforcement 
E-2 Technical conditions of vehicles 
E-3 Technical conditions of roads 
E-4 Inspection of transport services 
E-5 Pedestrian enforcement 
 
B Management of Vehicle Quality 
B-1 Technical specifications 
B-2 Safety equipment 
B-3 New vehicles certification 
B-4 Technical inspection 
B-5 Supervision of vehicle inspection 
shops 
B-6 Supervision of maintenance 
shops 
B-7 Mechanics Training 
F Judicial Action 
F-1 Prosecution of infractions 
F-2 Efficient infraction systems 
F-3 Law modification 
F-4 Accident investigation 
F-5 Civil responsibility of the state 
C Management of Roads and   
Public Space 
C1 Traffic management 
C2 Signs & markings 
C3 Safety audit 
C4 Black spots 
C5 Maintenance 
C6 Road safety elements 
C7 Rest areas for drivers and bus 
stops 
C8 Pedestrian facilities 
C9 Bicycle facilities 
C10 Land use planning 
G Accident Control and Insurance 
G1 Comprehensive rescue system 
G2 Comprehensive rehabilitation system 
G3 Insurance coverage 
D Management of Transport 
Services 
D1 Remuneration systems 
D2 Work conditions 
D3 Permanent grading of personnel 
D4 Dangerous loads and stowing 
D5 School children’s transport 
H Research and Information 
H1 Integrated information systems 
H2 Drivers and infractions register 
H3 Vehicles register 
H4 Accident register 
H5 Preventive indicators register 
H6 Register of instructors and examiners 
H7 Accidents studies 
H8 Users information 
(Not occupied) I Education and Communications 
I1 Curricula 
I2 Teachers training 
I3 Didactical materiel 
I4 Students protection 
I5 Campaigns 
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  At the turn of the millennium, Vision Zero in Sweden, Tomorrow’s Roads —Safer for 
Everyone in the UK, and Sustainable Safety in the Netherlands were well established 
(Koornstra et al., 2002). On the broader international stage a new sense of urgency 
regarding road safety was demonstrated with the 2004 United Nations Resolution 58/289, 
Improving global road safety, which commended:  
‘the initiative of the Government of France, the World Health Organization and the 
World Bank in launching the World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention in Paris 
on 7 April 2004, in observance of World Health Day, with the theme Road safety is no 
accident (United Nations General Assembly, 2004). 
This heralded the start of international action targeting road traffic injuries. In 2009 the 
World Bank Global Road Safety Facility issued an implementation report on the 2004 World 
Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention, formally introducing the Safe System concept 
(World Bank, 2009) and providing country guidelines for the conduct of road safety 
management capacity reviews and the specification of lead agency reforms, investment 
strategies and safe system projects (World Bank Global Road Safety Facility, 2009). The 
guidelines propose fast knowledge transfer to low- and middle-income countries by 
iteratively following these steps: 
 conducting a country capacity review  
 assessing the role of the lead agency 
 specifying an investment strategy 
 identifying projects to launch the strategy 
 preparing Safe System Projects 
 implementing Safe System Projects. 
Knowledge transfer, however, is not always easy. Social and religious concepts like caste, 
gender, karma, kismet or providence may render inoperable ideas that are valid in other 
places, while ideas that find no resistance may still be affected by institutional aberrations 
like nepotism, cronyism, corruption, class awareness or group-think. More subtle blockages 
include such matters as intra- and inter-departmental power struggles, and a legal 
environment that in some jurisdictions makes civil engineering professionals who work for 
public authorities untouchable. Many of these aspects need to be omitted from the official 
version of a country capacity checklist.  
King developed a model of the Road Safety Space of Contextual Factors (2005) to consider 
economic, institutional and sociocultural factors which have the potential to enhance road 
safety knowledge transfer processes as well as providing warnings of potential blockages 
before they can have an effect on knowledge transfer. He tested the efficacy of his model 
in two third world country settings: Thailand and Vietnam (Refer figure 2.2) 
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Figure 2.2 King’s model of the road safety space of contextual factors  
Later this model will be applied to themes which affected the road safety space at the time 
of introduction of the Road Safety Audit Policy, some of which are likely to persist as 
potential blockages to the introduction of the Safe System into the Queensland State 
departmental and political landscape.  
2.5.4 The Australian Safe System approach 
In November 2003 participants at an Austroads meeting decided to promote the Safe 
Systems approach, and 2005 saw the inauguration of the Austroads Safe System. This 
innovative system combined the three Es with the more inclusive concept of the Haddon 
Matrix, but centred on a new focus, human tolerance to physical force. (Also refer sections 
2.5.5 to 2.5.7) 
The 2009 ARRB Group Safe System Infrastructure National Roundtable report ARR 370 
although no longer labelled the Austroads Safe System provides a diagram very similar to 
the original 2005 model, with only slight visual differences but an identical framework. 
Road users are viewed as part of an interactive system which has to support and serve their 
physical frailty and safety needs, with safer vehicles, safer speeds, and a road environment 
that is more forgiving of human error and more suited to harm minimisation from impact 
forces (ARRB, 2009c). 
Safe Systems by definition are built around the system participants: that is, all stakeholders 
who contribute to the usage and characteristics of the system. A simple test to check if 
potential stakeholders are system participants is to consider in what ways system safety 
would be affected if they were excluded. Figure 2.3, shown below, provides a diagrammatic 
overview of the Safe System Model. 
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Figure 2.3 Safe System model (Source: Australian Transport Council, 2011) 
2.5.5 Current road safety strategies  
In Australia, national and state road safety strategies are documents designed by road 
safety specialists and underwritten by federal and state members of their relevant 
legislative assembly delineating the direction of road safety efforts during a set time span. 
The current federal document is the 2011–2020 National Road Safety Strategy and signed 
by the federal Minister for Transport and all his State and Territory colleagues. (Australian 
Transport Council, 2011) It is based on the international initiative: The Decade of Action for 
Road Safety 2011-2020, which was launched in March 2010 by the United Nations (World 
Health Organisation, 2010). 
The National Road Safety Strategy 2011–2020 is an exceptionally inclusive document in 
that more than 100 diverse stakeholder groups helped to moderate it and to contribute 
with perspectives on road safety. Central to the document is the Safe System philosophy, 
the all-encompassing stakeholder oriented approach to road safety. Each of the signatory 
jurisdictions developed an individual road safety strategy expressing solidarity with the 
federal approach. A November 2012 federal status report documented progress and 
delineated jurisdictional responsibilities and performance indicators for participants 
(Standing Council on Transport and Infrastructure, 2012). 
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2.5.6 TMR and the Safe System in Queensland 
Since July 2009 the newly amalgamated Department of Transport and Main Roads (TMR) 
has been the lead agency in the introduction of the Safe System in Queensland, it remains 
is the single most influential entity promoting and shaping the introduction of Safe System 
principle. Research of its website (http://www.tmr.qld.gov.au/) reveals that TMR combines 
(amongst other powers) the following authorities: 
 Vehicles 
o registration of motor vehicles 
o controlling admission to the system by setting vehicle standards 
o enforcement of vehicle standards  
o enforcement of mass limits 
o provision of legislative recommendations to the state government 
o internal training of staff 
 roads and roadsides (carried over from the former Department of Main Roads) 
o inspecting and maintaining the state-controlled road network 
o designing and constructing new roads  
o upgrading existing roads to safer standards 
o upgrading existing roads to accommodate rising traffic demands 
o auditing the existing road network and new construction projects 
o applying speed limits to part of the road network in accordance with 
current legislation and departmental processes 
 safe and compliant road users 
o controlling admission to the system by licensing new road users  
o interacting with educational institutions 
o conducting behavioural change campaigns 
o interacting with heavy transport industry by setting fatigue standards 
o interacting with Indigenous and other specific road user groups 
These authorities are supported by others, including the provision of staff training; but by 
the end of 2011 the author’s survey of Road Safety Auditors, as well as interaction with 
other staff indicated under-exposure of some departmental staff to Safe System principles. 
TMR as the State’s lead agency in its implementation now carries additional responsibility. 
Nonfeasance legislation (Refer chapter 6.4.3) protects TMR from liability exposure, but not 
from the need to be transparent and to be accountable as a corporation to its own staff as 
well as its road safety stakeholders. 
The new need to cooperate effectively with stakeholders from other departments and 
levels of government, and from community groups, requires a set of skills not needed when 
the department operated outside Safe System parameters (Refer Section 3.1.3). As well as 
grappling with such matters as methodology, there are organisational considerations, 
including what type of system the Queensland version of the Safe System should ideally 
become, whether an interactive decentralised model based on social facilitation amongst 
road safety professionals and other stakeholders is optimal, or if it would perhaps be better 
to develop a centralised model, cyclically evaluating and shaping a controlled system that is 
     
Chapter 2    Background and literature review  17 
facilitated socially or in some other way. It is unclear whether staff at TMR in areas relevant 
to road safety are aware of their own roles in this process or even of the corporation’s role. 
This thesis will investigate such essential issues and draw conclusions about the 
effectiveness of TMR; where problems lie in reconstructing the department and in working 
closely with interests that are not always congruent; and where and what improvements 
might be made. A Safe System relies on the willingness of professionals with different areas 
of expertise to cooperate beyond their individual spheres of authority. It may be that free 
and open interaction among stakeholders is hampered (knowingly or not) by politics and 
power struggles between participants (see Chapter 5.2 and 5.7.2). If this delays or 
compromises the introduction of Safe System, there is a need to discern what it will take to 
sidestep or overcome such problems in favour of a more holistic approach to road safety.  
2.5.7 Where to from here? 
There is some doubt as to how the new TMR might develop in relation to new road safety 
paradigms and associated operational improvements. Except for a reasonably well-
publicised launch, no widely visible advances in implementing the Safe System have been 
noted. This suggests that ideological and cultural shifts need to occur before sustainable 
progress can be made in areas of road safety. Chapter 5 will seek insight into the origins of 
the former Department of Main Roads and how it evolved, and review the results of 
different surveys, including two of departmental staff by this researcher, with view to 
establishing common themes relevant to the current state of road safety in Queensland. 
Safe System is about the lives and welfare of road users, and there is a need to ensure that 
its standards and related measures are implemented fully and quickly.  
2.6 2005 survey of road safety auditors by the author  
In October 2005, while working for DMR and within the framework of a CARRS-Q 
assignment, the author analysed the effectiveness of road safety auditors employed by the 
Department of Main Roads, as perceived by the auditors themselves. The survey 
investigated their attitudes and perceived needs; it was re-run as a part of a more 
comprehensive survey of auditors in 2010/11. (Refer Attachment 1: data from two road 
safety auditors surveys) 
The survey, titled Challenges and perceived needs: a survey of road safety auditors working 
for the Queensland Department of Main Roads’, requested feedback in three areas: 
background information, general survey questions and perceived needs (to achieve better 
and more effective work in the area of road safety). Although originally compiled as an 
assignment for a QUT course, it soon became apparent that the report needed to be 
treated as an internal departmental document. At the time there were many contentious 
issues surrounding the conduct of road safety audits (Refer attachment 1a). 
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2.6.1 The 2005 survey 
The survey, approved by the Director General, considered the depth of professional 
background experience and time spent in the department, exposure to road safety 
auditing, and the level of formal qualifications in the area of road safety. Another 
consideration was whether road safety auditors were financial decision makers (FDM): that 
is, whether they had the authority to implement some or all of their recommendations. It 
was decided to address separately auditors with and without financial delegation.  
The results vindicated this approach: there were differences between the two groups. 
Auditors who were able to arrange for implementation of at least some of their 
recommendations received a higher level of feedback and more encouragement to further 
their studies of road safety, and had a much higher satisfaction rating regarding their 
contribution to road safety. They were more at ease with their work and happier with the 
outcomes they achieved, and had a less stressful working life. Oddly, however, these FDMs 
were less willing to accept responsibility for the outcomes of their road safety audit work 
than were technical officers (TOs) without financial delegation. The majority of TOs 
accepted that they would feel responsible for not recognising a safety issue that 
subsequently caused a crash. 
2.6.2 General survey questions  
The questions were designed to gauge the level of support provided to road safety auditors 
at their place of work, to measure understanding of road safety principles by superiors, and 
to assess the level and type of feedback from management and how audit 
recommendations were acted on. Other questions related to job satisfaction and self-
worth. Two questions related to workplace stress, to provide a general indication of the 
auditors’ level of diligence and acceptance of personal responsibility. 
The 2005 Survey exposed an apparent lack of feedback to auditors regarding 
implementation of audit recommendations. TOs reported receiving a very low level of 
encouragement to further their studies in road safety, and even FDMs reported that they 
experienced lower than average encouragement to improve their knowledge in this area. 
Procedures to act on road safety audits were not in place in all districts. Despite these 
concerns, there did not seem to be much frustration or stress experienced by most of the 
auditors. 
2.6.3 Perceived needs  
This section of the questionnaire requested responses regarding peer networks, 
counselling facilities, a representative professional body, standardised departmental 
policies and procedures, and potential training for FDMs. 
There was a strong call for a peer network of departmental auditors, but only average 
support for the formation of a professional body. There were recommendations for 
standardised departmental policies and procedures for the implementation of audit 
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recommendations, and equally strong advice to train managers in the complexities of road 
safety. 
2.6.4 In retrospect 
The 2005 survey of road safety auditors provided an initial insight into road safety, road 
safety auditing, and the way it was pursued in a road engineering authority like the 
Department of Main Road. The survey raised questions as well as suggestions from auditors 
regarding possible improvements to audit implementation and management. 
2.7 Townsville City Safe Program  
Another aspect of stakeholder engagement, fundamental to informing the author’s ideas 
was revealed by insights gained while investigating the Townsville City Safe Program. 
A unique characteristic of the Townsville program was the apparently seamless 
cooperation of stakeholders and the positive effect on project participants and Townsville 
inhabitants in general. The program created a blueprint for similar programs in other 
Australian locations as a leading example of synergistic action that achieved extraordinary 
road safety outcomes using techniques that could be applied to many other similar 
projects. 
2.7.1 The Townsville program 
In 2006 the author investigated the Townsville City Safe Program, focusing on one element 
of the program, the Responsible Serving of Alcohol project. This was to discover how that 
initiative was positioned within other initiatives to reduce negative outcomes of alcohol 
usage, and how it might enhance road safety in Townsville. The investigation comprised an 
interview-based qualitative evaluation of the project by four stakeholders representing 
different interest groups. 
The Townsville City Safe Program was born from a City Council project involving as 
stakeholders the Royal Australian Army and Air Force, James Cook University, TAFE, the 
police, the Chamber of Commerce, Department of Tourism, Liquor Licensing Commission, 
Queensland Workplace Health and Safety Department, Queensland Health (Alcohol and 
Drug Services), and Queensland Transport, as well as the Salvation Army, the Queensland 
Hoteliers Association and Townsville taxi drivers. The program, formally launched in 
September 1995, addressed a wide range of social safety issues, including street crime, 
safety houses, and environmental aspects of citizen safety. One element of this was the 
Responsible Serving of Alcohol project, which was directed at road safety. An examination 
of this aspect of the larger project sheds light on how cooperation may be achieved in the 
face of conflicting points of view.  
Responsible serving of alcohol reduces the social cost of alcohol abuse and addresses a 
range of community issues by reducing public drunkenness. Concurrent campaigns based 
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on federal, state and community owned programs have common strategy overlaps with the 
potential for synergistic outcomes, symbolised in Figure 2.4. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Alcohol-related interest areas of three levels of government (author) 
Early City Safe projects were implemented before the formal introduction of state and 
federal alcohol strategies. Projects based on the responsible serving of alcohol which focus 
on drinking, driving and related issues have traditionally been co-addressed by local 
government and state road safety authorities.  
In the Townsville project, public stakeholder organisations made voluntary contributions in 
the areas of public relations and change facilitation. The effectiveness of their combined 
initiatives may be attributed to how the various stakeholders regarded their ownership of 
potentially complementary or politically competing programs. This became a contentious 
issue in the program. 
2.7.2 The interviews 
While analysing the Townsville project, the author attempted to obtain politically untainted 
information while providing biased stakeholders with an opportunity to voice their points 
of view. Interviewees were verbally informed and cautioned about the purpose of the 
interviews. At the time of interviews no additional departmental approvals were 
mandated. As there was a concern that it might be difficult to cut through the officially 
sanctioned image of the project, the interview was not limited to a set of predetermined 
questions; instead, open questions were used that might elicit complaints about, 
frustrations with, and previously unvoiced criticisms of the project. The interview 
methodology was basic: an empathic response to the different interests of the 
interviewees, combined with confirmation of substance by paraphrasing, and a mirroring of 
emotional content (Lifeline Telephone counselling guidelines, circa 1980).  
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Interviewees were representative of key personnel and stakeholders involved in the 
Townsville City Safe Project. The original intention was to contact a wide range of such 
people, but few of the originally planned contacts proved accessible at the time. All 
interviews were by phone. 
Local discord had been triggered by the issue of al fresco dining at restaurants on the 
Strand. There had been some earlier controversy regarding a combined agency raid on the 
Shamrock Hotel, accommodation catering primarily for backpackers. Later the Bullwinkle’s 
Nightclub suffered a similar fate. Letters posted in the Townsville Bulletin accused the 
mayor of insincerity and political opportunism. When a 3:00 am lockout was enforced for 
nightclubs in 2004, there was news of the formation of a licensee’s action group.  
Attempts to talk to owners or licensees of the Shamrock Hotel and Bullwinkle’s Nightclub 
for this survey were unsuccessful. Another six hotels in the Flinders Street area were 
contacted. Two licensees declared their preparedness to talk on the phone, but later 
relayed their apologies for having to attend meetings at the negotiated times of interview. 
The Mayor’s office was contacted, but he was too busy to respond; a message left on his 
home phone was unsuccessful in eliciting a response. 
After the interviews were conducted, an internet telephone search was conducted to 
locate the original 1996 project officer of the Townsville City Safe Project, but without 
success. A similar attempt was made to contact the original husband and wife in charge of 
the Salvation Army drug and handout services. Again, this was unsuccessful. An 
appointment set for a telephone conversation with the Gold Coast City Safe project officer, 
whose name had been mentioned by the current Townsville City Safe Officer as a peer 
network contact, was not met. 
However, interviews were successfully conducted with the program officer in charge of 
Townsville City Safe, the senior sergeant of the Townsville Police Station, the Senior 
Community Safety Officer from the Department of Communities, and the bistro manager of 
a Flinders Street hotel. Since the information is not publicly documented, the research is 
described in some detail below to demonstrate its contribution to the development of the 
research outlined in this thesis. 
2.7.2.1 Interview with the Townsville City Safe Officer 
The Townsville City Safe Officer expressed her concern about a general lack of funding for 
the program. When responsible serving of alcohol was mentioned, she replied that there 
was a lack of commitment and an adverse culture within the hotel lobby. 
When prompted regarding the difficulty of her job she said that networking amongst her 
peers and with officers from other government departments was helpful. On the positive 
side she mentioned that there was better enforcement now; but she also noted that any 
positive effort must be sustainable. Current enforcement was based on a multi-agency 
approach where police, fire and rescue services, licensing and Workplace Health and Safety 
authorities, cooperated to enforce positive outcomes. 
Chapter 2    Background and literature review 
22 
The officer provided contact details of other potential information providers; she also e-
mailed copies of local and international reference material. 
2.7.2.2 Interview with senior staff at Townsville Police Station 
There were obstacles to this interview. After making various phone calls it seemed 
impossible to reach a senior officer. Eventually, when after considerable difficulty contact 
was made, a senior police officer seemed happy to respond to questions. 
He had worked in Townsville for a number of years, and believed the responsible serving of 
alcohol should be compulsory. Although Townsville nightclubs signed a code of conduct it 
was not enforceable, and licensees experienced constant conflict between optimising 
profits and accepting responsibility for the outcomes of the way in which they served 
alcohol. He was enthusiastic about the 3 am lockout, claiming that street offences had 
been reduced by 50% since its inception and that other businesses and the community in 
general were happy with this outcome. 
He elaborated on the deterrent effect of the current Liquor Enforcement and Proactive 
Strategies (LEAPS) program, an initiative consisting of Health, Fire Services, Police and 
Liquor Licensing working together: whenever pedestrians or drivers were booked for 
drunkenness, they were asked where they bought their last drink. If a particular pattern 
emerged, the relevant establishment received undercover surveillance. Once the source of 
the problem was identified (which might be a particular staff member or something else), 
undercover police would reveal themselves to the licensee. In the case that there was no 
positive change, combined agencies action would be initiated. This initiative had seen 
tickets and fines of up to $10,000.  
The officer complained about being under-resourced, with only one part-time police officer 
and one full-time license officer working on LEAPS; he felt three fulltime officers from each 
department would have optimised the effect of the initiative. 
2.7.2.3 Interview with senior staff from the Department of Communities The Department 
of Communities is a Queensland State Government department. The officer spoken to was 
helping to manage a State Government evidence-based community safety initiative. His 
department’s interventions were based on the analysis of police, Health Department, and 
other quantitative data, and included qualitative data based on perception analysis of 
residents. When intervention was indicated, community-based safety strategies were 
initiated and tailored to actual as well as perceived needs, with stakeholders retaining 
ownership of the program and its outcomes.  
At the time of interview the Department of Communities was setting up programs in 
neighbouring Thuringowa and Charters Towers. Townsville City Council, because it was 
conducting its own City Safe project, did not want the help of his department. Although the 
Senior Community Safety Officer described himself as a network contact for the Townsville 
City Safe Project Officer, when prompted he admitted to some frustration, as there seemed 
to be a good chance to set up synergies but this was not happening. 
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2.7.2.4 Interview with the bistro manager of a Flinders Street hotel 
The bistro manager had no issues with the Townsville City Safe program. Since its inception 
there had been a lot less violence and fewer people waiting for taxis.  She felt that hotel 
staff were much better trained now, with TAFE helping with training, including responsible 
drink serving, gaming and servicing. Licensees subsidised block training of new employees, 
and the manager revealed that the Police and Licensing Commission said it was working. 
She felt that the Townsville City Safe was good for the community. She had heard only 
good feedback about the program. 
Prompted to provide comment on the 3am lockout, she expressed her understanding over 
nightclubs losing money and being upset about the lockout. 
Table 2.5 Interviews: identified issues 
Common issues identified 
 Townsville 
City Safe 
Officer 
Senior Staff, 
Townsville 
Police 
Senior Staff 
from 
Department 
of 
Communities  
Bistro 
Manager 
Lack of commitment and adverse 
culture of hotel lobby 
×    
Nightclub code of conduct used to be 
unenforceable 
× ×   
Cooperation helps stem crime and 
misconduct 
× × × × 
LEAPS initiative is effective × ×   
Positive community feedback × ×  × 
Multi-agency approach enhances 
LEAPS enforcement 
× ×  × 
Networking amongst peers helps 
morale and improves knowledge 
×  ×  
Less street crime now × ×  × 
Positive efforts must be sustainable × ×   
More funding and resourcing are 
needed 
× ×   
3 am lockout is a success × ×   
Nightclubs lose money from 3 am 
lockout 
 ×  × 
TAFE training of new employees has 
positive effects 
   × 
Licensees subsidise training of new 
staff 
   × 
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2.7.3 Summary of interview findings 
The original 1989 agreement of nightclub owners to abide by a code of conduct for the 
responsible serving of alcohol was not enforceable. This changed with the imposition of a 3 
am lockout and the LEAPS initiative. LEAPS provided enforcement as well as indirect 
learning which might have acted as deterrents to licensees, especially nightclub owners. 
Police and community feedback was positive regarding the lockout, although there was 
acknowledgement that nightclubs were losing money because of it. There had been a 
measurable reduction in street crime since the introduction of the measures. 
All interviewees agreed that a cooperative approach by all stakeholders helped reduce 
street crime and misconduct, although there was no obvious cooperation between City 
Council and the State Government Department of Communities. There also was no 
indication of federal funding to support its 2002 National Alcohol Strategy. The quantitative 
and qualitative tools of the Department of Communities’ evidence-based initiative would 
have benefited the Townsville program by optimising existing funding for those areas that 
offered the highest cost benefit, but this did not happen. There was a sense of lost 
opportunity because of what seemed to be ownership issues. 
Nick Nash, (1998) presented the following data listing, the key outcomes of the Townsville 
Responsible Serving of Alcohol project at a conference in Hobart: 
 The code of practice for the responsible service of alcohol was signed by all 
Townsville venues holding 5 am Extended Trading Permits in August 1995. Of 
Townsville’s licensed premises, 86.6% are signatories to the code. 
 Patron education, via television advertisements advising of refusal of service and 
refusal of entry, and via a pamphlet explaining the Liquor Licensing Act, was 
effective. 
 Reduction in alcohol-related offending led to a decrease of 24% in the incidence of 
minor assaults during the first six months of the project. 
 Between 1994 and 1996 physical assaults inside nightclubs decreased by 51.5%. 
 Police statistics indicate that minor assaults decreased by 72% in Flinders Street 
East (this figure represents the number of reports made by the public of assaults in 
Townsville’s Central Business District, which police then attended. Levels for arrest 
and conviction would be significantly lower). 
 High to medium rowdiness in males decreased by 25%. 
 High drunkenness of males reduced by 48%. 
 In 1994 51% of venues had no publicity concerning the laws relating to consumption 
of alcohol. In 1996 all venues had such notices. 
 Requests by security personnel to view ID increased by 300%. 
 Food, available in 14.3% of nightclubs in 1994, was available in 65.7% by 1996. 
 Additional taxis were available in 1996 compared to 1994.  
(Nash, 1998, p.6)  
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2.7.4 Lessons 
Key outcomes of Townsville City Safe, as presented by Nick Nash, proved it to be a 
trailblazing initiative; and much effort was put into it. More might have been achieved if a 
scientific approach using the quantitative and qualitative tools of the Department of 
Communities’ evidence-based initiative had been utilised. The need to invest in cost-
efficient sustainable strategies was made clear, as was the need for continuous evaluation 
to improve the project and to transfer the lessons learned in Townsville to the 
implementation processes of other, similar programs.  
Such programs require regular outcome evaluations and process improvements. Townsville 
City Safe’s achievement of win–win outcomes for diverse stakeholders from business and 
the community indicate that when diverse interests cooperate to achieve mutually agreed 
goals, it is often possible to find synergies: one example in this case was the cooperation 
amongst non-licensed premises and community interest groups. Police, the fire 
department, Workplace Health and Safety and other government departments united to 
apply public pressure (and enforcement actions) to nightclub operators to help reduce 
alcohol-related misconduct.  
As with this type of program effective stakeholder engagement is important; related risk 
assessments should consider the possibility of overt or covert resistance from stakeholders.  
2.7.5 The Townsville City Safe Program in today’s context 
When visiting the Townsville City Council website today, there is no mention of the original 
Townsville City Safe Program under that name. However, Council has developed and 
committed to its Community Safety Strategic Action Plan 2011 - 2014, which lists priority 
areas for actioning, and an implementation plan encouraging feedback and additional 
community input. (Townsville City Council, 2014) 
2.7.6 The next step 
The outcomes of the Townsville Responsible Serving of Alcohol Project indicate that 
synchronised action by likeminded stakeholders can achieve more than is possible through 
solitary efforts by the same number of stakeholders. Responsible Serving of Alcohol for 
some years now has been embedded in state laws, and there is no doubt that stakeholder 
engagement with the Townsville project showed the way for other initiatives, including 
many with elements related to road safety.  
For some time, formal action groups consisting of road safety stakeholders from diverse 
professional backgrounds have been operating in Queensland. One such is the North West 
Regional Road Safety Alliance, with which I had the privilege to be involved for four years, 
and where I experienced, and became personally involved in, synergistic road safety 
actions. 
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2.8 Summing up 
This chapter has provided an insight into the working experiences of the student and the 
influences which led to the origin of the PSC. It has provided a number of research 
objectives and questions, which need to be addressed within the framework of this thesis 
to check the functionality of the model, and has suggested factors and mechanisms, which 
may contribute to road design and road construction, and part of the dynamics of road 
safety in Queensland. 
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Chapter 3 Evolving a Synergistic Approach to Road Safety: 
Framework and Method 
 
 
Implementation of the Safe System is intended to usher in a new era of cooperative and 
participatory road safety action under the auspices of representatives of diverse 
stakeholder groups. Road-based specialists who currently dominate road safety reasoning 
will be introduced to equally valid ideas from different genres of road safety specialists, and 
any department laying claim to being the lead agency for the introduction of the Safe 
System will be expected to accept these other specialists as equals. Empowerment of the 
lead agency will not be grounded in leadership authority, but founded on its ability to work 
cooperatively on common projects, to find new and better methodologies proposed by 
previously overlooked groups, and to use them.  It was consideration of these needs, in the 
context of the author’s involvement in the projects described above, that led to the 
development of the Project Management, Stakeholder Engagement and Change Facilitation 
approach (PSC) described in this section. 
 
 
3.1 The PSC  
The PSC is a combination of three well tried and established disciplines. It is based on the 
belief that road safety interventions will gain synergistic benefits if the three crafts of 
project management, stakeholder engagement and change facilitation can be combined 
and implemented concurrently. It assumes that not including all three components may 
result in less than optimal outcomes, and neglecting of any one of them may lead to an 
increased level of on-going law enforcement.  
None of the components of the PSC is new; however, a series of searches conducted by the 
author and a transport librarian have not uncovered any precedent in which a model like 
this has been applied to optimise the outcomes of road safety interventions.  It therefore 
appears that the PSC in the format proposed here fills a methodological gap in the current 
implementation of road safety projects.  
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The Visualisation tool, Figure 3.1 below provides a view of the dimensions making up the 
proposed model: 
Project Management Elements have been categorised according to the Project 
Management Book of Knowledge (PMBOK) 
Stakeholders have been grouped in accordance with their corporate alignment 
And potential change facilitation providers are classified as coercive and non-
coercive and in accordance with their areas of expertise. 
A key-characteristic of the model is the cyclic improvement dimension, to allow for 
the building of a PSC knowledge base for like projects. 
 
 
 Project Management 
o Corporate fit 
o The nine elements of project management  
 
 Stakeholders 
 
o Government 
o Corporate 
o Service organisations, religious and cultural 
o Non-aligned stakeholders 
 
 Change facilitation providers 
o Coercive 
 Legislation and enforcement, religion, peer pressure 
 Other coercive change facilitation providers 
o Non-coercive 
 Cultural / social / education / media / change champions 
 Other non-coercive change facilitation providers 
 
 Adding a temporal cyclic dimension: Implement – Evaluate - Improve… 
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Figure 3.1 Visualisation tool: PSC 
3.1.1 Update to PMBOK Guide 2013 
 
January 2013 saw the publication of the new PMBOK Guide. In this 5th edition Stakeholder 
Management (and Engagement) have been included as a new, tenth element of project 
management. (Project Management Institute, 2013) The Guide provides an integrated 
framework of project management and stakeholder engagement, validating a more 
inclusive project management approach such as proposed in this thesis. PMBOK proposes 
to structure the project stakeholder management into:  
 Identification of stakeholders, 
 Planning of Stakeholder Management,  
 Management of Stakeholder engagement, and  
 Control of Stakeholder engagement.   
The addition of ‘attitudinal, behavioural and/or cultural change management’ as an 
element of PMI project management philosophy would further conceptually align PMI 
methodology with the PSC. 
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3.1.2 Making PSC work 
PSC borrows its components from three well established disciplines: project management, 
stakeholder engagement and change facilitation. The visualisation tool above shows the 
individual elements of these three disciplines as interfaces of a cubic matrix, to indicate that 
each individual element of each of the three disciplines needs to be considered on its own 
account, then in connection with each of the individual elements of its own discipline, as 
and also in connection with each of the elements of the other two disciplines. This might 
sound daunting, but the final number of elemental inter-relationships to be worked with 
will be fewer than those considered during the concept and design phases, and will vary 
from project to project. 
3.1.3 Project management 
Project management is practised within TMR as a well-established discipline. Proformas for 
Project design and project management are posted on the TMR ‘Onq’ webpages. There is 
the question of corporate fit, which needs to be established before a project enters its 
concept phase; and then nine areas of project management knowledge which need to be 
applied: time, cost, quality, scope, risk, procurement, communication, human resources 
and integration. (Transport and Main Roads, 2010 – 2014) 
Having established those management parameters, it is then a matter of analysing project 
and works management factors to guide the project from concept and business case 
through design and implementation to the finalisation phase, extracting any lessons for the 
next similar project. Under PSC, each of the project management considerations is applied 
and tested against each of the elements of stakeholder engagement and change 
facilitation: that is, a PSC project will be completely run under modern project management 
parameters, with stakeholder engagement and change facilitation integrated into the 
processes. There are obvious reasons for deploying specialists in stakeholder engagement 
and change facilitation, to act as component managers or advisors. Timelines and 
milestones need to be established in agreement with all stakeholders and change 
facilitators before formalising the project’s Gantt chart; so that the agreed project plan will 
reflect the project goals and aspirations of every participant.  
3.1.4 Stakeholder engagement 
From his departmental training and experience as Project Manager (Pre-construction) the 
author is aware of the traditional departmental viewpoint of treating stakeholders as 
project risks rather than accepting them as contributors to a project.  
However, when considering the resounding success of some community-based projects, it 
becomes obvious, that whatever is to be achieved in the area of road safety, it would be 
delinquent not to consider all stakeholders who are able to further as well as hinder the 
cause of a project. A project climate conducive to the potential emergence of synergies 
needs, according to Schoech’s (n.d.) definition of a synergy system and in accordance with 
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Del Valle’s (2010) preferences, a number of non-competitive, perhaps socially facilitated 
stakeholders, and to exclude contributions from adversarial stakeholders or any who might 
jeopardise the emergence of synergy by trying to impose corporate or personal preferences 
over the wishes of other contributors. This requires the stakeholder engagement manager 
to foster a collaborative project milieu to facilitate stakeholder engagement for the purpose 
of common learning and innovation, sometimes leading to fundamental corporate 
transformation (Sloan, 2009). Such an approach aligns with the distinction made in the 
Australian policy handbook (Althaus et al., 2007), in which bottom-up policies allowing a 
sharing of responsibility for their success are distinguished from top-down policies.  
A move towards stakeholder engagement does not remove the necessity for full risk 
management assessments, which need to be conducted under basic principles of project 
management within the PSC. These will help identify and assist supportive stakeholders 
who have recognised weaknesses in their capacity to support a project. It will also work 
towards identifying and minimising any impact from overtly (or even covertly) adversarial 
stakeholders. Another essential risk management consideration is the assessment of the 
operating milieu, which can negatively affect the emergence of synergies. 
Before considering the collaborative engagement of any group of stakeholders, their 
capacity to contribute under the terms of project management will need to be tested: does 
their culture and corporate fit align with project objectives? Will they be able to support 
the project for its duration? Have they the financial means to provide a contribution to the 
project; and if not, does the project budget allow for collaborative inclusion of that group? 
Can key performance indicators for stakeholders be determined and set? What can 
stakeholders be expected to contribute to the project; what not? Will their contribution 
expose them to any risk? What is the risk if they quit? What benefits can stakeholders bring 
to the project, and what does the project have to provide for them to contribute? How can 
stakeholders and their allies be engaged and managed? How can they be integrated into 
the project, and will they cooperate with other contributors? What is the fit between the 
stakeholders and the change facilitation providers, including methodologies: could their 
interaction escalate into contention? 
The stakeholder engagement practitioner handbook (Australian Government Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship, 2008) refers to the Australian and New Zealand Risk 
Management Standard (ASNZ 4360, 2004) when discussing stakeholder management from 
the perspective of risk management. The following five steps are taken from this standard: 
1. Establishing the context: understanding the situation clearly and without prejudice; 
asking what type of stakeholder engagement this is: for example, is it a high-level 
strategic project or a localised initiative? 
2. Identifying the risks: taking the time for the team to brainstorm the risks, thinking 
strategically and outside the square. 
3. Analysing the risks: determining the likelihood that this risk will occur and 
considering broader implications will ensue. 
4. Evaluating the risks: drawing all the information together in a written document and 
prioritising it. 
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5. Treating the risks: taking action before an issue has arisen and looking for methods 
to mitigate or dissipate its risks. 
These five steps should be undertaken in consultation and full communication with 
stakeholders, and the process should be monitored and reviewed. (ASNZ 4360:2004) 
These initial considerations need to be performed and recorded for every included 
stakeholder. Excluded stakeholders are entered in a risk-rated management register, with 
countermeasures determined and their anticipated risk reduction rating shown. It is 
recommended that this register be scrutinised by a human resources or communications 
specialist experienced in stakeholder engagement.  
Effective stakeholder engagement has the potential to achieve holistic and cost-efficient 
projects, sharing ownership and concerns amongst road users and road authority. 
 
3.1.5 Change facilitation 
Within the context of project management, change facilitation is generally understood as a 
change to the scope or any other of the project management elements. Within the context 
of the PSC change is to be understood as change of behaviours, attitudes or culture. 
A Google Scholar search provided 532 000 responses to behavioural change facilitation, 352 
000 answers to attitudinal change facilitation and 17 600 to cultural change facilitation. 
This is an area of great scope, in the case of road safety, projects can utilise types of 
facilitator who have been operating for millennia: the elders of ethnic, Indigenous, and 
religious groups. There is room for vicarious learning provided by traffic accident victims in 
person or through the media. There are other potential change facilitation providers too, 
whose usefulness will be determined by the particular challenge represented by the road 
safety intervention project under consideration. For example, there is no political 
impediment to the premier or any other politician writing to every church leader in the 
state, requesting that they and their congregation pray for road safety during holiday 
periods; nor is there any reason not to engage elders to help drive behavioural changes in 
Indigenous communities regarding the use of seatbelts, unlicensed driving, or sleeping on 
bitumen. These are practical approaches that may help change fatalistic or indifferent 
behaviours, attitudes or perceived cultural attitudes towards road safety and the use of 
cars.     
 
3.1.6 The Mount Isa Pedestrian Project: design and implementation 
The behavioural segment of the project was designed to be conducted in two stages: 
raising awareness of the problem amongst the Indigenous population of Mount Isa, and 
actualising Indigenous resources. For the first, elders of the various Indigenous groups were 
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asked their opinions about how the road environment of Camooweal Street between Isa 
Street and Twenty-Third Avenue could be improved, and how unsafe behaviours could be 
monitored and modified. It was hoped to identify a culturally acceptable solution, to help 
prevent similar future casualties. For the second stage, a public meeting of participating 
stakeholders, initiated and facilitated by the Indigenous consultant after the survey phase, 
provided an opportunity for Indigenous stakeholders to rate and to decide on culturally 
appropriate road safety measures, and on mechanisms for their implementation. 
A detailed project plan was drawn up and signed off by regional management. This was 
standard Main Roads procedure, to justify expenditure, prevent scope creep, maintain a 
record, and have an implementation plan. After being approved, the project plan was 
converted into a specification for consultancy services. The Consultant / Project Manager, 
who had helped with preparing the project plan, was chosen because of his local 
knowledge and his standing in the Mount Isa Indigenous community (Refer attachment 4). 
Elements considered important for the action were included in the project brief:  
Confidentiality  
No media involvement 
No leaking of survey information or personally identifiable data 
Selection of competent, Aboriginal staff 
Selection of survey respondents  
Elders only or persons who see themselves as elders 
The survey to include a representative cross-section of all tribes in Mount 
Isa 
Recording of potential friction between tribal groups (to guard against problems 
at the proposed stakeholder meeting) 
Time frame (85 working days) 
Cost management (schedule of rates contract with progress payments) 
Quality system—not applicable, except for mandatory compliance with specifications and 
other contract documents  
In scope 
Interview 60 stakeholders  
Arrange and facilitate a public meeting of Indigenous stakeholders  
Provide written report upon finalisation of project 
Out of scope— 
Liaison with or survey of non-Indigenous stakeholders 
Engagement of media 
Passing on of survey information to other but Indigenous stakeholders 
Risk management  
Reporting to project designer by e-mail: nature of risk and risk management 
measures taken 
Communications  
Internal—frequency and format of reporting 
External—N/A Project Designer only 
Human resources  
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Interviewers to be experienced in interviewing, of Aboriginal origin and culturally 
sensitive; their personal details to be provided by the consultant to the Project 
Designer 
Procurement  
The consultant is to provide all staff, materials and equipment to complete this 
project within the agreed time frame. (Part of original Specification, 2010) 
 
Desirable outcomes: 
This project has been funded by the Department of Transport and Main Roads to 
help prevent the occurrence of future pedestrian fatalities similar to the two which 
happened during the last five years on Camooweal Street...This project has the 
potential to address road safety in general in the Mount Isa Region. 
This project has the potential to unify Aboriginal interest groups by supporting a 
common goal. 
As such this project has the potential to set a benchmark for future combined 
Aboriginal action in other areas. 
The Department of Transport and Main Roads acknowledges and supports the 
cultural framework of traditional leadership and seeks to work together with 
Aboriginal elders on this goal of mutual concern. (Part of original specification and of 
questionnaire, 2010) 
The behavioural core project was conducted over a period of five months from September 
2010, with informal feedback extending into September 2011 (the time when the project 
designer left the region). The Indigenous consultant demonstrated his dedication to the 
cause of Aboriginal road safety by interviewing 132 respondents in their homes on an eye 
to eye basis, instead of the sixty specified in his contract. The public meeting was attended 
by more than forty elders, some with their partners, and co-facilitated by (some relatively 
young) elders of proven record and standing in the community. The elders’ meeting was 
made more attractive by the provision of an opulent lunch, suggested and organised by the 
consultant. The only invited guest who was non-Aboriginal was the project designer, who 
acknowledged the traditional land owners and their ancestors. (Refer attachment 4) 
3.1.7 PSC as a tool for encouraging synergies 
For synergies to emerge there must be more than one player. A lone busker may be able to 
make a living peddling his skills at street corners, and could in fact be a master musician; 
but synergies emerge on the stage of a symphony orchestra, where a number of master 
musicians forfeit individual dominance for the benefit of greater harmonies. In the PSC, the 
project designer is the composer, the project manager the conductor; stakeholders and 
change facilitators create the music. 
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It may be presumptive to assert that it is time to deconstruct departmental silos in favour 
of a more holistic, multi-disciplinary approach to road safety, but actions like the Townsville 
City Safe program (refer Chapter 2.5) have proven the benefit of concerted action, and 
there are already other multi-disciplinary road safety groups similar to the North West Road 
Safety Alliance operating throughout Queensland. These groups may be groomed to 
become inter-departmental regional core cells for the introduction of the Safe System. 
Some have already demonstrated synergistic action across diverse ranges of stakeholders, 
and have the potential to become drivers for more targeted synergistic action if actualised 
and empowered appropriately. The PSC provides a tool by which to shape a road safety 
project environment to help the emergence of such synergies. 
3.2 Justification of the case study approach 
Figure 3.1 presents the PSC as a three-dimensional visualisation tool, conceptually 
combining elements whose importance will be decided on a case by case basis including the 
skills of project management, stakeholder engagement and change facilitation, with a view 
to creating a project environment conducive to the emergence of synergies. Literature 
searches have established no evidence of an existing formal project implementation 
framework which combines these three competences to achieve a potentially ideal 
(synergistic) project outcome.  
However, there is a need to keep in mind what the PSC is not: it is not a new road safety 
paradigm. It is an implementation tool. 
Figure 3.2 provides an insight into the potential complexities of the case study approach 
taken in this thesis. The diagram aligns particularly well with the case study into the Road 
Safety Audit Policy, a multi-faceted approach exploring involved staff, processes and the 
operating milieu of the organisation, with each iteration providing new, confirmatory or 
contradictory insights. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Doing case study research: a linear but iterative process (Yin, 2009) 
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A case study can be described as instrumental where the use of the particular 
case study is to attempt to understand something else; the case study is a means to 
an end not an end in itself. The researcher might wish to focus on a case study as an 
instance of a wider phenomenon in order to obtain a better general understanding of 
it. Within this category it is possible to discriminate two further types...namely, 
exploratory and explanatory case studies. Exploratory case studies are described...as 
theory seeking and explanatory case studies as theory testing. (University of 
Strathclyde, 2013) 
 
Case Study 1. The study of in the Mount Isa Pedestrian Project is an instrumental and 
explanatory case study of the PSC (refer Figure 3.1).  
Case Study 2. The study of the RSAP can be described as an instrumental and exploratory 
case study. Exploring RSAP implementation methodology will provide an insight into the 
effectiveness of traditional ‘top’-down policy making and project implementation. The RSAP 
is reviewed through a number of different data sources and perspectives. Subsequently the 
PSC is applied as a gap analysis tool to expose those elements which would have benefited 
from the use of the PSC as an implementation tool. 
Due to the differences between the cases, the specific methodology adopted for each is 
different, and is therefore described in the relevant chapter instead of being presented as a 
generic methodology here. 
 
3.3 Summing up 
Chapter 3 has introduced the PSC as a road safety project implementation methodology, 
which given the right conditions can generate a project environment conducive to the 
emergence of synergies. Re-visiting chapter 2.2 and the definition of synergy as per 
Schoech (n.d.): 
‘For synergy to occur, subsystems must not maximize, but sacrifice optimization and 
cooperate for the good of the overall system, e.g., Teamwork.’  
This definition implies that for extraordinary (synergistic) outcomes the PSC requires a non-
hierarchical, non-competitive milieu with a number of contributors working as equals. It is 
recommended to utilise Kings RSS to categorise positive and negative characteristics of the 
project milieu; the results can be used to develop risks management strategies to eliminate 
or minimise potentially negative effects of the milieu. 
Chapter 3 has also explained how in this thesis the PSC, by the application of two case 
studies, will be tested for its functionality. 
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Chapter 4 Case Study 1: The Mount Isa Pedestrian Project 
The Mount Isa Pedestrian Project is the first road safety project, to which the PSC has been 
applied. The project was designed and conducted by drawing on the intellectual resources 
of stakeholders: 
 Members of the North West Road Safety Alliance (NWRSA), an association of road 
safety specialist from different disciplines.  
 Academics from Queensland University of Technology and the University of 
Queensland provided positive input.  
 Contact was made with the Transport Department of the Northern Territory, who 
had dealt with a similar problem in their jurisdiction by utilising high profile 
television advertising.   
 The most relevant contributions that made the PSC a suitable approach to the 
project, however, were provided by a number of Indigenous professionals, who 
included: 
o the manager of Myuma, an Aboriginal road construction company,  
o the regional Indigenous advisor of Main Roads,  
o an Indigenous member of the NWRSA, representing the Department of 
Safe Communities, 
o the Indigenous consultant and project manager, without whose advice and 
work the PSC would have failed its fit with the project at hand.  
The objectives of case study 1 are: 
 to establish the feasibility of the PSC approach in practice  
 to evaluate the usefulness of the PSC approach from the perspective of a road 
authority in terms of achieving stakeholder/community engagement and outcomes.  
The methods used are descriptive qualitative analysis of secondary sources (documents) 
and a report of the researcher’s observations and experiences as an active participant in 
this project. 
4.1 The North West Road Safety Alliance and Multi-disciplinary Road Safety Action 
In 2011 the North West Road Safety Alliance (NWRSA) had been operating for five years. It 
meets twice yearly and reports annually to its steering committee, consisting of 
representatives from shires, regional and district directors from TMR (Queensland 
Transport and Main Roads), executives from the Queensland Police Service, and 
representatives from other North Queensland road safety groups. 
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The NWRSA covers the geographic area from the Gulf in the north to Birdsville in the south, 
and from the Northern Territory border in the west to Hughenden in the east. It consists of 
representatives from Fire and Rescue Services, Mount Isa City Council, Mount Isa Safe 
Communities, Queensland Ambulance, Queensland Health, Queensland Police Service, 
TAFE staff, TMR (including former DMR), Workplace Health and Safety Queensland, and 
local industry group representatives by special invitation. All pursue the common goal of 
road safety, each from the viewpoint of their specific expertise. Remove any one of these 
members and the Alliance would be less effective and less meaningful. 
The two most formative changes to the group have been the integration of its funding 
body, the newly merged Department of Transport and Main Roads, and the introduction of 
Austroads Safe System. At this stage it is unknown what long-term effects new 
intradepartmental dynamics will have on the group, but indicators in 2010–2011 included 
reduced funding for the group, a more spartan meeting venue, and significantly reduced 
attendance at meetings. 
 
4.1.1 The professional interests of alliance members 
The NWRSA exists to provide a regional multi-disciplinary road safety forum, as a potential 
knowledge resource against which to test the completeness of scope of any proposed road 
safety project. As such the NWRSA is a vehicle for a new and more inclusive way to pursue 
road safety initiatives in the region. The table below, extracted from the annual report 
compiled for and presented to the (TMR) executive steering committee meeting in May 
2011, does not list an overview of synergistic road safety initiatives triggered by the group, 
but provides an overview of matters of concern and actions taken, which demonstrate the 
diversity of professional involvement by its members.
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Table 4.1 Concerns and actions of members of the North West Road Safety Alliance 
Stakeholder Representative Concerns Actions Other Stakeholders involved  
Local government Shire Engineer Pedestrian safety in recreational 
precinct of town 
Black Spot Project for traffic 
lights 
TMR; P&C Association; Local 
Member of State Parliament 
Mount Isa Safe 
Communities 
Coordinator Community safety with focus on 
Indigenous safety 
Awareness campaigns and 
behavioural interventions 
Partnering with various groups—
a James Cook University 
supported initiative 
Queensland Health Regional 
representative 
Child injury prevention; wearing of 
bike helmets; children’s car restraints 
in Indigenous communities 
Initiatives to raise awareness and 
intervention 
TMR; P&C committees; 
Indigenous elders and interest 
groups  
TAFE  Driving educator Indigenous driving skills; driver 
licensing, given low literacy skills 
Utilising TMR-developed 
licensing material designed to 
overcome disadvantages 
TMR; Indigenous elders and 
interest groups 
Queensland Police 
Service 
Sergeant in charge of 
traffic police 
Drink/drug driving; speeding; 
seatbelts; fatigue 
Liaison with community groups; 
education; enforcement 
NWRSA representatives; service 
organisations; schools 
WHS/DEIR Regional Workplace 
Health and Safety 
Inspector  
Workplace injuries; Dangerous 
events and Near misses 
Investigation; remediation; 
enforcement 
Police; Fire and Rescue Service; 
employer organisations; unions 
Queensland Fire 
and Rescue Service 
Area Commander 
QFRS Western 
Command 
Distance to crash site; lack of 
reliable communications; grey 
nomads / tourists 
Roads, Attitudes and Action 
Planning (RAAP) for Year 12 
students 
P&C committees 
 
Department of 
Transport and 
Main Roads 
Manager, Customer 
Service Centre; 
Regional Director; 
Regional Road 
Safety representative  
Management of Departmental Road 
Safety Issues; Provision of Forum to 
Road Safety Group 
Hosting two meetings per year; 
providing support and advice to 
other group members throughout 
the year as needed 
Interaction with all members of 
the group  
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4.1.2 Moving towards a more inclusive way of conducting road safety projects and road 
safety audits and crash investigations 
A group like the NWRSA is a contact forum for diverse stakeholders with different road 
safety concerns. There is no reason for a road authority not to regularly include project 
details of upcoming roadworks and completed road safety audits and crash investigations 
at meetings of such groups. Past outcomes of this type of cross disciplinary communication 
included: 
 Road signage for UHF repeater stations, 
 Improvement of outback telecommunications in specific geographic areas 
 Kilometre signage to next township, rest area and breakdown service 
 Widening of roads for emergency landing strips for Flying Doctor Service 
 Interventions regarding owners of stray cattle 
 Driver reviver stops 
 Indigenous road safety actions 
 Road information: variable message boards and brochures   
4.1.3 Reducing drink driving during public events in outback towns 
In 2008, Mount Isa Police together with local service clubs and Queensland Transport 
provided free breathalyser tests, hydration stations (free drinking water outlets) and road 
safety leaflets at the Mount Isa Rodeo. The campaign was successful in reducing incidents 
of drunk driving and public misbehaviour. It has been successfully replicated (with local 
variations) in other outback townships such as Birdsville, Cloncurry and Gregory Downs.  
4.1.4 Black Spot funding for local government  
In the past a Brisbane team of road safety staff of the former Department of Main Roads 
moderated local government applications for funding under the Federal Black Spot 
Program, with regional staff providing assistance to local authorities by checking their 
applications for correctness and optimum effectiveness. This is an ongoing road safety 
contact area for all three tiers of government. In the past the NWRSA has been used as an 
initial forum for state and local government employees to discuss the feasibility of Black 
Spot proposals, and to cooperatively sort and prepare applications to optimise the 
effectiveness of the funding submission. 
4.1.5 Driver reviver stops  
A program to man driver reviver spots by local service clubs was launched in the nineties to 
complement other antifatigue measures such as television and billboard advertising, audio-
tactile line marking, and the construction and signage of rest areas. This program still takes 
place in the North West region during school holidays, and some of the road houses in the 
region offer free coffee for drivers throughout the year.  
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4.2 Project to combat casualties from pedestrians sleeping on roads  
4.2.1 Project background 
Two pedestrian deaths occurred on Camooweal Street in Mount Isa in 2007, both in winter 
after dark, and of itinerant pedestrians of Aboriginal descent who went to sleep on the 
warm bitumen-surfaced carriageway of the state-controlled road parallel to the Leichhardt 
River bed where they normally camped.  
Following a Safer Roads Sooner (SRS) funding application, the North West regional office 
was granted $1 million in funding over two years for road-based interventions, including 
enhanced lighting, vegetation clearing on medians, and other pedestrian-focused 
measures, and the NWRSA was used as a forum to gain opinions and options as to how to 
address the behaviours that had led to the deaths. As the casualties were the result of 
behaviours related to Aboriginal culture, the suggestion was made to engage the 
Indigenous stakeholders, in the expectation that this might achieve a culturally-based road 
safety outcome, owned and driven by the Aboriginal tribes of the area. This idea was 
endorsed by the Traffic Engineering and Road Safety Branch, and approval to proceed was 
granted by Regional Management. The Queensland Department of Transport and Main 
Roads approved use of part of the Safer Roads Sooner funding to consult the elders of the 
Aboriginal communities. 
4.2.2 Project contribution by NWRSA 
The project consisted of two parts: the road environment-based segment and the 
behavioural action segment. The concept, development and implementation phases of the 
road segment followed proven and tightly specified departmental guidelines. As it 
proceeded, the author as project designer of the behavioural action segment became 
acutely aware that he knew nothing about Mount Isa’s support organisations for 
Indigenous people, nor of the causes leading to pedestrians sleeping on the bitumen. He 
was not familiar with local tribal mix and of education gradients within the Indigenous 
groups of Mount Isa; nor with tribal customs and culture, nor with intertribal dynamics. He 
decided to involve NWRSA members, and at their next meeting requested that an 
information-gathering item be placed on the agenda. This was conducted in two steps: a 
brainstorming session, followed by information collected by questionnaire. The exercise 
took approximately twenty minutes; it would have taken days of intensive research to 
gather an equivalent amount of relevant information. The quantity and quality of 
information gathered attested to the experience and diversity of the professionals who 
contributed the data (Tables 4.2 & 4.3). It also substantiated the contention that 
extraordinary efficiencies can be gained by the deployment of PSC principles. 
4.2.3 Other contributing stakeholders 
Further consultation took place with academic staff from UQ and QUT. Contact was made 
with the Northern Territory Road Safety Section of the Transport Department regarding 
their experiences with and countermeasures for Aboriginals sleeping on roads. There were 
conversations with the Aboriginal manager of Myuma, a successful Indigenous earthmoving 
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and road construction business, which trains and employs Aboriginals in the use of 
earthmoving equipment and road building. There were also discussions with the regional 
Aboriginal liaison officer, and contact was made with an Indigenous consultant with an 
interest in Aboriginal social issues operating in Mount Isa.  
It took several months and consultations with a number of specialists to arrive at a project 
plan. Although NWRSA members had been of extraordinary assistance in providing advice, 
it was eventually decided to exclude all except the Indigenous member from the 
behavioural project. This was because of paternalistic attitudes expressed by some of the 
NWRSA members; the project designer decided to prevent the image of another well-
meaning intervention. This step was also taken to actualise Indigenous elders in their 
traditional leadership role and encourage them to act as change facilitators. 
Table 4.2 Members’ opinions of issues  
The most important issues that need to be addressed  
Opinions of participants in the brainstorming session of the NWRSA 5.3.2009 
Improved control of people entering the centre—e.g. police must sign them in and centre must 
release when sober. Patrons not willing to accept this approach go to the watch-house 
Pass message on to Rotary community groups to ask if they are interested 
If possible, perhaps a designated area of the riverbed could be provided as a safe place to 
sleep, camp etc.—perhaps at the back of the Arthur Peterson Centre so that they are 
away from the road 
Night guards at the hospital to escort them back across the road to the Arthur Peterson Centre  
Pass message on to MICDA and church group 
Try and select a better place to house Arthur Peterson clients OR 
Roll call for clients at Arthur Peterson 
Patrol of volunteers for this area for x amount of hours  
Work with elders and tribal groups 
Identify hazards and eliminate, modify, or change environmental features, rather than rely on 
behaviour change or educational strategies (they are of limited value over time) 
Build the capacity of stakeholders to address the issue over time if working with elders and 
tribal groups 
Chop trees 
Increase lighting 
Provide benches to sleep on, on footpath 
Expand or implement temporary accommodation or a support facility for visiting Indigenous 
people  
Move the Arthur Peterson Centre to an area that would allow greater access to outdoor living 
Enable this facility to have greater access to washing and eating facilities  
Greater care and responsibility provided by employees at the facility  
The ready availability of alcohol throughout the day  
No fencing, so pedestrians can cross the road wherever they want 
Insufficient lighting 
Dark clothing of pedestrians 
Note: The Arthur Peterson Centre provides custody diversion, accommodation & meals, cell 
visiting & client support, and client liaison & referrals primarily for Aborigines 
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Table 4.3 Meeting of the North West Road Safety Alliance, March 5 2009 
North West Road Safety Working Group - Brainstorming Session 5.3.09: stakeholders 
Government stakeholders Corporate stakeholders Community stakeholders Change facilitation 
Queensland Police Service 
Queensland Transport 
Main Roads 
Queensland Health 
QAS 
Council 
Housing 
Local government 
State government 
Federal government 
Centrelink  
Department of Communities 
(DATSIP) 
Queensland Government Champions 
(DGs) for local Aboriginal 
Communities 
NT Agencies (Govt) 
Queensland Licensing Commission  
Department of Justice (magistrates)  
 
Hotels 
Local shops 
Xstrata 
Businesses along West St 
closest to the river (Brumbies, 
Step In Style etc.) that use the 
back car park 
Media 
Mining industry 
 
Riverbed Action Group 
ATSIL 
Yallambie 
Injlingi 
MICC 
Catholic Church Welfare Centre (Stanley 
St) 
St Vincent de Paul Centre (Camooweal 
St) 
Salvos Women’s Shelter 
Rotary 
Ambulance 
Department of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Policy  
ATODS  
QLD Health  
Health Homeless Outreach Team, 
through Queensland Health 
ICC 
Local licensing venue operators  
Local taxi company 
Aboriginal justice groups 
Indigenous Coordinating Council 
Churches (Salvos)  
Salvation Army 
St Vincent de Paul 
Church groups 
Father Micks Church (Soup Kitchen 
Father Mick 
Salvos 
Jehovah’s Witnesses 
Pentecostal Church in Flynn St 
Safe Community Group 
MICDA (Court House) 
Church Group (garden centre) 
Aboriginal elders  
Kalkadoon Tribal Council 
Jimaylya Topsy Harry 
Arthur Peterson Centre 
KASH (Kalkadoon Aboriginal Sobriety 
House) 
Indigenous Community Council 
Indigenous health workers 
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4.2.4 How the PSC informed the project approach 
Table 4.4 Project management and its role in the Mount Isa Pedestrian Project 
      Element Considerations Comments 
Pr
oj
ec
t M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Corporate Fit • Check with TMR 
• Design the project to suit 
stakeholders 
SRS panel approved project, 
Consultant helped tailor the project 
to stakeholder needs 
Time  • Gantt chart completed and agreed on 
after completed design 
• Allowances made for cultural delays 
•  
  
This took longer than anticipated, 
mainly due to cultural research 
e.g. sorry business 
 
Cost  • < 3.5 % of $1 mill project allowance Could be considered good value 
Quality • No specific quality plan; instead 
compliance with project brief 
As agreed and specified by Project 
Designer and Consultant / P-manager 
Scope  
 
• Survey (engage) 60 Indigenous 
stakeholders  on a person to person 
basis 
•  Engage Aboriginal elders to help find 
counter-measures 
Publicising pedestrian problem in a 
culturally sensitive fashion 
Resulting in the formation of an 
Indigenous road safety group 
Risk 
 
• Assessed as per departmental 
guidelines and national standards 
Utilising Onq intranet site and 
following AS/NZS 4360, 2004 
Procurement • Consultant to arrange for suitable staff 
(to be approved by designer) and all 
materials incidentals etc.  
Progress payments as needed 
Communication 
 
• Generally informal, exceptions reports 
in writing, completion report on 
conclusion of project 
No media involvement, 
confidentiality of survey data 
Human Resources • Only Aboriginal survey personnel to be 
employed 
To keep the project exclusively 
Aboriginal  
Integration • Project Designer and Consultant as 
Project Manager to attempt optimum 
integration  
That is all elements of project 
management, stakeholder 
engagement, and change facilitation 
 
This project varied from other projects, which the author in his role as Project Manager 
(Preconstruction) had designed and executed for the Department. Although project 
management elements were the same, they had to be applied in a less rigid way than was 
normally the case with Main Roads projects to allow engaged stakeholders (including the 
consultant / Project Manager) to identify with the project rather than being one of the 
Component Managers for a fee. 
The complexity of the project became clearer, when the three interfaces of the disciplines of 
Project Management, Stakeholder Engagement and Change Facilitation had to be integrated 
into the overall project plan (refer Figure 3.1). 
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Problems with the timeline (Gantt chart) were encountered when unexpected dimensions of 
Indigenous culture surfaced such as delays caused by ‘sorry business’ (deaths in any of the 
participating Aboriginal tribes)  
Table 4.5: Stakeholder engagement and its role in the Mount Isa Pedestrian Project 
      Element Considerations Comments 
St
ak
eh
ol
de
r 
E
ng
ag
em
en
t 
Federal Government • Considered irrelevant – Funding was 
provided by the Queensland Road Authority 
PSC has the potential to help shape 
federal initiatives: Alcohol and drugs, 
violence, jail suicides etc. 
State Governments  • Queensland TMR provided the funding for 
this project 
• The Northern Territory has similar 
problems and tried to solve it with 
television advertising 
Except for the funding application, the 
project did not gain much exposure 
within TMR or QLD Government nor 
outside QLD. 
Local Government • Local Government was represented at the 
NWRSA meeting and provided opinion 
: an exercise in gaining information, 
publicising the problem and engaging 
non-Aboriginal stakeholders 
Corporate 
Stakeholders 
• Consulted through NWRSA: 
o Police Service 
o Fire and Rescue Service 
o Workplace Health and Safety 
o Ambulance 
o Queensland Health 
o TAFE 
o Mount Isa Safe Communities 
o TMR 
NWRSA stakeholder engagement was 
facilitated by conducting a brainstorming 
session and allowing for suggestions as 
to the type of project to address the 
problem. 
The amount and quality of output was 
astounding and attests to the professional 
insight of those stakeholders. (Refer 
tables 4.2 and 4.3) 
Service organisations 
 
• Service organisations were represented as 
professional members of varying disciplines 
at the NWRSA. 
In their dual capacity many of those 
NWRSA members were able to claim 
participation in numerous previous 
synergistic road safety actions. 
Religious 
organisations 
 
• These were represented by some religiously 
aligned members of the NWRSA, as well as 
church followers within the Aboriginal 
communities 
There are also religious Aboriginal 
support organisations, which cater for the 
welfare of local residents as well as 
transient Aboriginals. 
Cultural 
Organisations 
• Each tribe has its own representative group 
of elders, to preserve history and culture; as 
well as an organisation to represent tribal 
land interests  
There are demarcation disputes between 
some tribes regarding the boundaries of 
traditional lands. These disputes needed 
consideration and risk management. 
Educational 
institutions 
 
• Refer table 4.3 for an overview of 
educationally oriented organisations 
The behavioural action within the 
framework of the Mount Isa Pedestrian 
Project was primarily based on 
Aboriginal people and their elders. 
Aligned Stakeholders • Qualified by being Aboriginal, including 
Aboriginal support organisations  
To keep the project exclusively 
Aboriginal  
Other Stakeholders • Mining companies in the North-West 
Region, Media organisations,   
An industry representative participated in 
the brainstorming session. No further 
input was sought.  
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There was only a little hesitation, when considering involving Indigenous stakeholders on an 
exclusive basis. At the time the high-profile federal Alcohol and Domestic Violence 
Intervention seemed to be failing. Aborigines did not want another well-meaning 
intervention; in fact the word ‘intervention’ evoked instant responses of opposition and 
aversion. There was no practical way to conduct a ‘top down behavioural intervention’ that 
would stop the kinds of pedestrian fatalities we were facing from recurring. In addition, such 
campaign could have achieved little in terms of supporting the dignity of a people torn by 
internal disputes, exposed to prejudice and suffering low self-esteem. The PSC was the 
logical way forward. 
Table 4.6 Change facilitation and its role in the Mount Isa Pedestrian Project 
      Element Considerations Comments 
C
ha
ng
e 
Fa
ci
lit
at
io
n 
Legislation • Existing legislation was unable to 
prevent road rules breaches leading to 
the two Aboriginal pedestrian fatalities.  
Empowerment and actualisation of 
affected stakeholder groups was 
considered a more effective option 
for remedial action. 
Enforcement • Enforcement action by non-Aboriginal 
action seemed futile, when considering 
concurrent outcomes of federal 
interventions targeting alcohol, drugs 
and violence in Aboriginal 
communities 
 
At the time even mentioning the 
word intervention triggered 
responses of  aversion by 
Aboriginals 
Religion • Considered generally effective if 
conducted by the church of aligned 
Aboriginals. 
Probably a good and cost-effective 
option for the small percentage of 
church-going Aborigines. 
Peer pressure • Attempting to grow behavioural change 
champions from within Aboriginal 
culture 
Outcome evidenced by the formation 
of Indigenous road safety group 
Other coercive • Engagement of Aboriginal elders might 
have resulted in some coerced 
outcomes 
This aspect is not quantifiable 
Change consultancy • Utilisation of a conventional change 
consultancy was considered 
inappropriate 
The Indigenous consultant delivered 
services and outcomes transcending 
the scope of the brief 
Cultural / social • This was the chosen venue for 
behavioural, attitudinal or cultural 
change 
No quantifiable outcomes, except the 
Aboriginal road safety group existed 
in late 2013; and by then had re-
focussed on other Indigenous matters 
of social importance.  
Education / media • Media excluded, Key information 
conveyed by stakeholder engagement 
through survey questions  
Vicarious experience was to be 
conveyed by relative of crash victim 
at elders meeting. Elders decided not 
to do this. 
Change champions • Aboriginal elders through road safety 
group, NWRSA members? 
Outcome in terms of lives or health 
saved is not quantifiable 
Other • Unknown  Unknown 
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Change facilitation by elders and Aboriginal champions was the preferred choice of the 
author and also the recommendation of the Aboriginal consultant; in retrospect, it is still 
considered the right choice. This approach was also endorsed by an email from the 
Aboriginal consultant (attachment 4). 
 
4.2.5 Outcomes of the project 
The project confirmed the feasibility of the PSC approach in practice by: 
 It proved that the PSC approach can achieve stakeholder and community 
engagement. 
 It raised awareness amongst the members of the NWRSA, Indigenous elders 
and survey respondents of the problem of Indigenous persons sleeping on 
the carriageway.  
 Its design included feedback advice from members of NWRSA giving the 
regional peak group of road safety professionals the opportunity to 
collectively engage with and learn of this road safety issue. 
 Knowledge of that issue was disseminated using a person to person 
engagement methodology (survey) with Indigenous elders, and the 132 
stakeholders who responded as survey participants.  
 The Indigenous consultant, as well as eight of the Aboriginal elders who 
attended the meeting, became founding members of a road safety group 
able to act as change facilitators in addressing the issue in a semi-traditional 
and culturally sensitive way.  
 Road environment-related changes were initiated, taking into account some 
of the survey-based recommendations. 
The author left his employment with TMR in 2011. Some actions of the Aboriginal road 
safety group were not completed: for instance, a formal finalisation/review meeting for the 
project was not held. 
In August 2013 the author contacted the Indigenous Project Manager about the Aboriginal 
road safety group. The emailed reply indicated that the group still existed, but their focus 
had changed to a number of other issues such as education, employment, and cultural 
heritage. (refer attachment 4) 
 
4.2.6 Additional considerations 
The exchange with the project manager of the Mount Isa Pedestrian Project brought back 
some concerns from the time when the project was being developed. The first expression of 
the purpose of the project was something like: ‘so that there will be no more pedestrian 
fatalities like those in 2009.’ A phrase like that included in the project brief and survey forms 
would have had corporate fit with the Department; but it soon became clear, that to hand 
over responsibility for fatalities to the elders, who might well find shouldering such 
responsibility a burden, would be unethical. Offering part ownership of the project instead 
provided the Department with the opportunity to publicise the problem (by survey) in a non-
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offensive  and culturally sensitive mode to the most affected population, while the 
subsequent elders meeting provided the community leaders with an opportunity to select 
and implement culturally appropriate solutions.  
This also left the Department to conduct its mission, which was to make the road 
environment more forgiving and to focus on harm minimisation. However, there are 
differences between actualising and empowering people. This is where a peer group, like the 
NWRSA could have provided continuing support, by inviting a delegate from among the 
elders to become a member of the group. It is proposed that any similar use of the PSC be 
based on an enabling rather than a delegating leadership style. Even notionally transferring 
corporate responsibility to a group of individuals of good will but unknown capability would 
be unconscionable.  
  
4.3 Summing up 
The Mount Isa Pedestrian Project fulfilled its originally stated objectives, expressed in the 
project specification (refer attachment 4): 
 This project has been funded by the Department of Transport and Main Roads to 
help prevent the occurrence of future pedestrian fatalities similar to the two 
which happened during the last five years on Camooweal Street 
This was achieved by raising awareness and engaging 132 stakeholders together 
with other householders present at the interviews. – As with many other road safety 
projects, the number of injuries prevented or mitigated, or lives saved are not 
known 
 This project has the potential to address road safety in general in the Mount Isa 
Region 
One hundred and thirty-two Aboriginal stakeholders were invited to provide their 
opinions regarding road environment and behavioural road safety. That alone 
enhanced road safety in the Mount Isa Area 
 This project has the potential to unify Aboriginal interest groups by supporting a 
common goal...  
This was evidenced by the formation of a road safety group of Aboriginal elders 
 As such this project has the potential to set a benchmark for future combined 
Aboriginal action in other areas 
This has been confirmed by the continuing existence of that road safety group – 
having changed its focus by now to address other issues. 
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 The Department of Transport and Main Roads acknowledges and supports the 
cultural framework of traditional leadership and seeks to work together with 
Aboriginal elders on this goal of mutual concern 
There is scope to extract learnings from this project and to apply and refine PSC 
methodology in similar settings in different geographic locations. The email 
exchange with the Aboriginal project manager attests to the long-term benefit of 
utilising the PSC in these types of settings (refer attachment 4) 
The project exceeded expectations in the wealth of information gained when engaging 
members of the NWRSA. It also helped raise awareness of an important issue with non-
Aboriginal stakeholders and support organisations. 
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This chapter, together with Chapters 6 and 7 are part of an instrumental and exploratory 
case study. Reviewing the RSAP through a number of different data sources and 
perspectives exposes both blockages and drivers for positive change at the time of RSAP 
implementation, and enables assessment of the ways in which PSC methodology, an 
intrinsically participatory project approach, can enhance RSAP implementation. In addition 
to identifying common themes recurring throughout RSAP analyses, the PSC is used as a 
gap analysis tool, to find those enactment elements, which would have benefitted from use 
of the PSC as an implementation instrument. 
This chapter builds on previous chapters to provide a deeper insight into the Queensland 
departmental background against which road design and road construction, and 
consequently road safety are conducted. Consequently there is a need to understand some 
subtleties of departmental dynamics, within which the Queensland Road Safety Audit Policy 
has to function. 
 
5.1 Methodology review 
The Road Safety Audit Policy prescribes a comprehensive audit methodology to guarantee 
safe design and construction standards as well as to maintain the existing state-controlled 
road network, the safety of which is moderated and maintained according to state-wide 
standards. In the early stages of this thesis it became clear that restricting reviews of the 
RSAP to the mechanics of the policy within the Department was insufficient to find causes 
for its less than ideal enactment. This chapter will examine how well the policy is 
implemented by utilising a number of different review perspectives, including a survey 
carried out specifically for this thesis, plus other available surveys, and departmental and 
non-departmental data sources. Common themes revealed through these reviews will 
inform the discussion in the following chapters. King’s RSS will provide the framework for 
road safety environmental themes in Chapter 7.4. 
Some of the common themes are based on facts, in that they describe situations that are or 
have been in existence at some time. Some are subjective perceptions by survey 
participants, and others refer to more or less isolated occurrences which happened 
somewhere at some time but are not quantifiable, or whose impact may not be assessable 
within the framework of this thesis.  
An attempt has been made to abstain from assigning moral values to recurring themes. The 
positivity or negativity of a theme is determined by its degree of supportiveness of the 
organisation, of road safety, and of their common evolution. 
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5.2 The history of Main Roads (and TMR) as it relates to road safety2  
The road safety audit approach in Queensland reflects the history of Main Roads as both a 
stand-alone organisation (QDMR) and as part of a combined organisation (TMR). This 
chapter begins by presenting a brief history of Main Roads with emphasis on the events 
which influenced the pursuit of road safety in the Department. 
Until the early 1800s pioneering in Queensland was restricted to settlements on the 
eastern seaboard, accessible by ship. Drays drawn by bullock or horse teams provided early 
inland transport. In 1863 the first railway line was built between Ipswich and Grandchester, 
a township approximately 76 km west of the Brisbane CBD in the Lockyer Valley. The first 
motor car arrived on the scene in 1900, and the RACQ was formed in 1906. There was 
competition for funding between road and rail, with the average Queenslander enjoying 
the independence of travelling by car and primary producers and traders preferring the 
flexibility and speed of motorised road haulage over rail transport.  
By the late forties the Queensland Main Roads Commission had established itself as a highly 
respected civil engineering organisation with technical expertise in areas of road and bridge 
construction, dry-docks and aerodromes. The Commission was constantly battling climatic 
challenges: the more densely populated coastal strip was exposed to heavy rains and 
cyclonic damage, and vast inland areas of productive black-soil plains became non-
traversable quagmires during seasonal flooding.  
In many ways, Main Roads in the 1950s was bedevilled with inefficiency and low 
morale, a consequence of the constant bleeding away of good staff to better jobs in 
the private sector. But there were compensations in a sense of community and 
companionship in a small, tight-knit organisation with its own culture and its own 
loyalties. With more effective leadership, Main Roads offered much to build on for 
the future. (Diamond, c 1990) 
In 1951 the Main Roads Commission became a state public service organisation: the 
Department of Main Roads. The fifties and sixties were an era of transportation studies and 
research, encouragement of higher qualifications amongst state public servants, and the 
introduction of in-service training. The sixties were also a time of decentralisation, and the 
establishment of divisions and districts started a demarcation struggle between head office, 
regions, and districts that is still ongoing, and whose implications have reached well into 
the present. During the seventies owning a car became an achievable target for many 
Australians rather than a privilege of the rich. Traffic on the state-controlled road network 
increased. The Main Roads Department continued to evolve. There was a drive for 
excellence in developing new manuals and processes. Cadets were taught how to dedicate 
                                                          
2 Some data in this section have been extracted from Diamond Main Roads Departments publication 
From bulldust to beef roads and beyond  (c 1990); other data are based on brochures and 
information pages available on the intradepartmental website. 
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their efforts to detail and precision. Throughout this time decentralisation continued and 
became increasingly ingrained into departmental culture. 
The eighties, and especially the nineties, saw core elements of project management 
addressed: scope control was regulated by introducing standard templates for bridge and 
road design concept documents. During the early nineties quality assurance became an 
issue, with quality auditors added to the support staff - a move not welcomed by all. There 
were coordinated efforts to deconstruct silo mentality within the department. Moves were 
made to enhance cooperation between different streams of professionals within Main 
Roads: an attitude relevant to today’s situation, with managerial attempts to align the two 
newly merged departments, the former Transport and Main Roads. 
From 1989 to 1995 the Main Roads Department and Queensland Transport were combined 
under Director General D. G. Stevenson. By time the two organisations were de-
amalgamated in 1995, there was consensus amongst a number of departmental staff that 
much of the corporate skill and knowledge of the Main Roads Department had been lost 
through retirement, voluntary early redundancy and redeployment, both public and 
private.  
During the late nineties intranet and internet technology revolutionised connectivity 
between districts and the central office, and access to publications and research data 
became easy and immediate. Personal computers became standard workplace equipment 
for Main Roads office employees. 
From 2000 onwards the Queensland population increased, as did traffic figures on state 
controlled roads. General road construction funding in the Southeast was directed towards 
large and medium scale projects, while dedicated road safety funding addressed relatively 
small-scale, benefit cost ratio (BCR)-based safety improvement schemes. On a state-wide 
moderated rationale, BCR-based funding criteria favoured the southeast because of its 
higher traffic figures. The higher population density in the southeast also gave it more 
powerful political representation. 
During these years grey nomads, pensioners towing caravans around the continent, 
became part of the traffic-scape. Tourism from overseas increased, and with it came 
visitors unaware of the particular challenges of travelling in Australia. The mining boom 
quickened. In some regions ore-hauling road trains of up to 160 tonnes added to the traffic 
mix of grey nomads, bicycle riders, commuters and other road users; nowhere in the 
history of road design had guidelines been developed to accommodate such a varied 
assortment. Combining design parameters for individual road users to derive a safe cross-
section resulted in unaffordable seal widths. Reducing speeds on sections of the road 
network became less a safety measure than a compromise between the economic 
demands of powerful lobby groups and the safety needs of vulnerable users like the young, 
the aged, the infirm and the perception-challenged. The decentralised management 
structure of Main Roads left each district to decide how to spend its funding, which was 
often done in response to local rather than state-wide needs. Providing safe roads and safe 
speeds became a logistical nightmare for planners and designers.  
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In 2001, when the High Court overturned the nonfeasance principle which protected 
Australian road authorities from liability for not conducting necessary work on the roads 
under their control, road safety auditing emerged as a way to reduce the road authorities 
exposure to liability (Kelledy, 2001). 
Yet for all of 2002 the Queensland Main Roads Department operated without nonfeasance 
protection. It is unknown which departmental achievements were influenced by that fact. 
In 2002 the current Queensland Professional Engineers Act was enacted, superseding the 
original 1929 act, enacting the compulsory registration of professional engineers in 
Queensland. From this time on, every project in Main Roads had to be reviewed and signed 
off by an engineer certified as a Registered Professional Engineer Queensland (RPEQ). 
Engineers who sought employment with the Queensland Main Roads Department, 
regardless of which country they completed their engineering degree in, had to obtain 
formal RPEQ certification, and until such time had to practise under the supervision of a 
certified engineer. (Bevan, 2010)   
In 2002 under Stephen Golding’s leadership as Director General, project management was 
successfully introduced as compulsory methodology for every Main Roads road project. 
This was a major achievement introduced in the year when the Main Roads Department 
had to operate without nonfeasance protection. 
This was a formative year for the Department in other ways too, with the Roads Alliance, an 
agreement of cooperation between the Local Government Association of Queensland and 
the Queensland Main Roads, being ratified. Through its regional road groups, which act as 
cooperative entities of Main Roads and Local Government staff, the Roads Alliance jointly 
manages 33,500 km of local roads of regional significance. It has set an international 
precedent for efficiency building between state and local government road authorities 
(QDMR, 2008b).   
In 2003 the Civil Liability Act 2003 was enacted in Queensland. Section 37 reinstated 
nonfeasance immunity, subject to an exception clause. The next year, 2004 saw a series of 
highly publicised fatal crashes in Queensland’s southeast; global consultants KPMG were 
commissioned to investigate intra-departmental communications and the effectiveness of 
accident reporting. One of their recommendations was to investigate Main Roads road 
safety audit methods across all district offices. Ernst and Young, a UK-based consultancy 
with global representation, was commissioned to carry this out, and uncovered 
inconsistencies in the conduct of road safety audits across all districts. This triggered work 
on the Road Safety Audit Policy, enacted on 7.July, 2006. From that date road safety 
promised to be more vigorously and consistently pursued across all districts and regions of 
the department (QDMR, 2006a). July also saw the establishment of the Road Design 
Training Centre, hosted by the Darling Downs Design Hub at the Toowoomba Office, and 
the first annual intake of ten cadets (TMR, 2013). The purpose of the training centre was to 
attract and retain suitable staff, accelerating progression by providing cadets with Main 
Roads-specific skills. In addition to the full complement of road design skills, their 
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curriculum included peripheral subjects like Native Title and Resumptions and Cultural 
Heritage Induction, along with environmental considerations (QDMR, 2010a). These 
subjects are still taught. Based on a 2010 email, an omission from the curriculum in 2010 
was the study of road safety and its principles. 
In 2008 head office staff employed in the implementation and monitoring regime of the 
RSAP suggested that the policy was outdated and needed review, and that key 
performance indicators were not achievable. Subsequently the RSAP was amended to 
exclude some key performance indicators and a departmental monitoring regime. 
On June 13 2009 the Auditor General delivered his audit findings regarding the 
effectiveness of the departments of Main Roads and Queensland Transport to Queensland 
State Parliament, identifying four key areas of concern: 
 The leadership at the state level for managing the transport network and urban 
congestion is not coordinated effectively and makes it more difficult for government 
agencies to drive a strategic response in an integrated and coordinated manner 
 Due to a systemic weakness in integrated planning across entities, there is no 
certainty that the agreed responses will achieve the optimal mix between the 
different elements of an urban transport network, such as land use, transport 
infrastructure, demand management and intermodal options 
 The continued use of out of date key transport documents and plans may result in 
decisions that are based on obsolete data and assumptions and not effectively 
address the current challenges 
 Inconsistencies in data collection and reporting might have significant impact on the 
entities’ ability to base their plans on accurate, complete and timely data, as well as 
to report on outcomes achieved. 
I consider that the merger of DoT and DMR into a single new department is an opportunity 
to enhance integration, embed genuine collaboration and leverage the synergies that exist 
in the roles of the former departments. (Auditor General Queensland, 2009, p. 2)  
A month later the Department of Main Roads and Queensland Transport were merged into 
a single department and—given the history of Main Roads and Queensland Transport—was 
faced with the exceptionally difficult challenge of becoming a homogenous entity.  
5.2.1 Reflecting on Main Roads history 
Main Roads deserves to be credited with impressive lists of engineering achievements.  It is 
understandable that the world view of some staff will be profoundly affected by triumphs 
of times past, and the logical question then arises: Why should something that has served 
us well in the past be deconstructed? 
The answer is evolution. A mono-focal engineering-only, authoritarian State Road 
Department needs to evolve to maintain fit with modern road safety paradigms which 
demand a more inclusive stakeholder-oriented mode of operating.  
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5.3 Resourcing road safety initiatives  
Road safety within the context of this section refers to the safety of the road environment. 
Road safety ranks differently with different stakeholders. In an ideal world road safety 
initiatives and dedicated road safety funding would be primary priorities; but (in the 
experience of the author) that does not always occur: there are competing interests and 
drivers, and limited funds; and other considerations may take priority over general 
principles of road safety. The risk of this happening can be mitigated by widening the 
discussion between regional road authorities and political or economic interest groups to 
all affected stakeholders. This would enable existing road safety groups like the NWRSA to 
provide a forum and empowerment to affected stakeholders, and assist in reducing the 
impact of complex relationships of vested interests upon regional road safety initiatives. 
The PSC driven by Safe System principles has the potential to help shape rules and promote 
fair outcomes in this new way of interaction. 
This section and the next (5.4) cover a range of areas before road safety audit is discussed, 
as it is important to provide a clear picture of the complex context in which road safety 
auditing operates.  
5.3.1 Political drivers 
Representatives of the three tiers of government are subjected to pressure, including that 
of political lobbying. Political support is often needed for the success of development 
applications, whether for a shopping complex, a suburban development, or a multi-million-
dollar mine proposal by a multinational corporation. Many such projects have impacts on 
infrastructure that may not be evident at first: for instance, they may affect traffic density 
or traffic mix on nearby road networks. It cannot be expected that every political 
representative will be aware of such matters: new developments are exciting, and 
additional employment and extra business opportunities resonate agreeably in most 
electorates. Politicians as well as developers are likely to perceive project risk in terms of 
adverse publicity rather than related road risk. Once political commitment has been made, 
public servants must use whatever funding is available to remediate associated problems, 
including any increases in road risk arising from a politically supported development. 
In mining areas such as Queensland’s North Western Region, multi-national corporations 
insert their super-heavy road trains laden with ore and other mine products into an 
otherwise benign traffic mix. The roads they use bear no visual evidence that they 
contribute a commensurate share for the upkeep of the road networks they use—much 
less for upgrading them to a fair and safe standard for all users. In some geographic areas 
they are the largest employers, and their demand for road systems that they do not have to 
maintain is a price governments may be willing to pay for the income they provide.  
One road subjected to heavy mines haulage is the Barkly Highway between Cloncurry and 
Mount Isa, where numbers of mining companies in 2008 inserted 120 super-heavy road 
trains (that is, one road train every 12 minutes of the day) into the daily traffic mix of 1400 
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commuters, tourists and grey nomads (Transport and Main Roads, 2011). Several sections 
of this highway are quite narrow, and the presence of wide, long vehicles constitutes a risk 
to oncoming vehicles, particularly at curves.  
 
Figure 5.1 A triple road train and tourist meeting on a culvert on the Barkly Highway 
(Cloncurry–Mount Isa) 
An additional consideration is wear in trailer linkages, which can increase rear trailer sway 
significantly above the listed limits. Numerous drivers travelling in western Queensland 
would have encountered road trains with rear trailer sway encroaching well into the 
opposing traffic lane. When questioned by the author, a road train driver asserted that did 
not matter while there was no opposing traffic; and road train drivers meeting on narrow 
sections of road would accelerate to straighten their rigs and limit rear trailer sway while 
passing.  
 
 
Figure 5.2 Vehicle Sway Limits for Multi-combination Vehicles (Source: Austroads, 2009) 
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The legal width of commercial vehicles is 2.5 m. The majority of heavy vehicles are 
built to the maximum width, but it does not include the additional 0.2 m width on 
each side of the vehicle generated by wing mirrors. 
ARRB Group Transport Research was commissioned to develop minimum estimated 
lane width requirements for various heavy vehicles. Data from this study is 
presented in … This figure does not include a clearance component. Typically, an 
additional 0.5 m is added to the given widths to determine the lane width.  
(Austroads, 2009 a, p. 279) 
 
Derived from the above table are current cross section width standards, which propose that 
two 3.5 metre-wide lanes in a fully sealed 9.0 metre-wide formation are adequate for 50 
metre long road trains with a gross mass of up to 160 tonnes, travelling at 90km/hour. 
There are no explicitly stated exceptions to traffic mix, and many existing state-controlled 
roads, classified as road train routes, especially in western regional centres, are unsealed or 
have cross-sectional characteristics well below even 1920 design criteria. (Diamond, c 1990) 
Below is a copy of the text of two slides of a PowerPoint presentation presented by the 
author to various level TMR management staff, concerning the Barkly Highway between 
Cloncurry and Mount Isa, the most heavily trafficked road in the North West Region: 
Between 1.1.2004 and 31.12.2008 four fatalities of a total of six fatalities on the 
Barkly Highway occurred on sections of road of up to and including 8.0 m width. 
There are 18.4 km of Highway out of a total 120.6 km of Highway length, which fall 
into that category. The three narrowest sections of Highway are three sections of 7.4 
m wide road totalling 8.7 km in length. Each of these sections of Highway had a 
fatality between 1–2004 and 12–2008. There was an additional fatality on one of 
those 7.4 m wide sections in 2009. 
One of those three sections has now been improved. However, extrapolating 
past crash records, there is still a 40% chance that there will be another fatality on 
one of the two remaining 7.4 m wide sections within the current year. Funding to fix 
the width problem on the Barkly Highway is needed—sooner, rather than later. 
(Ernst, 2010) 
Estimates for widening were $11 million. The author’s requests to Region to secure funding 
for these works at that time were unsuccessful.  
When the author enquired about much less trafficked roads in the region which had 
improvement budgets much higher than the Barkly, it was stated that there were problems 
in securing federal funding for Barkly Highway upgrading works. However, millions of 
dollars from the federal Nation Building Program and other funding sources were available 
at that time to upgrade remote roads, which had less than 1/10th of the Barkly’s average 
annual daily traffic (AADT) figures. The author’s observation at the time was that the 
remote road works included upgrading road sections to a cross sectional standard superior 
to the existing sections identified on the Barkly Highway as needing improvement. Road 
safety considerations in this case were not prioritised, neither based on the need for 
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reactive response in the face of past fatalities, nor based on the level of risk exposure 
attributable to sub-standard highway widths, traffic density or traffic mix. 
Reasons for these trade-offs of lives and health of vulnerable road users are unknown. 
Management responses provided at the time seemed to indicate political pressure. 
Regional management is empowered to work within those local conditions. It can be 
argued that there is a need to change that process, and to install an independent umpire to 
assign weight and voice to affected stakeholder groups.  
 
Figure 5.3 A quad road train crash on the Barkly Highway (Cloncurry–Mount Isa) 
5.3.2 Economic drivers 
An example of economic drivers adversely affecting road safety occurred some years ago 
when new coal mines south of Emerald went into production; and upgrading works were 
conducted to the railway between Emerald and the coast. During this time, coal exceeding 
the railway’s freighting capacity was transported by road train to coastal ports via the 
Capricorn Highway, competing for road space with other road trains, commuters, grey 
nomads, and, in small townships, children, the aged and other frail or perception-
challenged road users. This trade-off between human safety, even life, and political and 
economic benefit, is a scenario that is likely to be acted out again against the background of 
potential mine expansion in North West Queensland3. When mining produce exceeds the 
capacity of the single-track railway line along the Flinders Highway multi-modal corridor, 
quad or triple road trains of up to 160 tonnes may travel through small outback townships 
along the Flinders. Once under way, a road train of this size develops the kinetic energy of 
                                                          
3 In 2011 only some of the small towns along the Flinders Highway had effective heavy vehicle 
detours or bypasses. 
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more than 100 family sedans. Having such vehicles use the highway will reduce an already 
critically low standard of road safety to dangerous levels. 
It has been the experience of the author, that such an example of a trade-off is traditionally 
arbitrated by regional management, local government road authority staff, and affected 
industry bodies. Again it can be argued that there is a need to change a process in which 
the lives and health of vulnerable road users may be seen to be subordinated to the needs 
of industry, and to install an independent umpire to give weight and voice to all affected 
stakeholder groups.  
 
Figure 5.4 Heavy road transport, North West mining region 
Ideally, government revenue from mining operations should be used to address the 
problems they cause; however, taxation systems do not necessarily work this way, and may 
fail to win the government a share of mining profits in any case. An example of this is the 
federal government’s 2010 introduction of the Resource Super Profits Tax, specifically 
designed to make multinational corporations with huge profits pay to maintain and 
improve infrastructure commensurate with their level of use. When this caused a backlash 
from the corporations a Minerals Resource Rent Tax was introduced at 30% of the level of 
the super profits tax. (The Australian, July 2, 2010). Income from this tax during its first two 
quarters was significantly lower than expected (Treasury Portal, 2013).  
5.3.3 Regional and local authority resourcing priorities 
At all levels of government, dedicated road safety funding is small compared with that for 
other capital works. Applying for funding dedicated to road safety is complex. As with other 
grants, applications are moderated against their projected benefits on a competitive basis. 
Given the complexity of the forms involved and the level of effort needed to request minor 
road safety funding—which may not be granted—some local authorities will neither meet 
 Chapter 5: Case Study 2: The Queensland Road Safety Audit Policy 61 
the expense of consultant fees nor take the risk of investing their own human resources for 
uncertain funding outcomes4. 
Another obstacle to the implementation of road safety projects is the prioritisation of 
projects by their dollar value. Quite often a complex but relatively cheap project with a high 
safety improvement value has to compete with multi-million-dollar capital works projects. 
Common practice is to prioritise resources for the financially more valuable project. This 
can be confirmed by consulting past regional annual works programs to assess respective 
human and other resource allocations. Completion of capital works projects within 
programmed time frames is the historically proven method to attract financial allocations 
during the next funding round.  
5.3.4 Conflicting road works priorities and road safety auditing 
There will never be enough funding to improve all roads in a network to an ideal condition, 
and sometimes small improvements are preferable to no improvement at all. Independent 
road safety auditing (described later in this chapter) can be a means of preventing issues 
unrelated to road safety from overriding road safety initiatives.  
5.3.5 Professional accountability 
A simple method to gauge professional accountability is the level of liability exposure faced 
by road building professionals and their employers. The legal system in Australia favours 
defendants with substantial financial resources: for instance, when pensioners, say, come 
into conflict with road building authorities, their financial situation may prevent their 
maintainable claims for professional malpractice from reaching a court hearing. An added 
legal advantage in favour of public road building authorities and their employees is the 
nonfeasance principle (Chapter 6.4.3,) which, under general circumstances, prevents 
authorities from being held responsible for omitted road safety works (Law Reform 
Commission of Western Australia, 2002). There is no effective deterrent for organisational 
or professional misconduct in the form of swift and inevitable punishment (Watson, 2004). 
Instead there is a general perception of untouchability, which has the potential to promote 
a culture of indifference towards road safety. 
In any case, liability exposure should not be the main motivator of responsible professional 
conduct. Even if a subject such as professional ethics were taught as part of every civil 
engineering course and a formal professional pledge were required on completion of an 
engineering course or upon entry into the country’s professional association (National 
Academy of Engineering Washington DC, 2013), this would be inadequate to direct the 
actions of corporations; and nor should responsibility be limited to individuals. There is a 
need to include both the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Haynes, 2012) 
and social advocacy (Florida Atlantic University, 2014) for the road user in the guidelines 
                                                          
4 This insight is based on the author’s experience while assisting local authorities on an annual basis 
to edit and submit Blackspot funding allocations 
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used by road building authorities. Such basic codes will help to ensure professional conduct 
in the areas of designing, constructing and maintaining safe road networks.  
 
5.3.6 The PSC as an means to help overcome road safety blockages caused by 
complexities intrinsic to the traditional ‘engineering-only’ approach 
Section 5.2 painted a picture of the Queensland Main Roads Department’s proud history of 
engineering achievements based on a proven approach of authoritarian discipline and 
engineering expertise. Section 5.3 introduced dynamics, with the potential to interfere with 
a road safety- first approach. It is argued here that the hierarchical engineering-only 
methodology is dated, and that it is time to hand co-ownership of road safety problems and 
their solutions to stakeholders. Such a new era of transparency will help overcome non-
safety priorities competing with effective road safety planning by the provision of a full 
forum of stakeholders within the framework of a group like the NWRSA. Such new 
approach could be made mandatory for the lead agency of the Safe System, and the PSC 
could be used to help shape the rules of engagement and target outcomes, which a 
hierarchical Road Authority is ill-equipped to achieve. 
5.4 The use of standards and guides to provide a safe road network  
Road safety audits are governed by guidelines, so it is worth reviewing how current 
manuals, standards and design guides have in one form or another helped to provide an 
evolving safe road standard. 
 There is aptness in the term evolving: the projected design life5 of a road construction 
project might be ten or twenty years, and during that time the relevant standard applied to 
its design is likely to be re-written, often more than once. As a consequence, a road built 
and upgraded over a number of years will be made up of sections constructed in 
accordance with different versions of the standard. This may cause a hazardous situation 
for road users who expect a consistent road environment. In other cases, new and 
unforeseen developments may increase road usage beyond its original design capacities. 
While there is an onus on road authorities to identify such locations, to apply appropriate 
warning signage or to retrofit, the need for upgrading, or for imposing access restrictions or 
speed reductions, may not be obvious enough to instigate remedial action. 
5.4.1 Standards and road design guides used in Queensland  
Current road design standards used in Queensland follow three patterns: those developed 
as national standards, such as Austroads Publications and Australian Standards; those 
developed as state standards by the Queensland Department of Main Roads (now 
                                                          
5 The number of years for which the works are intended to remain functionally adequate 
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Transport and Main Roads: TMR); and those developed for local authorities by the Institute 
of Public Works Engineering Australia (IPWEA). Austroads, the successor of the National 
Association of Australian State Road Authorities (NAASRA), became the single most 
comprehensive reference source of road design and construction references, as well as 
current research reports and the full range of road safety and road safety audit specific 
guidelines.  
Table 5.1 provides an indication of overlapping road design standards. It would be rational 
to reduce efforts to maintain and develop different standards that serve identical purposes. 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 Overlapping road design standards and road design references in use in 
Queensland 
Design topic Austroads TMR IPWEA ARRB Australian 
standards 
Urban road design × × ×   
Rural road design × ×    
Drainage * × ×    
Road signage  ×   × 
Pedestrians and cyclists × × ×  × 
Gravel roads    ×  
Railway crossings × ×   × 
Vulnerable road users × × ×  × 
Heavy transport × ×    
Bridges × ×    
Road safety auditing × ×  × × 
Road safety guides and 
related publications × × 
 ×  
* The Institution of Engineers published Australian Rainfall and Runoff in 1987 
5.4.2 Organisations which help set road design standards 
Organisations which contributed to these design guides include the Australian Road 
Research Board (ARRB), one of whose standards is the Unsealed Roads Manual—Guidelines 
to Good Practice, the only Australian design and maintenance guide to non-bitumen 
surfaced roads for decades (ARRB, 2009b). In 1987 the Institution of Engineers, Australia 
published its definitive guide to hydrological and hydraulic design, Australian Rainfall and 
Runoff. It was reprinted in 1998. There are currently 21 projects under way which, at a cost 
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of $2.0 million over a period of four years, will contribute to substantially revise this 
reference document (Engineers Australia, 2011) .  
The Institute of Public Works Engineering Australia (IPWEA) has supported the specialised 
local authority sector of road works with a range of publications, some of which are 
included in Table 5.1. Economic and political pressures exerted on their works departments 
are more direct than at other levels of government. Occasionally road safety-related 
conflicts are played out in the decisions to construct or not to construct urban bypass 
routes, in Local Authority conditions imposed on new developments, and in the level of 
tolerance they display in their support of large corporations. Local authorities are 
encouraged to become involved in state road network maintenance and permanent works 
projects, and this adds the need to be familiar with TMR guides, standards and 
specifications, and, considering the current drive in Queensland to accept nationally 
uniform road design guides and standards, the need to be conversant with Austroads 
Standards as well. 
5.4.3 Meeting the challenge to standardise road design references 
Despite the overlap of some standards, it is clear that no one single standard provides for 
the needs of all. For a national standard to become effective it must cater for the specific 
requirements of national, state and local authorities and, where justified, provide separate 
standards for specific needs. A more inclusive set of standards and guidelines can only be 
derived by engaging all affected stakeholder groups, and exploring their needs, in 
consultation with their respective professionals. 
5.4.4 Addressing drivers’ behaviour  
While the three-tier road (engineering) authorities are responsible for different aspects of 
road safety, some elements fall outside their purview. These include such disparate matters 
as the presence of roadside billboard and television advertising, educational and 
enforcement campaigns, and a variety of road safety interventions outside the realm of 
road planning and construction. 
Some of these are regional. For instance, the North West is one of the last pioneering 
regions in Queensland. The author can attest that the harsh climate ensures that only 
physically strong and enduring people are able to cope. The ethos of hard working, hard 
living, hard playing, and hard drinking is strong. A senior officer from Mount Isa Police 
stated at a road safety group meeting that the incidence of drunk driving in the North West 
is much higher than the Queensland average. Drunk (or drug) driving is often seen as a 
behavioural and cultural issue beyond the control of remedial interventions made to the 
road environment. 
However, there are elements of this behaviour that engineering can respond to: the more 
drunk or drugged drivers are, the more they are susceptible to inconsistencies in the road 
environment, and the easier it is for them to misread the road. This is somewhat the same 
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for fatigue-affected drivers: research has found that 16 hours of sleep deprivation has 
similar effects to a blood alcohol concentration of 0.05% (Fletcher, Lamond, & van den 
Heuvel, 2003). On average 18 hours of sleep deprivation has effects equivalent to a blood 
alcohol concentration of 0.1%, with increases in reaction time escalating with continuing 
lack of sleep (Fletcher, Lamond, & van den Heuvel, 2003).  
Enhancing the road environment to make it more readable and more forgiving will improve 
crash outcomes for most road users at risk, whether fatigued, drunk or drugged; whether 
inexperienced; whether perception-challenged for other reasons. Specific road-based 
measures can include the provision of rest areas and stopping areas, audio-tactile 
linemarking, retro-reflectorised pavement markers, rumble sections and rumble strips, 
signage including fatigue zone and rest area signs, billboard advertising and ‘silly’ signs 
which work (for a while) because they remain stamped in a road user’s memory. On 
approaches to intersections, railway crossings or other road hazards, rumble strips are 
often spaced at decreasing distance. The resultant audio-tactile stimulus falsely indicates an 
increase in speed; which acts as an additional sensory alert to the driver. 
 
Figure 5.5 Example of a ‘silly’ sign 
A particular example of road design that has reduced crashes by modifying driver behaviour 
is the channelised intersection work of Arndt (2003), which has led to a reduction in rear 
end crashes during turning manoeuvres. Less well known is that his design also reduces 
overtaking crashes caused when road users mistake the right-turn signal of a vehicle in 
front of them as an encouragement to overtake. The barrier lines on intersection 
approaches present the road user with a legal and highly visible discouragement from 
overtaking (Arndt, 2003). 
5.4.5 Road design standards and their limitations regarding road safety  
The evolving realm of road design and construction standards, as well as specific 
adaptations of road construction, indicate that it is possible to cater for the behavioural 
shortcomings of road users by manipulating the road environment. These examples of 
crossovers into different fields of road safety demonstrate that there is value in a more 
holistic and integrated approach to road safety. 
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Road safety is a multifaceted issue. To each road safety specialist with a different field of 
expertise, road safety takes a different focus. By involving, co-ordinating, and catering for 
diverse specialist skills of road safety professionals, road safety expenditure can be reduced 
at the same time as safety outcomes are enhanced for all road users.  
5.5 Road safety audits  
5.5.1 Origins of road safety auditing 
The road safety audit originated in the United Kingdom when road safety engineers, 
realising that some relatively new roads had safety issues, decided to feed back some of 
their checking of ‘as-constructed’ projects into the design of new works. From this 
developed the forerunner of modern road safety audit guidelines, Guidelines on Accident 
Investigation and Prevention, by the UK Chartered Institution of Highways and 
Transportation (cited in National Roads Authority, 2004). 
Since then, other important milestones in the development of Safety Audit have occurred: 
1980: some UK local authorities start doing safety audits; 
1980–90: safety engineering and safety checks are developed in Ireland; 
1990: results of safety engineering and safety checking as applied to National Roads 
are reported at the local authority Spring Show Conference; 
1990/94: Standard and Advice Notes is published in the UK; 
1990/96: Institution of Highways and Transportation (IHT) Guidelines is published in 
the UK. 
1990s: Denmark, Australia, and New Zealand introduce safety procedures; 
1996: Safety checking continues in Ireland and is mentioned in the Department of 
the Environment’s Road Safety Engineering Manual (1996), with recommendations 
on safety checking; 
1999: Dublin Corporation introduces formal safety audit procedures; 
2000: The Irish Standard is introduced as part of the National Roads Authority’s 
Design Manual for Roads and Bridges (NRA DMRB).                                                       
(National Roads Authority, 2004, p. 22) 
5.5.2 The Introduction of road safety auditing into Australia 
During the 1990s there had been early trials of road safety auditing in Australia. The 
urgency of adopting safety measures increased in 2001, when the High Court overturned 
the nonfeasance principle, which protected Australian road authorities from liability for not 
conducting necessary work to the road systems under their control (Kelledy, 2001). 
Authorities who had been able to plead that road safety issues were prioritised against 
other pressing matters, and often could not be addressed in a timely manner because of 
funding difficulties, were no longer immune from prosecution. With the High Court ruling, 
Australian road safety auditing evolved as a tool to reduce their liability. 
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One response, taken by several states, was to introduce legislation that effectively 
reinstated the nonfeasance principle. This occurred in Queensland when the Civil Liability 
Act 2003 was enacted. Section 37 of the Act reinstated nonfeasance immunity, but subject 
to an exception clause whereby immunity would not apply if at the time of the alleged 
failure the authority had actual knowledge of the particular risk which resulted in the harm 
(Auditor General of Queensland, 2003, p. 83). As of 1 September 2012, Section 37 was still 
in force in Queensland (Office of the Queensland Parliamentary Counsel, 2013). 
5.5.3 Positive and negative aspects of road safety auditing  
From their inception, state road authorities have been challenged to plan, design, construct 
and maintain roads within a predetermined budget, and to do so within the safety 
constraints of the extant manuals for road planning and design, road construction, and road 
maintenance. There has always been some level of care towards the motorist, but this is 
often weakened by the inadequacy of funding levels and the need to manage a road system 
larger than can be kept in a safe condition, considering the resources at hand. In any case, 
to manage road risk has often been considered part of the civil engineer’s task, not that of 
the road authorities.  
Other arguments offered by those struggling to find funds for many necessary projects 
were that there is an onus on road users to drive to the conditions prevailing on any road at 
any given time; and that if drivers come to harm through drunk or drugged driving, from 
fatigue or plain carelessness, then it is their fault. There was no benefit seen in applying an 
extra safety layer following audit criteria, which would use up scarce resources without 
adding value to the road network. These four points: cost, public responsibility, private 
responsibility, and effective deployment of funds, all need to be examined to understand 
various levels of acceptance of Road Safety Auditing, as well as to pave the way for the 
introduction of the Safe System. Chapter 6 will provide analyses of the Queensland Road 
Safety Audit Policy, measured against synergistic processes, and establish rationales for its 
less than perfect implementation. 
5.5.4 Road user safety versus funding levels 
When the three Es (Engineering, Enforcement, and Education) were the dominant road 
safety paradigm, it was believed that road users could be educated to drive safely in 
accordance with whatever skills the road environment demanded, and to comply with all 
rules and regulations. With the introduction of the Haddon Matrix, it became clear that 
there were sets of dynamics beyond the three Es that contributed to road safety, but 
despite this knowledge the planning culture for road projects was still driven by the need to 
prioritise capital works projects by funding allocation, rather than by their relative road risk. 
At an interdepartmental road safety meeting in 2011, with the Safe System high on the 
agenda, two TMR managers in decision-making positions extolled the three Es paradigm as 
if it were the quintessence of road safety wisdom. It is envisaged that current inclinations to 
trade off road user safety for economic and political expedience will diminish with the 
progressive implementation of the Safe System.  
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5.5.5 Managing road risk—a civil engineering job? 
In principle, it has been assumed that the management of risk related to the road itself is a 
matter for civil engineers. In Australia there are no consequences for failing managing road 
risk: when in 2001 the Australian High Court abolished the nonfeasance principle, states 
responded by re-introducing nonfeasance to various degrees. Consequently, civil engineers 
working for any national, state or local government road authority today, along with the 
authorities, are nearly untouchable (Ludlow, 2009).This has the potential to promote 
indifference to professionalism, personal conduct and organisational demeanour. 
Road safety auditing is a valuable approach which has served the engineering fraternity and 
road safety stakeholders well. Yet, as has already been mentioned, road safety is not 
related exclusively to the road environment. With a growing understanding of the dynamics 
of road safety as they relate to the road environment, the vehicle, the road user, and the 
operational environment within which road safety is to be exercised, there is a need to 
transcend the traditional engineering issues only approach to road safety and road safety 
auditing. 
5.5.6 Road users should drive to prevailing conditions 
As a way of limiting the attention paid to the needs and characteristics of road users, civil 
engineers have focused on the road itself, not always considering the effect of weather, 
light, or other conditions, and asserting that road users have an obligation to drive to the 
prevailing conditions. While this is generally true, legally as well as logically, it cannot act as 
an escape clause. The Road Network Safety Assessment (RNSA) of state-controlled roads 
identified road safety issues and inconsistencies on every road of the Queensland state-
controlled network, most unrelated to changes in seasonal or weather conditions. Certainly 
inconsistencies in the road environment are more dangerous to a perception-challenged 
road user, regardless of the reasons for this deficiency, but to lay blame on the driver 
instead of accepting some duty of care for the health and lives of drunken, drugged, or 
fatigued drivers is unprofessional and unacceptable.  
                                        
Figure 5.6 Examples of drive to prevailing conditions signs (TC Signs, TMR 2011) 
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The role of environmental factors in road crashes cannot be eliminated; and there is no 
known way to build a climate-proof road system. There is no way to build a totally forgiving 
road. Many Australian roads will remain gravel surfaced, with the safety focus on harm 
minimisation through low-cost, evidence-based road environment improvements and the 
imposition of safer speeds. Over time, vehicle safety standards continue to improve; these 
also contribute to safer travel on low safety standard roads, but cannot entirely eliminate 
risk. 
To some extent these considerations will continue to be reflected in the legislative 
environment. Targeted amendments to legislation can be expected to initiate cultural 
changes in road management authorities, as well as to change the attitudes and behaviours 
of road users. Both of these will positively affect road safety. 
5.5.7 Effectiveness of road safety auditing 
Austroads Report AP-R209, (2002) Evaluation of proposed actions emanating from road 
safety audits, demonstrates benefit/cost ratios of 3 to 242 from the implementation of 
recommendations from audits of individual design stages, and ratios of 2.4 to 84 for audits 
of existing roads. This assigns the highest benefit cost ratio to feasibility, preliminary design 
and design stage audits: the audits: those that reveal where safety issues can be corrected, 
before they are cast in concrete. 
Focusing on road safety issues, conducting road safety audits and escalating them for 
implementation is supported at all levels of government as a sensible engineering approach 
to remediate hazards in the road reserve. It is reasonable to expect that road safety issues 
uncovered during a road safety audit and discussed and prioritised for remediation, be 
addressed as soon as possible.  
5.6 The Queensland University of Technology 2006 report on the Workout Program  
In 2005 the Queensland Department of Main Roads initiated the Workout Program, an 
investigation into how Main Roads might change to enhance business outcomes. The 
program was structured to provide Main Roads staff with an opportunity to contribute to 
department-wide improvement (QDMR intranet, 2006c)6 ; The Workout change project was 
conducted in accordance with the ADKAR (Awareness, Desire, Knowledge, Ability and 
Reinforcement) model owned by Prosci.   Subsequently QUT was commissioned to provide 
a report on change readiness amongst Workout participants, to act as a benchmark for 
future research.  
Report data were derived from observations of integration team meetings and focus group 
sessions. The report was produced by Professor Kerry Brown, Dr Jennifer Waterhouse, Dr 
Lisa Bradley and Mr Robert Thompson, all from the School of Management of Queensland 
University of Technology.  
                                                          
6 A 2014 search reveals this report is no longer publicly available, however it should be accessible via 
TMR Library or the QUT authors mentioned above. 
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Although the report references the Workout Project in particular, it has relevance as an 
indicator of drivers of, and blockages to, positive change at that time. Of particular 
relevance to the implementation process of the RSAP were a highly positive 
acknowledgement of the diversity of people, their skills and knowledge, and a similarly 
positive satisfaction rating of participants who were contributors to the improvement 
process. Doubt was expressed regarding unity of purpose within the senior leadership 
group (SMG), and concerns were voiced regarding lack of visible leadership behaviour, 
differing expectations of leadership, and a continued hierarchical structure, in spite of 
workout processes. Communication in general and between teams, and to and from the 
organisation, were also matters of concern. Uneasiness was expressed regarding potentially 
insufficient and sub-optimal outcomes, as well as of outcomes pre-ordained by 
management, and a decisively disturbing finding was a high degree of anxiety about the 
organisational culture, which was perceived as a potential blockage to change. 
 
Themes included:   
 Appreciation of the diversity of people, skills and knowledge  
 Concern regarding unity of Senior Management Group  
 Lack of visible leadership behaviour  
 Differing expectations of leadership  
 Some concern regarding continued hierarchy   
 Balancing Workout and own job  
 Concern regarding potential lack of continuity/consistency of process  
 Communication  concerns:  
 Difficulties establishing a common language   
 Intra-team communication  
 Inter-team communication  
 Communication to and from the organisation  
 Satisfaction in being able to contribute  
 Concern regarding non-adoption of recommendations  
 Concern regarding outcomes pre-ordained by management   
 Positive sense of breaking down divisional silos  
 Concern  regarding culture as a blockage to change   
 (QDMR, 2006c) 
Findings of the report which have particular relevance when considering any type of change 
program include the following: 
Conflict is generally considered a beneficial dynamic for superior team performance…  
However…overt conflict in the SMG leads to a breakdown in change programs…  
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…scenarios that could occur in relation to the Network7 established 
If fully supported by SMG and own workplace: The Network could become a force for 
change on a day to day basis. 
If fully supported by SMG, but not supported in their workplaces: The Network may go 
underground as a force for change but may ultimately become change weary and 
lose enthusiasm. 
Unsupported: The Network may go underground and become totally disenchanted in 
which case they may become a blockage for change into the future. 
To borrow from the Varghese era of Main Roads there appears a need to ‘walk the 
talk.’        (QDMR, 2006c) 
The QUT Report of Workout Program was designed to provide a snapshot in time to rate 
‘change readiness amongst Workout participants to act as a benchmark for future research’ 
(QDMR, 2006c). That snapshot reveals some of the cultural background of the organisation 
at the time of posting the RSAP. Positive and negative traits exposed in the survey had the 
potential to affect the operational background for implementation of the Road Safety 
Policy; they must therefore be considered potentially influential factors for or against the 
implementation of the Safe System.  
5.7 The Culture Shaping Project and TMR’s 2010 Staff Survey  
After nominal integration of the Departments of Transport and Main Roads, the Board of 
Management of the newly formed department decided in November 2009 to initiate the 
Culture Shaping Project to more effectively align the two departments. The definition of 
culture within the framework of needed change was ‘the way we do things around here’, 
and included:  
 acceptable ways of thinking and behaving 
 the values, beliefs, behaviours and norms that newcomers need to understand in 
order to be accepted, and thus helping define who belongs and who doesn’t 
 things that worked well in the past and which inform the choices of today 
 things that help keep a group aligned and united especially during difficult times 
and significant change 
 a set of general basic assumptions about the nature of reality, the world and our 
place in it, which lie at the heart of an organisation’s culture. 
Each organisation has a set of these assumptions around which its identity and cultural 
patterns operate. (Transport and Main Roads, 2010a) 
Interviews, workshops, surveys and focus groups were conducted, in which specialists 
helped to sort desirable past, present and future cultural characteristics for the newly 
formed organisation. A six-step plan was implemented to start driving desirable change: the 
                                                          
7 ‘Network’ within the context of the report referred at a general corporate level to a group of 
persons working overtly or covertly towards a common purpose 
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assumption was that change would need to be driven over a number of years and reviewed 
at annual intervals to achieve alignment of the two entities.  
Within the context of this thesis the ‘Culture Shaping’ Project undertaken by TMR can be 
regarded as reasonably unbiased; if it uncovered cultural characteristics within the former 
Main Roads Department which needed to be reshaped, then those characteristics are likely 
to have been relevant to the implementation of the RSAP and, if continued, are likely to 
have an impact on the implementation of current and future initiatives. (Transport and 
Main Roads, 2010a & b)  
Figure 5.7 below provides the proposed implementation timeline for the Culture Shaping 
project. 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Culture Shaping Project (Transport and Main Roads, 2010a) 
5.7.1 About amalgamation 
At regional office levels responses to amalgamation were guarded. Voluntary redundancies, 
offered by the new leadership, were not supported by management of all regions. Former 
Main Roads activities continued to function largely independently of TMR. The previous 
amalgamation had lasted only from 1989 to 1995, and there was a perception amongst 
some staff that the current amalgamation might also be only a temporary measure, driven 
by political motivation, rather than practical advantages. The ‘Culture’ Shaping Project was 
initiated in November 2009, to align QDMR and QT cultures to improve alignment of the 
newly merged departments. It was managed by the Assistant Manager of Organisational 
Capability with support and guidance from Wheeler Strobel Consulting Group. The analyses 
of Main Roads and Queensland Transport heritage cultures are the most thorough ever 
conducted in the history of Queensland and highly relevant in the context of the Main 
Roads operating milieu. For that reason the summary of the Main Roads culture 
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assessment is provided verbatim as Attachment 6, and also as source material in reference 
to King’s RSS (refer Chapter7.4) 
5.7.2 Characteristics of Main Roads heritage culture 
Documents posted on the intranet list significant evidence of eight themes of relatively 
common, historical cultural patterns and their characteristics. They include: 
Theme 1: Changing locus of power: 
Theme 2: Socialisation to family and community: 
Theme 3: Management team culture: 
Theme 4: Staff engagement and decision rights: 
Theme 5: Pride and loyalty: 
Theme 6: Technical excellence: 
Theme 7: A can- do culture: 
Theme 8: Unity of purpose 
(TMR, 2010a. For a full listing of theme characteristics see attachment 6) 
All these themes and explanatory characteristics are expressed in relatively positive 
wording, leaving it unclear why there is a need for a shaping project in what appears to be 
an overwhelmingly positive culture. Some cultural characteristics assessed as needing 
change have been re-expressed in a non-offensive positive manner. The table below 
rephrases some positively expressed points of the DMR culture with their negative 
extremes. 
Table 5.2  DMR cultural patterns in survey summary rephrased in the negative 
Theme / 
dot point 
‘Significant evidence of historical 
cultural patterns’ phrased as per 
TMR document 
‘Significant evidence of historical 
cultural patterns’ phrased as its 
negative extreme 
1/1 Flexibility in interpreting and 
implementing policies because of 
local conditions 
Ad hoc decision-making, ignoring 
existing policies—regions and 
districts doing their own thing. 
1/3 Covert resistance to decisions 
coming out of Brisbane 
Passive aggression, sabotage 
2/5 A commitment to looking after 
family first and then the extended 
family in looking after each other  
Nepotism, cronyism 
6/7 Perspective that engineering is the 
real work of MR 
Groupthink, dismissive of and 
resistant to non-engineering concepts 
8/2 Change weariness Unwillingness or inability to accept 
change 
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This revised wording shows how apparently benign organisational characteristics may be 
perverted when taken to their extreme; it also demonstrates that negative characteristics 
may be cloaked in positive wording. 
TMR’s current culture project has been conducted with support and under the guidance of 
Wheeler Strobel Consulting Group, an Australian firm which, according to their website 
(2010), has been helping to lead change in Australia and overseas since 1983. (Although the 
company now appears to be deregistered - Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission, 2014 - and no longer has a dedicated webpage, a brief description can still be 
found at http://www.australianexporters.net/companyID7247.htm.) Their methodology 
proposes a leadership-driven change process with primary culture embedding mechanisms: 
what leaders pay attention to, measure, and control on a regular basis 
how leaders react to critical incidents and organisational crises 
how leaders allocate resources 
deliberate role modelling, teaching, and coaching 
how leaders allocate rewards and status 
how leaders recruit, select, promote and excommunicate (Transport and Main 
Roads, 2010b). 
This does not take account of the historical power struggle between head office and the 
districts and regions; nor does it consider covert inter-regional networks of like-minded 
managers who fiercely defend their turf. Instead, it is based on the assumption that leaders 
at Board of Management level have both a unified and common purpose, and aspirations 
regarding organisational culture that are similar to those held at regional and district levels. 
Based on Main Roads history, this is an unrealistic assumption. 
It would be a setback for road safety if the disbanding of DMR and QT and their realignment 
into a combined entity were to be unsuccessful for a second time because of poor 
understanding of the existing situation, and the consequent choice of less than optimal 
realignment tools.  
5.8 Summing up 
Chapter 5 has built on and expanded on previous chapters by providing additional detail 
underlying the functioning of the implementation processes of the Road Safety Audit Policy. 
The chapter has included a section on the history of the Main Roads Department, which has 
the potential to become an encumbrance to its ongoing evolution considering the changes 
required for the introduction of the Safe System with the NRSS regarded as its 
implementation vehicle.  
It is understandable that staff who have had their world view shaped by being part of a 
strong and historically significant organisation should question changes brought by road 
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safety auditing and Safe System implementation. There is scope for exploration if some of 
those staff have the desire or capacity to embrace the attitudinal changes necessary to 
continue functioning in an ever evolving road organisation. 
The chapter has provided examples of regional decisions, made by the Department, which 
arguably could have had different outcomes in a more transparent environment: for 
example, if made in cooperation with an empowered forum of stakeholders, guided by PSC 
methodology. 
Two Main Roads initiated projects, the 2005 Workout and the 2010 Culture Shaping Project 
have been discussed. Both those projects were conducted to introduce cultural change into 
the Department. Sections included here are related to staff surveys concerned with the 
cultural milieu, within which Main Roads operated. The cultural traits of QDMR will be re-
visited and assessed for their impact in Chapter 7.4.  
During the course of the next chapters it will become clear how some specific negative 
cultural stimuli, uncovered during scrutinising the RSAP, have the potential to adversely 
impact upon current initiatives including the introduction of the Safe System and 
implementation of the National Road Safety Strategy 2011-2014. (Australian Transport 
Council, 2011)  
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Chapter 6 Case Study 2: The Queensland Road Safety Audit Policy 
Outline of Results 
6.1 The Queensland Main Roads Departments Road Safety Audit Policy 2006 
A paper titled Safety analysis without the paralysis: the road safety audit program, 
authored by Owers and Wilson in 2001 for the Department of Civil and Architectural 
Engineering of the University of Wyoming, states as a conclusion:  
Two questions must be addressed in an analysis of whether the Road Safety Audit 
Program (RSAP) should be implemented by a transportation entity—whether the 
RSAP adds value to the entity and whether the RSAP is legally defensible. This study 
answers both of these questions in the positive. 
A deeper issue is whether the public policy of improving road safety for all road 
users outweighs the competing policy favouring the plaintiff’s redress of his or her 
harm. Approaching the issue from a utilitarian perspective, the public policy of 
improving road safety for all road users—favouring the many over the individual—
must reign supreme over the competing policy favouring the plaintiff’s redress of his 
or her harm that favours the individual over the many. 
It follows that a combination of the utility of the RSAP, the fact that it has solid legal 
grounds, and overwhelming public policy argument of improving road safety, 
creates solid support for using the RSAP. Therefore, the Road Safety Audit Program 
should be implemented by the transportation entity. There no longer is an excuse. 
(Owers and Wilson, 2001, p. 124) 
An aspect worthy of noting is that this insight was developed in the United States, a country 
with an adversarial legal system, which in many aspects is similar to Australia’s. 
6.1.1 A Queensland-centric case study 
This chapter is part of a Queensland-centric instrumental and exploratory case study. RSAP 
implementation is reviewed through a number of different data sources and perspectives 
to uncover and explore factors relevant to the PSC and its potential use within the 
Department in Queensland. In addition this case study applies the PSC as a gap analysis tool 
to expose those elements of RSAP enactment which would have benefited from the use of 
the PSC as an implementation tool.  
Three documents make up the Queensland Road Safety Audit Policy (RSAP): the Policy 
Development Brief, the Road Safety Audit Policy, and the Road Safety Audit Policy 
Supporting Guidelines. This chapter will provide an insight into these policy documents, 
present summaries of three related surveys, compare RSAP documents with the 
recommendations of the Australian Policy Handbook, and offer for discussion some mono-
focal reviews exploring additional perspectives. 
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6.1.2 The brief 
In the days of RSAP development it was mandatory to seek approval of the senior 
management group by providing a development brief for any policy with whole-of-
department implications. The policy development brief stepped through issues 
identification, stakeholder identification, options analysis, recommendations, consultation, 
responsibility for implementation and evaluation (review). The Australian policy handbook 
(Althaus et al., 2007) might have been the guide, but its use did not prevent gaps during the 
policy development phase, most of which will be dealt with in the section addressing 
evaluation of the RSAP. 
One of the more extraordinary statements in the RSAP Development Brief is the part that 
relates to stakeholder identification and reaction: 
Who are the stakeholders?—Main Roads regions, districts, TRUM Division, Roads 
Program Division. 
How will they be affected? 
How will they react? (Senior Management Group, 2006, p1) 
Neither road users, nor industry nor local Government are included as stakeholders: the 
RSAP Development Brief makes no reference to the interest of the beneficiaries of 
improved road safety. Nor is the public service mentioned, although here was an 
opportunity to state the pursuit of road safety as the charter of the Queensland 
Department of Main Roads. Both Safe System philosophy and the National Road Safety 
Strategy (Australian Transport Council, 2011) are based on more inclusive and participatory 
principles.  
It can be argued that there is a difference between stakeholders and beneficiaries; 
however, road safety paradigms have changed. Under Safe Systems philosophy compliant 
road users are no longer regarded as being merely the beneficiaries of the professional 
knowledge of road engineers, protected by traffic rules and the vigilance of enforcement 
agencies. Road users have graduated to become stakeholders, who as participants in the 
Safe System can claim their right to share system ownership by engaging and voicing their 
opinions regarding system processes.  Based on this new paradigm the National Road 
Safety Strategy 2011–2020 (Australian Transport Council, 2011) had its genesis in the 
cooperation of more than 100 different stakeholder groups. 
6.1.3 The Road Safety Audit Policy (QDMR, 2006a) 
The first part of the policy document, the Policy Statement, provides an overview of the 
audit processes covered by the policy: 
 existing roads 
 the Road Network Safety Assessment (RNSA), a video tape-based desktop review of 
all state-controlled roads, moderated and risk-rated on a state-wide scale 
 road and traffic project audits (including upgrade projects). 
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There is reference to the Road Safety Policy Supporting Guidelines, where roadworks 
projects are categorised into groups according to complexity and funding allocation, and all 
or a percentage of them are to be audited at the feasibility stage, the preliminary design 
stage, the design stage, the roadworks traffic scheme and the pre-opening/post 
construction stage. 
The policy document delegates the selection of projects at their respective audit stages to 
the districts, and gives responsibility for conducting the audits to the districts’ project 
managers. It also prescribes a departmental road safety audit tracking system, to be 
updated by the districts, and mentions key performance indicators to be extracted from the 
system for departmental reports at three-monthly intervals. 
6.1.4 About a preamble to the Road Safety Audit Policy document 
When the policy was published, it contained no preamble stating its overall objectives. This 
was an unfortunate oversight in a policy emphasising the welfare of road users as central to 
the environmental road safety efforts of the Department of Main Roads: such a statement 
would have made the purpose of the policy much clearer to those who use and administer 
it, and would have helped place focus on the cost and suffering that the Department was 
trying to prevent by installing the RSAP. A preamble has the potential to act as a pragmatic 
implementation incentive to some stakeholders, as well as presenting itself as moral high 
ground to less utilitarian stakeholders, and as such has the potential to act as logic-based 
soft policy implementation instrument.  
Despite having posted the RSAP for general use, Main Roads Management did not possess 
coercive leadership powers to support its implementation processes if needed; it seems 
that any other, even soft, implementation instruments would have been useful to help align 
districts and regions. Perhaps the next version of the policy will include such a preamble. 
The Safe System is making the frailty of the human body central to all other considerations. 
It is expected that the road user will receive commensurate mention in the next policy cycle 
of the RSAP—or its replacement.  
6.1.5 The Guidelines 
The document opens with an appeal for cooperation and liaison between all parties 
participating in the actions of the road safety audit program:  
‘As the road safety audit program comprises a number of necessary components, 
the responsibilities for carrying out the major actions of the program are detailed in 
Section C of these guidelines. Many of these actions involve more than one party. It 
is the responsibility of each person involved to cooperate and liaise with the other 
parties involved.’ (QDMR, 2006b) 
The Guidelines emphasise the importance of selecting projects for auditing on grounds of 
their risk level, and not of their funding level. Detail is provided on how to estimate the 
time required for different stage audits. Mention is made of the prioritisation of remedial 
treatments. The Australian Road Research Boards Road Safety Risk Manager software 
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(ARRB, 2009a) is recommended as a ‘transparent and objective way of assessing the 
likelihood of harm occurring and the severity of harm if it occurs, as well as the effectiveness 
of different solutions’ (QDMR, 2006b, p2). There are notes on administration, reference to 
the departmental tracking system, and chapters on road safety audit training and 
registration, and the selection of road safety audit teams. 
Section B of the guidelines provides a detailed road safety audit selection matrix for new 
road and traffic projects and roadwork traffic schemes, providing a concise guide to which 
projects to audit at any particular stage. It also provides guidelines for the on-site audit of 
issues identified during the RNSA desktop assessment of the state-controlled road network. 
Section C of the guidelines identifies the responsibilities of the parties participating in the 
audit process, in tabular format. Responsibilities for audit selection and implementation, 
and record keeping, are assigned to the districts, while the duty of monitoring of the 
effectiveness of the audit process is allocated to the Engineering and Technology Division. 
6.1.6 The proposed impact of the Road Safety Audit Policy 
The road safety audit regime, which is prescribed in the policy document and the 
referenced Road Safety Audit Policy Supporting Guidelines, is comprehensive. The 
governing documents are designed with attention to detail. No doubt is left to the reader of 
these documents that their implementation will create a new era of road safety awareness 
and enhance environmental road safety on the state-controlled road network. 
6.1.7 Removal of key performance requirements of the Policy  
On 3 June 2008, a memorandum was signed by a departmental manager in charge of 
implementation of the policy: 
It has come to light that some of the Key Performance Indicators in the Road Safety 
Audit Policy are impractical to monitor. As such we have reviewed the Policy and 
amended the Key Performance Indicators to reflect an achievable set of targets. The 
policy still requires these targets be met, but doesn’t suggest a monitoring regime. 
(QDMR, 2008a)   
The RSAP was amended in that same year with a clause watering down the original 
surveillance directive, originally scheduled for review in 2009.  
There were several reasons for this apparent change of direction. First was that the RSAP 
was written as a ‘top’-down policy: there was no shared ownership between the executives 
who wrote the RSAP and the districts and regions who were expected to comply with it. 
There were no policy instruments to enforce compliance, although a monitoring regime 
was embedded in the policy: by which all audits were to be lodged on a central 
departmental database, and from this three monthly status reports were to be generated 
for the General Manager (Engineering and Technology). The 2008 amendment removed 
that monitoring regime, calling it impractical. It is uncertain if this term was to indicate it 
was unworkable, not-viable or unrealisable:  
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 Unworkable?  perhaps because of lack of shared ownership between head office 
and regions. 
 Not viable? possibly because of lack of corporate fit as result of doubts 
regarding increased liability exposure. 
 Unrealisable?  maybe because of the absence of effective policy instruments to 
enforce RSAP implementation and to formally monitor the audit processes.   
Whichever was intended, if previous dynamics persisted within Queensland’s lead agency 
they were likely to have an inhibiting effect on the introduction of the Safe System and the 
implementation of the NRSS. 
6.1.8 Alternatives to a road safety audit policy 
Even in ‘the new world order of TMR’ it will be a formidable task to encourage Main Roads 
Districts and Regions to conform to policies coming out of Brisbane Head Office. It is 
possible that nothing short of the state parliament legislating for departmental conformity 
with road safety principles will manage this—perhaps by adding to an existing act or 
regulation some sort of disciplinary action for wilfully or by neglect exposing the travelling 
public to danger. An alternative legislative option would be for the Queensland 
Government to enact a Transport (Road Safety) or (Safe System) Act, similar to the existing 
Transport (Rail Safety) Act 2010, with formal departmental work procedures filling in 
details. A system which warrants review by Legal Branch is the regime used in Victoria to 
induce road authorities to earn nonfeasance immunity. (Ludlow, 2009) 
Any such legislative action would need careful scrutiny by Legal Advice Branch, with focus 
on corporate fit and the appropriateness or effectiveness of implementation instruments. 
Everyone who uses roads, or has relatives or friends who use roads, can be regarded a 
stakeholder in road safety, and it is necessary to recognise that reality and to adjust road 
safety practices and policies to cater for it. Deconstructing professional silos in the 
disciplines of road safety and utilising the diverse knowledge of all stakeholder groups will 
drive the road safety dollar further, and more effectively. 
6.2 The 2010/11 survey of road safety auditors by H. Ernst (Refer Attachment 2) 
By 2010, DMR had ceased to exist as an independent entity and the RSAP was no longer 
considered meaningful by a large number of departmental staff. The cultural alignment 
project had started, and there was talk of the Safe System.  
The 2005/06 survey (see Attachment 1) was regarded as a baseline against which to 
measure the responses of the 2010/11 survey. Apart from a re-run of the 2005 survey, the 
2010/11 survey included questions relating to the 2005/06 Ernst and Young survey of 
district and regional DMR centres. Participation, with 20 out of a pool of 62 auditors in 
2005/06 and 20 out of 50 in 2010/11, was similar.  
The average age of departmental road safety auditors was lower in the 2010/11 survey. 
They were now categorised as Road Safety Auditors or Senior Road Safety Auditors, with 
half of those surveyed having attained senior status. Only one of the survey participants 
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responded as having conducted studies in road safety past the audit course. FDMs and TOs 
were similar in that auditors who were able to arrange for implementation of at least some 
of their recommendations still received a higher level of feedback, more encouragement to 
further their studies in road safety, and higher satisfaction regarding their contribution to 
road safety. FDMs were still more at ease with their work, happier with the outcomes they 
achieved and enjoying less stressful working lives.  
6.2.1 General survey questions 
The survey results in this category did not change significantly from the preceding five 
years. Feedback indicated a slightly lower level of support for road safety auditors, with 
non-FDM auditors expressing an increased need to train managers in the complexity of 
road safety. In spite of a core group of middle management auditors in the head office 
providing overwhelmingly positive responses, the overall results did not indicate significant 
positive changes. 
The 2010/11 survey showed a renewed call for a peer network of road safety auditors. The 
need for such body was more pronounced amongst non-FDM auditors. 
6.2.2 Summary 
Comparing 2010/11 survey data with 2005 data showed that dynamics had changed. 
Embedded in the population of non-FDM and non-senior road safety auditors were a 
number who had recently joined the Brisbane office. Their satisfaction with the support 
they were receiving was very high compared with that of their regional and district based 
counterparts, whose satisfaction rating at best was patchy. 
A division of power in auditing and implementing audit recommendations was evidenced 
by auditors in some regions and districts who felt they did not receive feedback regarding 
their audit recommendations. Some stated that they did not receive any encouragement to 
continue their road safety studies. When asked about their acceptance of responsibility for 
overlooked road safety issues or inadequate representation of their findings, five of the 
twenty respondents ranked their personal responsibility for harm resulting from their 
potential mistakes at four or higher (five being the highest rating—the rating system was 
identical in both surveys. 
6.2.3 Additional criteria surveyed in 2010/11 (refer attachment 2) 
The 2010/11 survey requested feedback on a number of questions pertaining directly to the 
Road Safety Audit Policy of 2006. Some questions in this section of the survey also related 
indirectly to the 2005 Ernst and Young survey.  
Road safety auditors are the staff who implement the RSAP at district or regional level. It 
was therefore extraordinary to note a high level of ‘I do not know’ responses to questions 
referring to the Road Safety Audit Policy and associated documents. For example, two 
thirds of the respondents were unaware of the Road Network Safety Assessment (RNSA), 
the desktop audit of all state-controlled roads, which is moderated on a state-wide basis, 
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and more than one third did not know about the Road Safety Audit Policy Supporting 
Guidelines, which provide details on the implementation, management and administration 
of the road safety audit program as well as defining which new roadworks projects need to 
be audited, and providing details on RNSA processes. Those guidelines also provide a 
responsibility assignment matrix, distributing management of road safety audit actions to 
the various parties involved in the delivery of the state-wide road safety audit program. 
Close to one third of respondents did not know about the existence of the Departmental 
road safety audit tracking system. Only three used the department’s recommended Road 
Safety Risk Manager software to rank audit findings. Only three claimed that their district or 
region always conducted remedial works arising out of their road safety audits. Only four 
attested to their district or region closing out the audit cycle: audit, fix, and review; and 
only two claimed that this was always done. 
Not one question was answered without at least one auditor providing an ‘I do not know’ 
response the number varied from one to thirteen from a total of twenty survey 
participants.   
6.2.4 Review of the 2005 Ernst and Young survey  
The findings of this survey were very detailed, offering ratings for each Main Roads office’s 
conduct of crash investigations and road safety audits, with some recommendations for 
remedial action relating to road safety auditing, similar to the recommendations in my 
2005/06 survey. 
The 2010/11 auditor’s survey, conducted by the author for the purpose of this thesis, had 
as one of its objectives a reassessment of the findings of the 2005 Ernst and Young survey 
against audit practices five years later, and for that reason, it included some questions 
complementary to those asked in the other survey. Responses indicated the continued 
existence of inconsistencies in the treatment of road safety issues across district and 
regional offices. 
The 2005/06 Ernst and Young survey questions are presented in Attachment 3. It is a 
confidential intradepartmental document, and for that reason only the survey question 
segment is provided in this thesis. It is not clear if the complete document would be 
accessible under the Right to Information Act 2009 for a person not employed by TMR. 
6.3 RSAP and the Australian Policy Handbook  
The authoritative guide to formulating policy in Australia is the Australian Policy Handbook 
by Althaus, et al. (2007), written with particular reference to the federal political landscape, 
so that not all its considerations suit an intradepartmental policy. However, the checklists 
on pp. 223–227 provide a comprehensive list of policy cycle parameters suitable for 
checking each step of the policy model, represented in the Australian Policy Handbook. 
That model is shown in figure 6.1 below. 
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The Handbook proposes a cyclic policy model with distinctive steps, and detailed 
elaboration of each. Its cyclic nature includes an evaluation phase with the option to modify 
or terminate the policy. The model prescribes, amongst other considerations, three steps 
similar to the audit cycle model: identifying issues, implementation, and evaluation. Every 
evidence-based improvement concept, which ratifies further corrective iterations with data 
collected during the previous cycle, has to include these three steps. Another important 
step in the model is consultation – having a conversation with stakeholders. This would 
have to be included in any policy intervention, which is designed to initiate change. The 
model is shown in figure 6.1 below. 
 
Figure 6.1 The Australian policy cycle (Althaus, Bridgman & Davis, 2007) 
 
The RSAP does not conform to Australian Policy Handbook (Althaus et al., 2007) guidelines 
in several areas: 
1. The RSAP is an internal non-enforceable intradepartmental document.  
2. It provides the most effective liability reduction when the audit cycle for each issue 
is closed, or a problem has been rated for remedial works. An issue which has not 
been reviewed for implementation or closed out has the potential to increase the 
department’s liability exposure under section 37 clause 2 of the Civil Liability Act, in 
cases where a non-remediated risk materialises. 
3. The RSAP has an inadequate dedicated implementation budget. 
4. Some project management processes during the implementation phase of the RSAP 
would benefit from more detailed consideration. 
5. There is an apparent lack of consideration of the road user as the beneficiary of the 
RSAP. 
6. Staff involved in delivery of the RSAP have not been inducted into its intricacies.  
 Chapter 6: Case Study 2: The Queensland Road Safety Audit Policy Outline of Results 85 
7. Financial decision makers at district/regional level have not been advised about the 
possibility of departmental liability exposure increasing from only partial compliance 
with the RSAP. 
8. There are no defined policy instruments (apart from monitoring) to enforce 
implementation.  
It is expected that some of these issues will resurface when other checking parameters are 
applied to the RSAP. 
6.4 Additional perspectives  
A number of additional review perspectives of the RSAP have not been captured 
adequately by the surveys and reviews noted so far. Although covering only narrow aspects 
of the RSAP or RSAP related environment, these reviews are worthwhile in providing a 
more complete implementation overview. 
6.4.1 Key performance indicators 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 are a subjective assessment of the achievability of RSAP-imposed key 
performance indicators, based on the author’s work as a road safety auditor. 
Table 6.1 KPIs of Section 5 of the Road Safety Audit Policy (QDMR, 2006a) for audits of 
new projects (based on the author’s experience of establishing and managing 
the North West Regional Road Safety Audit Program) 
Key Performance Indicator Comment 
Audit selection of new project audits as per 
audit selection matrix of the RSAP 
Supporting Guidelines 
This has proven manageable in the North West 
Region as an annual regional audit program 
updated on a bi-monthly basis.   
For the three year period after opening, a 
crash reduction to 25% below the state 
average for midblock sections and 
intersections of that type of road 
This does not allow for different Average 
Annual Daily Traffic figures; nor does it make 
allowance for traffic mix. However, the 25% 
figure is provided as an initial target subject to 
review over time. 
Timing of audits so that recommendations 
can be implemented prior to the next stage of 
the project 
This makes sense, and once treated as project 
milestones / holdpoints generally proved to be 
no problem. 
Traffic scheme audits to be conducted within 
24 hours of a roadwork site being opened to 
traffic, and recommendations to be 
implemented within 48 hours. 
Audit a roadwork site early, so that road users 
are protected. Depending on the effectiveness 
of communications between area engineer and 
auditor this proved to be generally manageable 
in North West Region. 
80% of audit recommendations to be closed 
out—otherwise a review is triggered 
This acknowledges the cyclic principle of 
auditing, but often did not happen – due to 
prioritisation of other works over road safety 
issues. It was unclear, who had to trigger 
reviews, and what to do with those reviews, 
once they were conducted. 
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The audit report to be produced within four 
weeks of completion of the audit 
This proved to be a very reasonable allowance 
for completing the report. 
Audit findings and recommendations to be 
assessed within one month of the receipt of 
audit. Accepted audit recommendations to be 
tracked until remedial actions are 
implemented 
This looks a reasonable time frame, and 
occurred some of the time. Tracking of audit 
recommendations and their remedial actions 
was supposed to occur from the Departmental 
Database. There was no general awareness of 
any head office actions regarding unclosed 
audits until monitoring was aborted by head 
office in 2008. 
Reasons for rejecting audit recommendations 
to be documented in detail 
Proper documentation - essential and 
manageable, it was conducted in some 
instances. 
 
 
Table 6.2 Key performance indicators of section 5 of the Road Safety Audit Policy (QDMR, 
2006a) for on-site audits of road network safety assessment (RNSA) issues 
(based on the author’s experience of establishing and managing the North West 
Regional Road Safety Audit Program) 
Key Performance Indicator Comment 
Conduct the RNSA within two years A matter of resourcing - some Regions found 
it possible to do so. 
Conduct resulting on-site audits within the 
next year  
This was a matter of resourcing – and was 
not achievable in all regions. 
Rank findings using ARRB’s RSRM 
software tool 
Looked good: an impartial tool to provide 
state wide consistency; but the tool was 
largely unknown and used in very few 
regions.  
Implement audit recommendations Closure of the audit cycle; this happened in 
some instances.  
 
The key performance indicators presented in Section 5 of the RSAP seem reasonable and 
achievable, if slightly conservative. The crash reduction target references are the only 
exception; however, their inclusion and revision over time would lead to demonstrated, 
evidence-based benefits provided by road safety auditing. 
6.4.2 Findings regarding road safety audits on March 18 2011 
The intradepartmental database, used to track completed audits until they can be closed 
out, was accessed on March 18 2011, to obtain an indication of policy compliance. Below is 
a copy of a project summary extracted from that database. 
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Figure 6.2 All road safety audits—status 18.3.2011 (Transport and Main Roads, 2011) 
 
The graph implies that only 510 audits out of a total of 3591 conducted since 2006 on the 
state-controlled road network had been closed out. To close out an audit, its 
recommendations need to be negotiated and implemented; reasons for non-
implementation or alternative options to address an issue need to be documented. After 
implementation is complete, an on-the-ground implementation review forms the basis for 
closure of an audit issue.  
The graph also indicates that 2841 audits out of a total of 3591 conducted since 2006 on 
the state-controlled road network had not been closed out at March 18 2011: this means 
that under Section 37 clause 2 of the Civil Liability Act there are more than 2841 
departmentally documented road safety issues, for each one of which the Department 
could be liable if the risk results in harm to a road user. This recognises that most audits list 
more than one open road safety issue, and also that some of the audits listed as open may 
have been closed out but the information has not yet been entered into the database. 
 
6.4.3 Nonfeasance (for an interpretation by the Manager, Legal Practice and 
Administration, see Attachment 5) 
As noted earlier nonfeasance legislation protects Australian road authorities, except in the 
Northern Territory, from liability for not conducting repairs. (Ludlow, 2009, p.50) 
An alternative course of action has been taken in Victoria, which introduced a regime 
requiring authorities to establish effective policies, processes and systems to manage roads, 
in order to receive statutory protection from civil liability. (Ludlow, 2009, p.50) 
In its broadest context: 
 Nonfeasance In law, the omission of some act that is expected to have been 
performed 
Chapter 6: Case Study 2: The Queensland Road Safety Audit Policy Outline of Results 
88 
 Misfeasance In law, the abuse of lawful authority in order to achieve a desired 
result. 
 Malfeasance an act carried out by a public official that cannot be legally justified 
or that conflicts with the law. 
(Encarta Dictionary: English UK. 2013) 
 In the context of this thesis nonfeasance refers to a road authority not conducting repairs 
to the road system under its control. 
The nonfeasance rule stems from the early days of road construction in England, when local 
communities repaired roads to the best of their ability. There was no benefit in punishing 
whole communities if their repairs were not sufficient, so the nonfeasance rule was 
established: not to repair was acceptable.  
From the time of early settlement in Australia the nonfeasance rule was legally and 
culturally embedded into the rights of Australian road authorities (WA Government, 2002). 
The rule provides legal protection to state and local government road authorities from 
persons wishing to sue them for road crashes and their consequences, arising from 
neglecting to repair roads. 
On June 18 2001 a circular containing the following paragraph was sent to all senior 
management staff of the Queensland Department of Main Roads: 
Main Roads Senior Management should be aware of a very recent decision of the 
High Court which will have a major impact on the liability, in negligence, of road 
authorities in Australia. The name of the decision is Brodie v Singleton Shire Council; 
Ghantous v Hawkesbury City Council which was handed down by the High Court on 31 
May 2001. (QDMR, 2001) 
The Australian High Court decision was that having done nothing was no longer a defence 
for road building authorities when determining liability. With the precedent set, risk 
assessments and road safety audits became departmental means of reducing liability 
exposure. Provided that there was a paper trail, a needs assessment, a road safety audit, or 
any other formal strategy prioritising a particular risk within a range of risks, liability 
exposure was reduced. In every district of Main Roads, network assessments were 
conducted and issues catalogued. Road safety auditing became a needed tool to reduce the 
liability exposure of the department, and the groundwork was laid to prioritise road 
environment safety issues on a district-by-district, risk-rated basis. 
As at September 2013 the latest version of Section 37 of the act reads: 
Restriction on liability of public or other authorities with functions of road 
authorities 
(1) A public or other authority is not liable in any legal proceeding for any failure 
by the authority in relation to any function it has as a road authority— 
(a) to repair a road or to keep a road in repair; or 
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(b) to inspect a road for the purpose of deciding the need to repair the road 
or to keep the road in repair. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if at the time of the alleged failure the authority 
had actual knowledge of the particular risk the materialisation of which resulted 
in the harm. 
(3) In this section...road authority means the entity responsible for carrying out 
any road work. (Office of the Queensland Parliamentary Counsel, 2013) 
This seems to absolve road authorities from all legal liability from failing to repair or failing 
to inspect a road for repair. However, if an authority knows about hazards in the road 
reserve, and those hazards cause harm, it remains liable. 
The question is whether Section 37 of the Civil Liability Act provides a plausible argument 
against auditing. Audits cost money. Implementing audit recommendations will cost more 
money still. There is little doubt that audits signed by the auditor and the district or regional 
director, as well as by the manager of program delivery and the area engineer, and 
monitoring and management staff at head office, can be considered actual knowledge of 
the authority; and that unimplemented audit recommendations which have been shelved 
but remain on the departmental Road Safety Audit database have the potential to increase 
liability exposure by contributing evidence that the authority had actual knowledge of a 
particular risk which resulted in harm.  
On April 11 2011 the author was provided by the Legal Advice Branch of TMR with a more 
complete assessment of the legal landscape in which TMR staff have been operating since 
the reinstatement of the nonfeasance rule in Queensland. It indicated that there are a 
number of problems to overcome for successful prosecution of a negligence claim against 
the department, of which the most difficult to prove is that the department, and not just 
one or two of its employees, knew about the road safety issue resulting in the claim. In 
addition, an allegedly negligent engineer could be liable under various guidelines of 
professional bodies and under criminal law, which could be considered independently of 
assessing defensibility of a scenario under section 37 (The Manager Legal Practice and 
Administration, 2011) (see Attachment 5). 
6.4.4 Road safety audit policy and dedicated funding processes 
There are two formal road safety reviews in the former Department of Main Roads: the 
road safety audit and the crash investigation. The distinction is that a road safety audit is 
solely proactive; whereas a crash investigation is necessarily reactive; it defines reporting 
processes subsequent to a crash. This distinction is also reflected in the requirements when 
applying for road safety dedicated funding. 
One type of audit is not regulated through the RSAP: the thematic road safety audit. 
Thematic audits are conducted as a means to test specific road safety issues. Those can be 
issues of public concern published in newspapers or broadcast through electronic media, 
sometimes they escalate into the political arena. Thematic audits are also conducted to 
support proactive funding applications. 
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The table below provides a listing of road safety-related funding sources. A common 
feature of all the sources listed is that priority is given to reactive funding applications, 
which are granted in accordance with the numeric ranking of their benefit cost ratio (BCR)8 
or, as for element funding, in accordance with their net risk rating: that is, for reactive 
applications it is mandatory to provide detailed crash records including, if applicable, crash 
investigation reports together with a treatment proposal and benefit cost calculations. The 
higher the BCR, the more likely that the funding application will be approved. 
 
Table 6.3 Funding sources specifically dedicated to road safety projects 
Name Funding provider Current funding 
limit per project 
Funding conditions 
Black Spot Federal government, 
administered by state 
$ 2 million 25% proactive, 75% reactive; 
proactive projects require a 
thematic road safety audit 
Safer Roads 
Sooner 
State government, out 
of speeding and red 
light camera fines 
 
$ 2.5 million Proactive permitted, reactive 
preferred. Proactive projects 
require a thematic road safety 
audit. 
Transport 
Infrastructure 
Development 
Scheme 
(TIDS)  
50% state, 50% local 
government 
Not stated Proactive permitted, reactive 
preferred 
Element 
Funding 
State government As annually 
allotted to region 
or district 
Proactive permitted, reactive 
preferred 
 
All road safety funding sources now include an allowance for proactive projects, which 
must be accompanied by a thematic audit. There may be a road safety issue, perhaps when 
a number of non-casualty crashes do not add up to a BCR high enough to attract reactive 
funding. In such a case a well-prepared thematic audit may elicit funding to finance 
remedial works.  
Both black spot and TIDS funding applications by local governments are perused and 
sometimes amended by district or regional Main Roads officers prior to being forwarded to 
the relevant committee for approval. This opens the way for trans-governmental 
interaction in the areas of road safety, road safety assessments and road safety auditing. 
Contact precincts like these have the potential to promote the benefits and skills of road 
                                                          
8 BCR calculations are based on the number and severity of crashes as well as risk exposure (traffic 
counts). Funding conditions provide primarily for remedial works for known crash sites (reactive 
works) 
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safety auditing, and to set up trans-governmental cooperation and efficiencies in road 
safety areas.  
There is a need to address known safety issues on the state controlled road network 
continuously; this is especially true of issues which have been uncovered during a road 
safety audit, signed off by auditor, area engineer, and regional or district managers, and 
entered on the departmental database. Although it may be true that there will never be 
enough funding to remediate all road safety issues uncovered during road safety audits, 
Black Spot, Safer Roads Sooner and TIDS, as well as Element, are dedicated road safety 
funding sources; and there have been many times when each has been used to address 
otherwise unfunded issues uncovered during a road safety audit. There are benefits in 
checking all possible funding sources until issues can be resolved, resulting in safer roads 
for users as well as reduced liability exposure for road authorities. 
6.4.5 The compatibility of audit and policy concepts 
An investigation into the conceptual compatibility of policy and audit will test if, from the 
viewpoint of corporate alignment, there are differences between audit and policy intents: 
that is, depending on circumstances, audit and audit-related policy may serve different and 
perhaps at times incompatible purposes. 
An analysis of the former Main Roads Departments audit guides suggests that auditing is to 
be conducted as a simple process of finding and fixing flaws in a cyclic mode of audit, 
improve, review:  
 Audit:  Check for non-conformances (generally) by applying the criteria of 
an impartial, unbiased checklist. List non-conformances and recommend corrective 
actions. 
 Improve: Initiate and implement (negotiated / agreed) corrective action, by 
the audited party or someone else on their behalf. 
 Review: Undergo a post implementation review of corrective action, for 
final closure of issues uncovered during the audit process. 
 
Figure 6.3 The audit cycle (Source: QDMR, 2002) 
The three steps can be taken in any order, but there is a need to close the audit cycle and, if 
incomplete, to reiterate the process. 
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State government departments are executive, not legislative, bodies. However, it can be 
assumed that it is legitimate for executive bodies to formulate and attempt to enforce 
policies for behaviours and practices within their department, through or on behalf of the 
departmental head, because Policy implies authority, expertise, order (Colebatch, 1998, 
cited in Australian Policy Handbook, Althaus et al. 2007). It can also be assumed that in 
order to be effective, an intradepartmental policy adopts the patterns of policy-making 
used in government. The national guideline for policy-making is the Australian Policy 
Handbook 2007, but Queensland Public Service guidelines are expressed in the formulas of 
former public service policy-making courses.  
The Australian Policy Handbook (Althaus et al., 2007) does not offer a concise definition of 
public policy; instead it describes some of its important characteristics: 
It is intentional, designed to achieve a stated or understood purpose. 
It involves decisions and their consequences. 
It is structured and orderly. 
It is political in nature. 
It is dynamic.  
As per Figure 6.3, auditing is a simple process of finding and fixing flaws in the cyclic mode 
of audit, improve and review. For the purpose of road safety auditing there is a nationally 
adopted (Austroads) Road Safety Audit Guide with checklists for particular stages, and Main 
Roads Department templates to help format audit reports. Policies, one would assume, are 
drafted with good intentions; they can be statements of intent, hypotheses (perhaps to be 
refined over the span of several policy cycles), authoritative choices or objectives, and they 
can be misused as political or corporate window dressing. 
Policy and audit compatibility is not always guaranteed. In government departments, 
allocation of resources needs to be justified. There could be conflict for some departmental 
staff when assessing corporate fit in the allocation of road safety audit resources; or audit 
findings might expose weaknesses and shortcomings in departmental work or work 
processes, and cause embarrassment. Departmental employees who have problems in 
accepting change may perceive road safety auditing as an intrusion into the way in which 
departmental service delivery has traditionally been conducted. They may choose to argue 
that there is misalignment of any road safety audit concept with departmental fit and that 
auditing should be no more than a token exercise to comply with minimum mandated 
requirements of the RSAP or, if needed at all, as a means to minimise departmental 
exposure to liability. There certainly will be departmental mis-fit if ‘auditing’ in policy terms 
is understood to mean that compliance with the audit requirement of the three-step cycle 
alone is sufficient. An audit policy designed to cater for anything less than rigorous 
implementation of the complete audit cycle would, whatever its intent, will neither align 
with nor be supportive of any audit intent.  
6.4.6 Decency and the public service 
There is a category of potential conflicts that any person working for any tier of Australian 
road building authorities may encounter. It should be a given that road authorities assume 
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corporate social responsibility; but there are reasons why they may not do this 
unreservedly. For one, there is a sound financial motivation for a road building authority 
not to accept corporate social responsibility for its work; for another, at least some 
professional public servants would regard overt or enthusiastic advocacy for the road user 
to be a career-limiting move. 
The principle of nonfeasance, as has been shown, will further favour the authority, unless it 
can be proven that it had prior knowledge of the road safety issue; and there might be 
difficulty in establishing that the authority rather than one or two of its employees had 
prior knowledge of the contentious issue. Additional factors weighting legal advantage to 
the department include: 
 Very few auditors have adequate financial delegation to arrange for 
implementation of their recommendations.  
 There is a divide between implementation personnel and auditors, who are rarely 
informed of whether their recommendations are being implemented. 
 Pre- and post-implementation meetings are not a procedural norm in all Main 
Roads districts and regions. 
 Since July 2008 the department apparently no longer monitors the departmental 
road safety database, as it is considered impractical (personal communication to 
the author). This reduces departmental knowledge of road safety issues, including 
their closure or lack thereof.  
 As knowledge of departmental procedures and databases is not widespread, even 
permissible requests to departmental documentation under the Right to 
Information Act 2009 will not be conducted, as the departmental road safety audit 
database will be largely unknown to plaintiffs and their legal representatives and 
therefore will rarely be exploited as evidence in favour of a plaintiff. (QDMR, 2008a) 
 
 
Figure 6.4 below is a listing of quotes from prominent Australians regarding the 
affordability of the Australian legal system.  The authoritative statements of those 
prominent Australians from a judicative background corroborate the inequity of 
accessibility of justice in Australia. 
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Figure 6.4 What promininet Australians say…  (Community Law Australia, 2012) 
As a state government department, TMR has virtually unlimited financial and human 
resources to defend a claim with the best possible legal and professional representation 
through all available courts. There are few individuals capable of finding the funding 
needed to pursue a negligence case against TMR to its conclusion. Moreover, of the large 
pool of road safety specialists, many are employed in one of the three tiers of road 
authority; and most of them would stand up in court for their employer. Plaintiffs wishing 
to obtain an expert opinion must ask an employee of the department that is being legally 
pursued to testify against their employer, at the risk of their career. To find a road safety 
specialist with appropriate knowledge and expertise outside the system (independent 
academics excluded) would be unlikely, and plaintiffs could have difficulty in finding a 
competent expert, who is prepared to stand up in court. 
 
6.4.7 Advocacy or loyalty? 
For road safety specialists there is the conflict of being torn between protecting their jobs 
and career prospects by supporting their employer and advocating for a genuinely 
aggrieved road user, limiting the possibility that they will willingly provide advocacy for 
road users. 
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Even in the most ethical of organisations, such dilemmas may be insoluble. It is one thing to 
talk about road safety ideals and a generally irreconcilably different thing to accept liability 
for professional choices and actions. For the road safety professional the choice is to pursue 
professional advocacy for the road user or to toe the departmental line of professional 
solidarity. Non-conformity may be met with targeted and precisely graduated management 
responses that are designed to teach—whoever the wrongdoer—‘acceptable ways of 
thinking and behaving and values, beliefs, behaviours and norms that newcomers need to 
understand in order to be accepted, and thus helping define who belongs and who doesn’t’ 
(see Attachment 6, p. 6))  
Inevitably there are limitations imposed on TMR public servants and road safety 
professionals in their advocacy for road safety on behalf of road users, and limitations on 
the extent to which TMR might be prepared to exercise corporate social responsibility. As 
well there are times when professional ethics will conflict with professional solidarity and 
loyalty to the department, Main Roads employees may also encounter times when there is 
a choice between exposing a colleague who has made a mistake that they could have made 
themselves, and protecting their colleague and their own livelihood. Road safety 
professionals may also have to tolerate economic and political issues taking priority over 
road safety issues to which they have assigned high risk ratings. 
It is difficult for career public servants to speak up for road safety, if doing so might 
jeopardise their careers9. It is difficult to take part in a meeting to discussing an unsafe road 
outcome when the outcome seems to have been pre-emptively decided by management. It 
is difficult to stand up when other public servants are agreeing on that outcome under the 
same pressure to conform. The real difficulty, however, is that at some point, agreement to 
less than acceptable road safety action becomes malfeasance. 
For the sake of the travelling public and the ongoing evolution of road safety in this 
country, road authorities and their leaders need to embrace a new, less sheltered and more 
inclusive methodology of interaction with their stakeholders. 
6.5 Summing up 
This chapter has provided an insight into the RSAP policy documents and attempted to 
convey awareness of concerns by staff in charge of RSAP implementation. This chapter has 
substantiated the need to remain mindful of the underlying operating milieu, when 
attempting to implement new initiatives. Part of this milieu is the extraordinarily expensive 
Australian legal system which favours the defendant, who has the benefit of virtually 
unlimited intellectual and financial resources (Community Law Australia, July 2012). 
                                                          
9 The Author based this insight on cases with specific verifiable evidence. These are corroborated by 
independent statements expressed by other colleagues. However, the author did not conduct 
quantitative surveys to credibly identify these occurrences as endemic characteristic of the working 
milieu. 
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Protection from corporate liability is provided by nonfeasance legislation, originating from a 
17th century law, designed to provide indemnity to communities of English villagers charged 
with road maintenance. Personal conversations with staff at middle management and 
executive level indicate their generally good working knowledge of the legal advantages of 
working for the department. Such conversations make it obvious that what should be 
twenty-first century realities like corporate social responsibility and professional advocacy 
exhibit poor fit with privileges which were originally granted under different circumstances 
in a different country. 
The PSC relies on teamwork and a working climate suitable for the emergence of synergies. 
Consequently extensive analyses of the policy are critical, especially when reflecting on the 
case study’s original purpose: to underpin PSC methodology. It is acknowledged that 
considerable material for further in-depth discussion is embedded in these analyses.  
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Chapter 7 The Queensland Road Safety Audit Policy: 
Common Themes 
This chapter will answer the question asked in Chapter 6.1.5: ‘Why did the RSAP not have 
the expected impact?’ The answer is more complex than was originally expected and in 
retrospect justifies the processes used in this thesis to derive a solution.  
In this chapter we will seek common themes from this case study. There will be summaries 
of overlapping data from different analyses of the RSAP in the context of historical and 
organisational trends in Main Roads and an analysis using King’s Road Safety Space Model 
(RSS) (2005). The PSC will be utilised for a gap analysis of RSAP implementation, and the 
usefulness of this approach will be assessed for the implementation of the Safe System and 
the National Road Safety Strategy.   
Themes recurring in more than one survey, or survey themes corroborated by staff, are 
organised in this chapter in the following categories: 
 personnel and processes 
 the policy 
 the operational environment of the policy.    
 
 
7.1 Personnel and Processes (see Attachments 1-3) 
7.1.1 Personnel 
Data relating to audit personnel extend across both Departmental auditor surveys. Positive 
themes were satisfaction with personal contribution to road safety and acceptance of 
personal responsibility for audit recommendations. Negative themes were more numerous, 
and included discontent with workplace support, lack of feedback regarding audit 
recommendations, lack of encouragement to pursue further road safety studies, lack of an 
auditors’ network, lack of a representative body for auditors, lack of road safety training for 
managers, and lack of policies and procedures.  
No additional positive audit personnel-related themes appeared in the 2010/11 survey, and 
there was no appreciable difference in the ratings of negative themes. The perceived need 
for standardised departmental policies and procedures to review road safety audits, and to 
document their implementation, was reconfirmed in 2010/11, in spite of the 2006 RSAP 
providing such standards. 
Table 7.1 below provides an insight into common themes as pertaining to audit personnel 
in the 2005/2006 and the 2010/2011 surveys of road safety auditors conducted by the 
author. There was an expectation of evolutionary positive changes. 
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Table 7.1 Common Themes – Audit Personnel 
*For detailed survey data relating to this table refer section 6.2 and attachments 1 & 2 
 
7.1.2 Processes 
Common themes regarding audit processes and compliance with the RSAP were captured 
in the Ernst and Young survey of 2005 as well as in the survey of road safety auditors in 
2010/11 and some of the single focus surveys reviewed in Chapter 6.4 There were a 
number of positive themes revealed in the 2010/11 Auditors survey that indicated an 
improvement over the process practices observed in the Ernst and Young survey: 
Although the 2010/11 survey of departmentally employed road safety auditors does not 
provide for tracing survey responses to any particular regional office, it seems clear that 
there have been improvements in the areas of investigation (undertaking the audit) and 
documentation; however, these improvements do not indicate state-wide compliance with 
the audit policy. 
The third Ernst and Young category of survey, output and implementation of audit 
recommendations received below average ratings for all questions. 
Negative themes in the Ernst and Young processes-centred survey were confirmed as 
recurring in the 2010/11 survey, and further substantiated by a review of key performance 
indicators of the Road Safety Audit Policy (Chapter 6.4.1) and a check of the departmental 
road safety audit database (Chapter 6.4.2). One of the puzzling contradictions was that, 
while the RSAP seemed to fail, there were unrelated road safety groups with some road 
safety projects that achieved extraordinarily positive, even synergistic outcomes. Sections 
7.3 to 7.6 will help provide some answers. 
*Common Themes – Audit Personnel (2005/06 & 2010/11 Surveys) 
 
Theme 
Common Themes (see sources below) 
Auditor 
survey 
05/06 
Auditor 
survey 
10/11 
Other 
(refer 
section) 
Satisfaction with contribution to road safety Yes Yes  
Acceptance of personal responsibility for audit recommendations Yes Yes  
Discontent with workplace support Yes Yes  
Lack of feedback regarding audit recommendations Yes Yes  
Lack of encouragement to pursue further road safety studies Yes Yes  
Lack of an auditors’ network Yes Yes  
Lack of a representative body for auditors Yes Yes  
Lack of road safety training for managers Yes Yes  
Lack of policies and procedures Yes Yes Yes: 2.1 
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Table 7.2 Common themes – audit processes 
  
*For detailed survey data relating to this table refer Attachments 1 to 3 
# Also see Chapter 6.4.1 Removal of Key performance indicators 
*Common Themes – Audit Processes 
 
Theme 
Common Themes (see sources below) 
Ernst & Young 
survey 05/06 
Auditor survey 
05/06 
Auditor survey 
10/11 
# Other (refer 
section) 
Most regions / districts employed at least one senior road safety auditor No  Yes  
Most regions / districts used Austroads Audit Guide to Road Safety No  Yes  
Most regions / districts used departmental audit templates. No  Yes  
Most regions / districts provided audit opportunities for all its auditors.  No Yes  
Most regions / districts used the departmental audit tracking system. No  Yes Yes, 6.4.2  
Most regions / districts maintained records of departmental audits No No Yes  
Most regions / districts completed all audits resulting from the road network safety 
assessment. 
  No  
Closing out rate of audits was consistent across regions / districts. No No No No, 6.4.2 
Road safety issues were a standing item on the agendas of most management meetings.   No  
Most regions / districts prepared an annual road safety audit schedule.   No  
The Road Safety Audit Guidelines were largely known.   No  
Most project managers knew about their responsibility to trigger road safety audits at 
prescribed milestones of their projects. 
  No  
Most regions / districts conducted all required audits. No No No  
Most regions / districts provided adequate resources for auditing. No No No  
Most regions / districts conducted traffic scheme audits within the required timeframe.   No  
Most regions / districts assessed audit findings within the required timeframe.   No  
Most regions /districts used Road Safety Risk Manager software as recommended.   No  
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7.2 The policy  
This section makes reference to common themes from the history of Main Roads (and 
TMR) as it relates to Road Safety (Chapter 5.2), a review of RSAP by applying the checklists 
of the Australian Policy Handbook (Chapter 6.3) (Althaus et al., 2007); an assessment of the 
compatibility of audit and policy concepts (Chapter 6.4.5); and a review of the RSAP by 
policy stated key performance indicators (Chapter 6.4.1) 
Table 7.3 Common themes – the policy 
*Common Themes – The Policy 
 
Theme 
Common Themes (see sources below) 
Chapter 
Reference 
^Utilising 
the PSC 
for gap 
analysis 
#Subjective 
Assessment  
The Road Safety Policy documents were crafted with care to road safety 
detail. 6.1.1 to 6.1.5  
 
The RSAP raised awareness of the complexities of road safety Attachments 
1a – 1c  
 
RSAP-related activities saved the lives, health and property of road users.    
The RSAP promised to launch an age of departmental road safety evolution.    
The RSAP was designed to reduce liability exposure of the department. Attachments 
1a – 1c  
 
Both managers and auditors need cyclic refresher training in requirements of 
the RSAP 
Attachments 
1a – 1c   
The RSAP had no effective policy instruments. 6.3   
There was not enough training for auditors and other implementation 
personnel.  6.3  
 
The implementation budget of the RSAP was inadequate to fulfil its road 
safety role. 6.3,   
 
Lack of corporate fit  5.2, 6.4.3, 
6.4.5  
 
There are instances where the concepts of audit and policy conflict. 6.4.5   
Project management for RSAP implementation was inadequate in areas of 
Time, Cost, Scope, Communication and Human Resources Management 6.3   
Risk management should have included considerations of the operational 
milieu as per Kings RSS    
The RSAP was never fully integrated into the work practices of all regions    
Only intradepartmental stakeholders were considered  6.3,   
There was (and still is) lack of compliance with the RSAP Attachments 
1a – 1c, 6.4.2   
Change Facilitation was not adequately addressed    
The RSAP was (an exclusive) intradepartmental top down policy. The PSC 
conducted gap analysis clearly demonstrates the effects of the shortcomings 
of such directives. (see Chapter 7.5) 
   
At this stage the PSC is the only known project implementation tool, which 
risk manages RSS factors; which in the implementation of the RSAP 
presented major blockages 
   
RSAP improvement loop did not occur, instead key performance indicators 
were removed one year prior to scheduled review date 6.4.1   
 ^ Refer Section 7.5 for details 
# Subjective Assessment is based on interpretation of research data or corroborated by understandings 
gained from conversations with departmental staff. 
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7.3 Operational Environment  
This section will make reference to common themes from the history of Main Roads (and 
TMR) as it relates to road safety (Chapter 5.2); the Queensland University of Technology 
2006 Report on Workout Program (Chapter 5.6); TMRs 2010 Staff Survey (Chapter 5.7); a 
consideration of the nonfeasance rulings (Chapter 6.4.3); and the conflict between public 
advocacy and loyalty (Chapter 6.4.7). It will provide an overview into the operating 
environment of the RSAP and the personnel charged with its implementation.  
One could argue that an investigation of the operational environment at the time of RSAP 
implementation is a distraction from what this thesis is attempting to achieve: the 
introduction and appraisal of the PSC as a potentially synergistic road safety 
implementation methodology. However, let us (again) re-visit Chapter 2.6 of this thesis: 
The definition of synergy within the context of this thesis has been adopted from a 
definition by Schoech (n.d.), that ‘Systems working well experience synergy where 
the total system outputs are greater than the sum of all inputs...For synergy to 
occur, subsystems must not maximize, but sacrifice optimization and cooperate for 
the good of the overall system, e.g., teamwork.’  
Del Valle in his 2010 Presentation at Abu Dhabi takes this concept a step further, when he 
applies it specifically to road safety: 
 
Figure 7.1: Slide from Del Valle’s Presentation in Abu Dhabi 
While Schoech’s (n.d.) defining condition for synergy to occur is the cooperation of equals 
in a non-dominated team culture, Del Valle explains his approach to solving road safety 
problems as based on ‘technical measures and systemic foundations’: that is both, Schoech 
and Del Valle accept the operational environment as an essential part of their systems 
modelling. 
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The PSC from the perspective of providing conditions for the emergence of synergies relies 
on a supportive project environment and therefore needs to include assessments of the 
operational milieu. As part of project management these have to be conducted under the 
element of risk assessment including both synergy obstructive and synergy supportive 
aspects. 
7.4  King’s Road Safety Space (RSS) 
King’s Road Safety Space (RSS) (King, 2005) has been chosen here as the most logical and 
visually comprehensible model to represent potential blockages in the road safety 
operational milieu. King specifically modelled the RSS as a tool for road safety knowledge 
transfer into other countries. He uses the biological metaphor of species introduction into a 
new ecological space to help conceptualise the process. He tailors the RSS model 
specifically for each road safety issue of interest; he also investigates and compares the RSS 
of the originating country in relation to the road safety issue in question. 
With the RSAP, having arrived in 2006 as a new species in Queensland, there appears good 
reason to complete its implementation analysis utilising RSS modelling. 
The road safety space model explicitly considers economic, institutional and social 
and cultural factors (from specific to broad) which influence the particular road 
safety issue which a particular road safety transfer effort seeks to address. (King, 
2005) 
7.4.1 Tabulating positive and negative themes 
The table below tabulates positive and negative themes affecting the Road Safety Space at 
the time of RSAP implementation. Chapter references provide their sources. The column 
Subjective Assessment expresses insights gained from the opinions of other auditors 
conveyed in the author’s survey and corroborated by other auditors or by the author’s own 
experience, or subjective assessment derived from interpretation of research data, 
conversations or other communications with departmental staff. Although listed in this 
chapter, their impact will vary from one regional office to the next and in most cases will be 
difficult, if not impossible to gauge. 
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Table 7.4 (a) Common themes: the road safety space 
# Subjective Assessment is based on interpretation of research data or corroborated by 
understandings gained from conversations with departmental staff 
 
 
 
*Common Themes – The Road Safety Space 
Theme Common Themes (see sources 
below) 
 
 
Chapter Reference #Subjective 
Assessment 
Economic   
Work with the Department offers workplace security 5.7.2  
Work with the Department offers financial security 5.7.2  
The Department will pay for legal representation, if you make a mistake.   
Limited funding to introduce RSAP   
Limited funding for Road Safety Projects 5.3.3, 6.4.4 
  
 
Permanent Works are generally prioritised above dedicated Road Safety Projects 5.3,  
Dedicated Road Safety Funding priorities based on cost benefit ranking 6.4.4, 5.2  
Economic and political drivers competing with road safety priorities 5.3,  
Reactive before proactive road safety funding. Table 6.3  
Social and Cultural   
There is often a connection between Main Roads culture and local culture forged by 
families who have served in Main Roads in that town for generations 
5.2, 5.7.2  
Nonfeasance protection is perceived as a good thing  6.4.3,  
Local management is generally respected 5.2, 5.7.2  
There is a strong sense of untouchability (The Department and nonfeasance will protect us)   
Staff are generally happy to mix socially outside work hours. 5.7.2  
There is a positive satisfaction rating for being able to contribute to (departmental) 
improvement processes 
5.6  
There is positive acknowledgement of diversity of people, their skills and knowledge 5.6, 5.7.2  
Professional ethics not a subject of  engineering courses 5.3.5, 9.3  
Professional pledge on entry into Engineers Australia introduced on 28.7.2010 9.2  
Demand to respect local leadership 5.2  
Perception that nonfeasance protection is needed   
The Australian legal system is very expensive 6.4.6, 6.5  
Strong sense of pecking-order in many district / regional offices   
Group think and fear of career limiting moves often inhibit road safety meetings   
There is lack of professional accountability 6.5, 6.4.6, 6.4.7  
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Table 7.4 (continued): common themes – The Road Safety Space 
 
 
# Subjective Assessment is based on interpretation of research data or corroborated by 
understandings gained from conversations with departmental staff 
 
 
 
*Common Themes – The Road Safety Space 
Theme Common Themes (Refer Sources 
below) 
 
 
Chapter Reference #Subjective 
Assessment 
Institutional   
Pride and loyalty are an integral part of most district workplace cultures 5.7.2  
If you don’t rock the boat, you can have a good career in the Department   
There is unity of purpose in a can do culture – this becomes clear during emergencies and 
times of climatic challenges  
5.7.2  
There is emphasis on technical excellence 5.7.2  
Subculture of ‘Main Roads Families’ 5.7.2  
Subcultures of ‘Main Roads Factions’ 5.7.2  
Paternalistic subculture of ‘We know best’ and road user to ‘drive to prevailing conditions’ 5.3.2  
Road safety  education not always supported by senior management 2.6, 6.2  
There is resistance to change 5.6, 5.7.2  
There is lack of road safety  education for senior management 2.6, 6.2  
Regions consider themselves autonomous, doing their own thing, ignoring Head office 
directives and policies 
5.7.2  
Regions have been encouraged to work to local conditions: Climatic, Funding limitations, 
Human resource limitations 
5.7.2, 5.2  
Regions are to prioritise:  
Politically - appease local member and media 
Economic - Needs of large corporations against that of vulnerable road users 
Social - liveable communities versus access needs of industry 
5.7.2  
Stakeholder management rates before stakeholder engagement 7.6.3, 8.2.2   
Professional road safety advocacy for road users is a relatively unknown concept   
There is a generally high level of ignorance of basic road safety principles  2.6, 6.2  
Ambiguous corporate fit of RSAP 6.1.7, and 
  
 
 
Corporate social responsibility towards road user is largely rejected 5.3.5, 6.4.6, 6.4.7, 6.5  
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The diagram below represents the Road Safety Space as extant as at the time of 
implementation of the Queensland Road Safety Audit Policy. The centre of the figure 
denotes the issue under investigation, in this case the road safety audit policy, with the 
three corners of the figure signifying Economic, Institutional and Cultural / Social factors 
impacting upon the issue as well as each other. Issues are positioned on the diagram by 
relevance being broad -, mid-range, or specific to the issue.  
For the purpose of road safety transfer King (2005) proposes: 
 Use the model to identify the contextual factors which influence the issue of 
interest. 
 Nominate candidate countermeasures which have been shown to be effective in 
the West. 
 Use the model to identify the contextual factors which influenced the success of 
these countermeasures. 
 Determine whether – given the context in the recipient country – these 
countermeasures are likely to be successful as they stand, or only after 
adaptation to local conditions, or only if the local context can also be changed, 
or not at all. 
 
In terms of its biological metaphor, successful transfer of a road safety measure requires an 
understanding of how a country’s road safety space functions, how the measure itself 
functions in its originating country, and how its introduction will interact with pre-existing 
road safety systems and phenomena. (King, 2005) 
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Figure 7.2 Road safety space (RSS) at the time of introduction of the road safety audit policy: (following King, 2005) 
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The problematic economic, institutional and cultural/social environment (King’s road safety 
space) explains most of the causes for the less than expected impact of the RSAP. It is 
unlikely that the over-expensive legal system or nonfeasance legislation can be overhauled 
in the short term10, but education and intradepartmental sanctions for professionals 
violating road safety principles can help force changes in attitudes and culture.  
There are two real problems: one is that most of the influences of the road safety space 
that negatively affected the RSAP still exist. For a more streamlined introduction of the Safe 
System, there is a need to do something about departmental road safety space. The other 
is that there is a need to distinguish between road safety space problems and their 
symptoms, many of which are listed as common themes under the heading Personnel and 
Processes (Chapter 7.1 above).   
To overcome some of the problems that have been revealed, it would be useful to leverage 
all positive themes and to reshape the corporate culture to one that is more inclusive. This 
is where the PSC can help provide focus. 
7.5 The PSC applied as a Gap Analysis Tool to the RSAP 
Every road safety intervention can be regarded as a project, one that will succeed best 
when the three crafts of project management, stakeholder engagement, and change 
facilitation are combined and implemented concurrently. This requires the cooperation of 
specialists in all three areas, from which may emerge synergistic outcomes. 
It will be difficult to prove causal relationships between any emergence of efficiencies and 
the RSAP. However, although largely unproven as a methodology to engineer synergies, the 
PSC model could be useful as a tool of analysis in helping to find which elements are lacking 
if no such efficiencies are discerned. The table below summarises what might be gained by 
applying the PSC to scrutinise the RSAP. 
Table 7.5 PSC applied to the introduction of the Road Safety Audit Policy  
Management Item Comment 
C
ha
ng
e 
Fa
ci
lit
at
io
n 
Coercive (N/A) No defined policy instruments for 
intradepartmental policy 
Non-coercive (education) ‘Top’-down type policy 
Publication by Intranet Yes 
Provision of templates and guidelines Yes 
Specialist advice available to districts 
and regions (on request) 
Yes 
Monitoring regime:  
Departmental tracking system    
Key performance indicators  
Yes, but considered impractical one year before 
scheduled RSAP review date 
                                                          
10 There is a need to reflect on why the highest Court of the Land legislated in 2001 against 
nonfeasance. Refer also section 7.5.4. 
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Management Item Comment 
Quarterly reports to GM  
Ongoing departmental familiarisation 
courses in Brisbane 
No 
Roadshow to facilitate learning in 
regions/districts 
No 
Application of any change facilitation 
methodology  
No - or if so unknown to student 
Pr
oj
ec
t M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Corporate fit Not established—ambiguous legal situation 
Time management Implementation timelines were set, but not 
achieved in all instances 
Cost management The implementation phase of the RSAP was 
under-funded 
Quality management The policy document can be considered a quality 
instrument —however, its implementation was 
not quality controlled 
Scope management Scope, especially as it pertained to stakeholder 
engagement and change facilitation, was 
inadequately considered 
Risk management The operating milieu was not assessed. It is 
unknown if legal implications of unclosed audits 
posted on a departmental database were 
considered. 
It is unknown if regional/district resistance was 
gauged prior to posting the RSAP 
Procurement management Departmental templates and Austroads 
Guidelines were made available; there was 
support from E&T for districts, regions and 
individual staff who requested it. 
Communication management There were breakdowns of communication 
processes between management of some Regions 
/ Districts and Head Office 
Human resources management Policy implementation would have benefited 
from cyclic contacts between district and 
regional road safety audit staff and Brisbane 
office staff. 
Integration management The policy was not fully integrated into the work 
practices of design and construction processes of 
all districts/regions of the Department of Main 
Roads 
St
ak
eh
ol
de
r 
M
an
ag
em
en
t -
 
En
ga
ge
m
en
t 
Government: 
Federal - liaise regarding nonfeasance 
Unknown if there was any lobbying 
 
State - liaise regarding nonfeasance Yes—Civil Liability Act Section 37 
Local Government—Help set common 
road safety standards and road safety 
auditing standards 
This contact precinct is now well established 
through the Roads Alliance, multi-disciplinary 
road safety Action Groups and TMR 
administered funding 
Intra-departmental: head office, regions 
and districts 
Communication problem - analysed as power 
struggle in 2010 TMR staff survey 
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Management Item Comment 
Intra-departmental: general (fyi type) 
familiarisation for all staff 
Did not happen 
Intra-departmental: policy refresher 
courses for existing road safety auditors, 
induction for new auditors 
Did not happen 
Intra-departmental: road safety subjects 
taught at Cadet School 
Did not happen - unlikely to happen 
Intra-departmental: assessment of RSAP 
documentation by legal branch 
Yes, with advice included in audit courses (Also 
see Attachment) 
Corporate: liaison with ARRB Group 
and Austroads 
Yes 
Liaison with consultant engineers to 
assist in RSAP prescribed audits 
Yes 
Any other corporate stakeholders?  Unknown who else might have been involved 
Road user Not mentioned in policy or supporting 
documentation 
Im
pl
em
en
t, Ev
al
ua
te
,   
 
Scheduled for 2009, conducted in 2008 Some of the key performance indicators were 
removed before the scheduled review date. 
The review of the RSAP came too late to fix 
implementation problems 
7.5.1 Comparing the PSC against other review tools  
The PSC is a new road safety project implementation tool, and differs from other review 
methods mentioned in this thesis. The Australian policy handbook (Althaus et al., 2007) is 
specialised in that it provides effective governmental policy-making procedures suited to 
the federal sphere of politics. It does not profess to be a guide for intradepartmental 
policies, nor for road safety intervention projects. 
Used as a planning or review tool for road safety intervention projects, PSC provides a 
stakeholder and change facilitation focused gap analysis of elements which, if considered 
during planning and implementation, have the potential to optimise outcomes—and in 
some cases to help create an environment suitable for the emergence of synergies. 
7.5.2 The potential value of PSC in optimising road safety projects 
It is expected that under the Safe System, road safety projects will be conducted by 
engaging a number of diverse stakeholders at one time. It will take some time to groom 
TMR to fill its role as the lead agency for the introduction of the Safe System, but once that 
prerequisite is met, it may become clearer that the Safe System operational philosophy and 
PSC methodology exhibit a tight fit: 
1. both cater for stakeholder engagement 
2. both are about embedding of cultural change and  
3. both rely on efficient project management methodology. 
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7.5.3 PSC in the implementation of the Safe System 
In this early era of introducing the Safe System to Queensland, any improved 
implementation strategy for road safety interventions is worth considering. The PSC takes 
into account enhanced project management and stakeholder engagement as well as a 
holistic appraisal of potential change facilitation providers. In 2011 TMR already seemed to 
be displaying regrettable parallels with the introduction methodology of the RSAP. As it was 
with the introduction of the RSAP, the introduction of the Safe System also seemed to be 
based on top-down policy-making, inconsistently supported by decentralised regional 
managements, poorly understood by technical staff, and lacking incisive policy instruments. 
In order to introduce the Safe System there is first a need to follow a (partially) 
deconstructive path of road safety space improvement. This has to be a prerequisite for 
TMR to qualify for its role as the state implementation agency for the Safe System. PSC can 
provide the methodology to generate stakeholder support, and to embed the new 
paradigm and the needed cultural changes—all within the framework of a well-managed 
project. 
PSC complements the most fundamental aspects of safe systems philosophy, which is 
based on the consideration and cooperation of all relevant stakeholders around the new 
focus: the vulnerability of the human body. PSC has the potential to support that central 
focus of Safe System philosophy by helping engage the interaction of non-adversarial 
stakeholders, and identifying and managing those stakeholders who can be expected to 
offer token rather than supportive contributions or who are covertly adversarial.  
The Safe System transcends the RSAP in that it is not an intradepartmental road safety 
policy document but a new national road safety paradigm endorsed by the federal and all 
state governments. This puts a new kind of pressure on public service organisations to 
adapt. There already are visible compliance differences between states, with the Northern 
Territory operating without nonfeasance protection and Victoria currently leading the field 
in vehicular safety standards and in engaging communities to nominate for funding for road 
safety projects. (Transport Accident Commission – Victoria, 2012)11 
Queensland road safety space needs to be modified, if health and lives are to be saved 
under a fully applied Safe System. 
It will take a holistic methodology of road safety project implementation to integrate the 
Safe System fully into everyday work practices of public servants. At this stage of learning, 
PSC can help provide that methodology. 
The Safe System paradigm also can find its place in rail, sea and air transport. It is unknown, 
to what extent it has been already applied to those transport modes; yet wherever Safe 
System methodology is implemented, the PSC has a unique fit for its support. 
                                                          
11 A check revealed that as at August 2014 TMR also has a Community Road Safety Funding Program 
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7.5.4 PSC in the implementation of the National Road Safety Strategy 
The National Road Safety Strategy 2011 – 2020 (NRSS) is an initiative of the former 
Australian Transport Council (ATC), developed in cooperation with more than 100 
stakeholder groups, who contributed written submissions and comments. (Australian 
Transport Council, 2011) The ATC comprised all Commonwealth, state, territory and New 
Zealand government ministers with responsibility for transport. The NRSS is now overseen 
by the newly formed Standing Council on Transport and Infrastructure (SCOTI). Like the ATC 
SCOTI includes transport, infrastructure and planning ministers from the Commonwealth, 
States and Territories, and New Zealand as well as the Australian Local Government 
Association. 
The most significant aspect of SCOTI is that it provides forum for members of federal and 
state legislative assemblies in charge of land and sea transport in Australia and New 
Zealand. It is the most powerful Australian organisation with the potential to come to 
understandings and express and enforce politically aligned transportation safety will by 
legislation throughout the top tiers of government. An excellent start and superior 
incentive for every public road authority to improve focus on road safety would be for 
states to repeal state nonfeasance legislation. It is worthwhile at this point again to reflect 
that in May 2001 the Federal High Court ruled against nonfeasance legislation, and that it 
was the States, who one by one re-introduced nonfeasance protection, thereby overriding 
the federally proposed rights of many individuals with that of State and local Government 
Road Authorities. (Refer Section 6.4.3). This stance conflicts with basic principles of 
Corporate Social Responsibility. (Haynes, 2012) 
It would be pleasant to think that, sometime this century nonfeasance legislation, 
originating from a 17th century law, which has well outlived its original purpose; will be 
terminated or superseded by a law commensurate with the professional dignity and 
expertise of 21st century civil engineers.   
However, the most significant aspect of successful NRSS implementation is the way in 
which Safe System methodology is enacted at the coal face; that is, the way in which road 
authorities at various levels direct their workforce to follow formal NRSS guidelines. In that 
setting PSC will display the best fit with NRSS and Safe System philosophy by providing a 
cost efficient inclusive project implementation methodology.  
7.6 Summing up  
This chapter has covered the areas of people and processes, the policy documents and 
RSAP operating milieu, describing idiosyncrasies, deficiencies and causes for the less than 
perfect implementation of the Queensland Road Safety Audit Policy. Many of these 
shortfalls still persist despite policy and departmental changes and are likely to affect new 
initiatives, like the introduction of the National Road Safety Strategy and Safe System. 
 Chapter 7: The Queensland Road Safety Audit Policy: Common Themes 112 
The PSC with its more participatory stakeholder and change facilitation-focused approach 
has a superior fit as an implementation tool for both Safe System and the NRSS; but it 
cannot be optimised for departmental use until the departmental operating milieu is 
improved, potentially by taking legislative measures to support those two initiatives.  
The PSC has been devised as a tool, especially to implement road safety interventions 
effectively; its effectiveness as such can range from enhancing the outcomes of road safety 
interventions to the creation of conditions suitable for the emergence of synergies.  
This section has introduced the PSC as a tool of gap analysis (see section 7.5), helping to 
determine which of the necessary elements are lacking when a multi-stakeholder road 
safety project does not lead to enhanced efficiencies. A similar test could be conducted for 
proposals in a wide range of areas to assess the value of applying the PSC for a specific 
project. 
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Chapter 8 Discussion 
There is a need to re-state that this thesis is Queensland-centric, that is it relates to surveys, 
data and professional opinions of road safety staff of Queensland State Road Authorities. 
Opinions stated by the author as his own are drawn from his experiences and corroborated 
by opinions gained from work-colleagues or supported by inferences from research data, 
whose impact on road safety space or an operating milieu is not always quantifiable. It is 
acknowledged here that some material presented in this thesis is contentious and has the 
potential to stimulate further discussion. 
8.1  Case Study 1: The Mount Isa Pedestrian Project 
8.1.1 Desired outcomes 
Within the context of this thesis the project was reviewed as an instrumental and 
explanatory case study of the PSC. The objectives included:  
 
 assessing the value of the model based on a case study of the PSC application in the 
Mount Isa Pedestrian Project (Case Study 1, Chapter 4) 
 establishing the role of a synergistic approach to road safety policy and program 
implementation, focusing on road environment safety – including two instances, when 
the PSC elicited a close to synergistic effect: 
 presenting the PSC as a model which promotes synergy in the context of current 
strategic drivers, such as the Safe System approach. 
• to determine the feasibility of the PSC approach in practice  
• to evaluate the usefulness of the PSC approach from the perspective of a road 
authority in terms of achieving stakeholder/community engagement and 
outcomes. 
8.1.2 Summary  
As the Project Designer of the Mount Isa Pedestrian project, the author conducted the 
feasibility and concept phase of the project by requesting a brainstorming and fact-finding 
session with the NWRSA, a group of professional specialists with an interest in road safety. 
This request was based on the recognition that certain regional- and community-based 
road safety action groups achieved exceptional results with some of their interventions. 
NWRSA members within less than half an hour provided valuable feedback which would 
have taken days to uncover in any other way.    
 By utilising PSC principles, a large amount of information was gathered during the 
brainstorming session at the NWRSA, which rapidly established itself as a valuable 
multi-disciplinary sounding board for road safety projects. 
 Based on PSC principles, all but the Indigenous member of the NWRSA were 
excluded from further participation in the project. This was to prevent potential 
culture-based conflict and to strengthen esteem and respect for Aboriginal elders, 
who were designated to act as change facilitators from within their own culture. 
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 Part of the concept and design phase of the project was taken up by making fact-
finding contacts:  
o These included the Northern Territory Transport Department, which was 
already addressing the issue of Aboriginals sleeping on roads with 
television advertisements. They were happy to have their advertisements 
screened in Queensland as long as credit was given to their source. 
o There was also in-depth email exchange with the author’s QUT supervisors, 
who provided personal leads and literature. 
o And Professor Paul Memmott from the University of Queensland provided 
valuable information during and after a familiarisation course with 
Aboriginal culture, which he conducted at Myuma, an Indigenous 
roadworks camp near Camooweal. 
 Detailed project design was based on cultural advice provided by two Aboriginal 
consultants with exceptional standing in their communities.  
o Based on that advice I considered the most effective change facilitation for 
this particular Indigenous culture-based problem was to engage elders as 
change facilitators, to empower them to work from within their own 
traditions.  
o For this reason, as well as those given above, non-Indigenous stakeholders 
and interventions were excluded from the project. 
 
 The PSC approach was validated by the enthusiasm of the consultant, who 
obtained road safety-related survey responses from 132 instead of the minimum 
number of 60 Aboriginal respondents. 
 
8.1.3 Outcome assessment 
The case study of the Mount Isa Pedestrian Project established that the PSC could be 
applied in practice. Standard departmental methodology would have excluded involvement 
of Indigenous stakeholders and would have been limited to a media release about the 
causes and costs of the project.  
The targeted objectives were achieved: 
1. The first of these was an assessment of the model, using the case study of the 
Mount Isa Pedestrian Project  
This project substantiated the usefulness of the PSC in uniting stakeholders 
from different backgrounds and demonstrated the value of engaging 
stakeholders to uncover assumptions and opinions shaping their 
perception of a road safety. 
. 
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2. The second goal was to establish the role of a synergistic approach to road safety 
policy and program implementation, focusing on road environment safety. There 
were two instances, when the PSC solicited a close to synergistic effect; 
The first during the brain storming and fact gathering session with the 
NWRSA and the second in the formation and continued existence of the 
Aboriginal road safety group 
 
3. The third goal was to present the PSC as a model which promotes synergy in the 
context of current strategic drivers, such as the Safe System approach: 
Both, the NRSS and the Safe System rely on engaging stakeholders to 
define desirable systems characteristics and to help formulate culturally 
appropriate and embeddable implementation strategies. The PSC exhibited 
a better fit than any other project implementation tool known to the 
author. 
4. Consequently the project established the usefulness of the PSC approach from the 
perspective of a road authority in terms of achieving stakeholder/community 
engagement and outcomes. 
It also revealed a weakness in that a project like this needs follow-up and 
continued support, in the case of the Mount Isa study; this might have 
been achieved by seconding a delegation or a member of the Aboriginal 
Road Safety Group to the NWRSA. However, for such a change to occur, 
further departmental change and empowerment of groups such as the 
NWRSA are needed. (For further insights into methodology and outcomes 
see attachment 4) 
Without utilising PSC methodology:  
 NWRSA members would not have been engaged in the pedestrian road safety issue 
 and would have had little opportunity to contribute with their expertise regarding 
behaviours that were leading to road deaths.  
 One hundred and thirty-two Indigenous stakeholders would not have taken part in 
the pedestrian road safety issue on a person to person basis, or have had the 
opportunity to be included in a respectful and culturally manner on an issue of 
deep importance to them. 
 Their elders from a range of tribes would not have collaborated to find a culturally 
acceptable solution to a problem, which is not favoured as an everyday 
conversational topic amongst Aboriginals; and 
 the Aboriginal road safety group would not have been formed 
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8.2 Case Study 2: The Queensland Road Safety Audit Policy 
8.2.1 Desired outcomes 
Within the context of this thesis the implementation of the RSAP was reviewed as a 
retrospective instrumental and exploratory case study of the PSC. The objectives were 
several:  
 The first was evaluate the degree to which road authority culture and process 
foster or limit stakeholder/community engagement, using a variety of different 
data sources to review common themes, which furthered or hindered the 
implementation of the RSAP. 
 In addition utilising the PSC was utilised as a gap analysis tool to expose PSC 
elements, which were not addressed during RSAP implementation. 
 Extrapolating results of all those analyses to reflect on the implementation of the 
NRSS and Safe System and 
 Assess the fit of the PSC with Safe System and NRSS philosophy 
8.2.2 Summary  
Traditionally departmental stakeholder management is viewed as part of risk management 
methodology, as expressed in ASNZ 4360:2004. This is a legitimate process to manage 
potentially adversarial stakeholders. However, the PSC model is driven by inclusive 
stakeholder engagement, as opposed to the more commonly practised exclusive 
management methodology.  
Analysis of RSAP implementation made it clear that there was no prospect that the RSAP 
would achieve synergistic outcomes; instead cases of mediocre interaction between head 
office and some regions as well as blockages relating to implementation personnel, 
implementation processes and the departmental operating milieu, were revealed by the 
analysis.  
Utilising the PSC project implementation as a gap analysis tool uncovered additional 
deficiencies:  
 Including a lack of policy instruments, 
 shortcomings in the areas of project implementation,  
 failure to engage stakeholders and  
 no system to encourage or facilitate change 
When King’s Road Safety Space criteria were applied to elements of heritage culture as 
expressed in the 2010 TMR culture shaping project (see Chapters 5.7 and 7.4), underlying 
causes for less than acceptable adoption of the RSAP became discernible.  
The TMR Culture Shaping project is a very recent initiative, and some undesirable cultural 
traits from previous management behaviours still endure. If not addressed, these are likely 
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to have a negative influence on new initiatives such as the introduction of the Safe System 
and the implementation of the NRSS. 
There is already a primary amount of leverage inbuilt into the current NRSS, the vehicle for 
the implementation of the Safe System, and an analysis of the NRSS implementation 
methodology uncovers stakeholder engagement across more than 100 different groups in 
its formulation. Each of those groups has hundreds to many thousands of members, who 
together have the potential to become a critical mass, and of whom many may have the 
potential to facilitate attitudinal changes within their organisation and beyond. With 
regards to implementation instruments, for instance, transport ministers from all States 
and Territories (and New Zealand) shape SCOTI, the NRSS implementation organisation. If 
they were to unify and exercise their political will, they could provide unified legislative 
support for Safe System and the NRSS.  
This demonstrates that the NRSS is founded on a participatory methodology of stakeholder 
engagement: that is, in line with PSC principles. A case could be made that there is now a 
need for SCOTI to consider the application of legislative implementation instruments and 
the most appropriate methodology to facilitate change.  
 
 
 
8.2.3 Some Queensland – centric proposals for a way forward: 
 
There are a number of useful approaches Queensland could make to find a way forward: 
 The first is to utilise the PSC as a gap analysis tool, and to include a series of Road 
Safety Space (RSS) -related questions in the next departmental staff survey  
 The Ernst and Young survey of 2005/06 could be re-run to gain an indication of how 
far the department has moved towards road safety in the last eight years. This will 
provide a new baseline by which to measure progress and give indications of a 
reinvigorated road safety culture. 
 This could be enhanced if, in re-running the Ernst & Young survey, add some RSS-
related questions were added to the original format. 
 Another approach would be to apply an RSS risk assessment to every departmental 
project (including PSC- designed road safety projects); this could be done simply by 
including RSS criteria checks as part of the standard departmental risk management 
template. This will help identify potential RSS blockages and identify those which 
persist. 
 There is also an opportunity to enhance the exchange of ideas and work methods 
between rural and coastal regional offices. Better familiarisation with urban design 
principles will enhance the quality of road design in rural centres; rotation of staff 
will help break down the social and cultural idiosyncrasies, which have been 
traditionally permitted as part of the tradition of working to local condition in some 
of the more remote centres.  
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 Specific and enforceable guidelines are indicated, especially for remote regions 
where demands from local members, large corporations, and political pressure 
groups need to be balanced against the health and welfare of vulnerable road 
users. 
 All these measures will be invaluable; but there seems little merit in reinstating the 
RSAP unless it is backed by enforceable policy instruments.  
 Road safety and the introduction of the Safe System could be supported by 
legislating a Road Safety Act, with departmental work procedures pinpointing areas 
of most concern and determining sanctions for violations.  
 The long-term objective of such action is to abolish nonfeasance.  
 One of the arguments to substantiate the practical as well as the financial value of 
the PSC is that it introduces stakeholders and change facilitation into road safety 
project management methodology; the rationale behind this is , that deployment 
of traditional change facilitators, already operating and embedded in our culture 
can be much far cost-effective than ongoing deterrent and enforcement action. 
While there will be situations, when a cost effective quick-fix can only be 
implemented by 3Es routines; the failure to consider free or cost-effective 
behavioural, attitudinal or cultural change facilitation may ignore the potentially 
single most important method to implement an effective and enduring road safety 
intervention. 
 The day of the top down engineering only approach to road safety has passed with 
the dawn of the Safe System. It is now time for a more inclusive and more 
transparent approach, that includes stakeholder groups with their professional 
representatives in the decision making process. Road safety issues are co-owned, 
and their remediation affects stakeholders.  Added transparency will show when, 
and how often, non-road safety related issues, which in the traditional hierarchical 
road authority structure have the potential to override road safety interests of 
affected but so far voiceless stakeholders, become dominant; and will indicate 
ways to redress the balance. 
 
 
8.2.4 Outcome assessment  
During the multi-focal analysis of RSAP implementation, it became apparent that many of 
the identified deficiencies were symptoms of deeper problems relating to the underlying 
operational milieu. This became most obvious when utilising King’s RSS to categorise and 
provide a visual overview of those deficiencies.  
As Schoech (n.d.) from his perspective of systems theory indicates, synergies can only 
emerge in a non-dominated team environment, where equals cooperate to achieve a 
common goal. Del Valle (2010) from a road safety perspective points out, that road safety 
interventions include technical measures based on systemic foundations.  
Those views provided by specialists from different professional perspectives substantiate 
the value of the PSC as a specialised road safety implementation tool providing project 
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management, stakeholder engagement and change facilitation. Those views also validate 
the analysis of the operational milieu, specifically in relation to the issue to be addressed. 
This is where a risk assessment utilising King’s RSS is recommended to help optimise project 
outcomes by targeting a project environment (systemic foundation) conducive for the 
emergence of synergies. 
Applied as a tool of analysis to the RSAP, the PSC met its stated objectives, but to have used 
it without assessing and categorising RSS criteria as part of project risk would have failed to 
uncover some of the less obvious causes for its less than ideal implementation. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
9.1 Learnings from the Mount Isa Pedestrian Project 
Even though it was applied in the Mount Isa Pedestrian project without implementation of 
its improvement loop, the PSC established its usefulness as an implementation tool for a 
road safety project; in future PSC projects the review-based improvement loop should be 
mandatory. This will not only provide continuous improvement for similar projects; but will 
also improve PSC methodology in itself. 
The stated intent of disseminating information about the two Aboriginal casualties to the 
Indigenous citizens of Mount Isa by survey was successful. The subsequent formation of a 
road safety group was another successful outcome from the participatory culture-based 
elders’ meeting, and an indirect acknowledgement by all participants of the need to 
promote road safety from within tribal culture. The core group of elders who formed the 
Road Safety group were well educated and high achievers, not only amongst their own 
people, but also when compared to the leaders of any other ethnic group. There is no 
reason to expect that the same qualities will not be found when other projects in similar 
settings call for local leaders to act as change facilitators: that there was nothing about the 
Mount Isa elders that indicates their high educational levels and strong desire to achieve 
practical objectives would not be present in any other group anywhere else. 
There was no follow-up of the project as the author left his employment before a 
finalisation meeting with the consultant could be conducted. An email from the consultant 
attests to positive residual effects of the project, which has had no departmental support 
since the author left Mount Isa (see Attachment 4) 
The NWRSA brainstorming exercise provided insights transcending the objectives of the 
original research plan. One was that groups with particular interest in a particular road 
safety project are excellent sounding boards for its implementation; the other that there is 
scope to groom such groups to grow into change facilitation vehicles for the introduction of 
the Safe System. The health of such groups can be the considered the regional canary for 
road safety, and monitoring it will provide a fast way of determining if road safety is alive 
and working well. 
9.2 Learnings from the Queensland Road Safety Audit Policy 
Practical steps to warm the soil could be:  
 Make it easier to change the notion that untouchability is a desirable status for a 
trained professional. Nonfeasance is a 17th century law, designed to provide 
indemnity to communities of English villagers charged with road maintenance; not 
well-suited to highly skilled 21st century civil engineers.   
 to work towards gaining support from all stakeholders in road safety issues for the 
abolition of nonfeasance legislation. 
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 include professional ethics as a mandatory part of civil engineering courses, which 
should also include modules on corporate social responsibility and professional 
advocacy for road users 
 Making the teaching of road safety a mandatory part of civil engineering courses 
may also help, as may balancing the depersonalised mathematical exercise of risk 
assessment with graphic images of crashes and their victims, and talks between  
aspiring engineers, and crash victims and their relatives conveying their 
experiences vicariously.  
 # to take a pledge upon entry into Engineers Australia.  
# On 28.7.2010 Engineers Australia adopted a Code of Ethics, which chartered applicants 
and applicants for registration need to declare, that they are willing to abide by  
(Engineers Australia, 2010) 
The adoption of the PSC for any kind of road safety intervention is a way forward, and is 
recommended for trialling, improving and adoption by TMR. Such trials need to be 
supported by first training the practitioners in the basics of cooperative culture to help 
optimise synergistic potential. Once that is done, excellent testing grounds are available in 
the various road safety alliances and groups which have developed under departmental 
guidance. 
The problem as ever is to overcome institutionalised resistance to change. Many Road 
Safety Space related blockages were still operative in some former Main Roads offices by 
the end of 2011, and are likely to continue to impact negatively on the implementation of 
the Safe System. One option to sidestep the immediate need for a new RSAP is to conduct 
formal annual compliance checks, with results to be published on the intranet. It would be 
advantageous to have audit implementation checks moderated by an extra-departmental 
authority such as the Auditor General, to provide leverage in cases where enforcement or 
sanctions are indicated.  
Other Options to overcome former Main Roads organisation-related Road Safety Space 
blockages would include: 
 applying Safe System supportive legislation  
 identifying Road Safety Space-related blockages and their geographic locations 
 not attempting to implement the Safe System until RSS-related blockages have 
been remediated  
 utilising specially trained, departmentally independent staff to help introduce the 
Safe System, until a critical mass of lead agency staff have been appropriately 
trained for department wide deployment 
 training existing road safety groups and Road Safety Auditors to become champions 
of the Safe System. 
 Carefully worded Road Safety Space checks can be added to the standard 
departmental project risk management form, phrased to expose blockages in the 
departmental operating milieu each time a project manager considers a new 
project. 
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 In extreme cases it may be necessary to exclude former Main Roads offices that 
refuse to comply with the Safe System from all but legislated implementation 
processes, that is, to sidestep and isolate, overtly or covertly resistant districts 
attempting to sabotage the process. 
 Lesser but useful tactics to encourage acceptance of the Safe System might include 
an intranet website, online road safety quizzes with prizes and nominated support 
staff, to assist with adjustment problems. 
 
9.3 About change facilitation 
Hardly ever in the history of the Queensland State Road Authority has there been a greater 
need to facilitate the State Road Authority staff’s capacity to adjust to change. That need 
was recognised and is attested to by the implementation and subsequent QUT assessment 
of the 2006 Workout Program and the 2009 Culture Shaping Project (see Chapters 5.6 
&5.7). 
Any new initiative, whether the introduction of road safety auditing, a new road safety 
paradigm or a National Road Safety Strategy needs facilitation of behavioural, attitudinal or 
cultural changes. This need is, disputably, a matter of caring for the mental health of staff 
and a maintaining a healthy workplace atmosphere. 
Modern professional change facilitation consultancies, each one offering its own brand of 
facilitation, could be a useful option to consider to assist in achieving this, while historically 
proven change facilitators with relevant expertise, might offer another way forward, by 
going back to first principles.  
It is necessary to apply knowledge from the area of project management, relative to the 
overall project and to each stakeholder as well as to the proposed change facilitation 
provider, to ensure that the selection of a change facilitation provider aligns with the 
corporate objectives and ethical standards of the department. For instance, if a road safety 
intervention project were driven by religious elders who discriminate against women, they, 
and the project, might be considered offensive and other stakeholders might not 
cooperate. A local Indigenous road safety intervention project driven by an elder from a 
rival tribal group might experience adverse outcomes. There might be difficulties if the 
change facilitation provider does not apply a methodology appropriate for the temporal 
management framework of the department: for instance, if a department has minimal 
coercive powers but the facilitation provider advocates strong leadership as the key to 
successfully implement changes, conflict may ensue. Conflict might also occur if more than 
one change facilitation provider is appointed, or if a mixture of coercive and non-coercive 
change facilitations is involved in a project. Careful consideration of the project, the 
stakeholders, and the potential change facilitators will assist in finding a good fit. 
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9.4 Summing up 
The opportunity to make the best out of the 2009 amalgamation of Main Roads and 
Queensland Transport into TMR is here. The 3Es are no longer the quintessence of road 
safety paradigms. The Main Roads Department achieved spectacular feats of engineering 
through its hierarchically structured authoritative ‘top’ down ‘engineering-only’ project 
implementation methodology. Yet evolutionary changes have been happening in the areas 
of road safety paradigms and stakeholders’ rising awareness of their rights to co-ownership 
of the public road space; and changes are likely to also happen in the road safety legislative 
realm. The challenge for TMR and in particular its former Main Roads arm is to embrace 
those changes and to drive them as part of the lead agency, responsible for implementing 
the Safe System. Some of the identified positive heritage attributes of Main Roads Culture 
include: 
 Pride and loyalty: 
 Technical excellence: 
 A can-do culture: 
 Unity of purpose  
It is time for the organisation to muster its best, as it has demonstrated during past times of 
pressure. It is time to evolve. There is no worthwhile alternative. 
The PSC by its design can support that quest. 
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Attachment 1 - Data Summary from ‘Survey of Road Safety Auditors, 
working for the Queensland Department of Main Roads’ (2005 Survey 
Report) 
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Data Summary Sheets 
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Survey Results  TO’s   FDMs   
BACKGROUND Total Average  Total Average  TOTAL 
How long have you been working for Main Roads?  (Years) 273.00 22.75  155.00 17.22  428.00 
How long have you been working as a Road Safety Auditor for Main Roads?  
(Years) 44.50 3.71  44.50 4.94  89.00 
How many road safety audits did you conduct during the last year? 23.00 1.92  37.00 4.11  60.00 
How many road safety audits did you conduct since becoming Road Safety 
Auditor? 130.00 10.83  140.00 15.56  270.00 
What is your highest road safety qualification?        
Does your position permit you to decide on implementing some/all of your road 
safety recommendations? No (13)   Yes (9)   22 
        
ATTITUDINAL / PERCEPTIONAL SURVEY 
Average Median Mean Average Median Mean Average 
I am content with the support, that I receive as a Road Safety Auditor at my 
workplace. 3.00 3.00 2.95 3.33 4.00 3.12 3.14 
The financial decision makers at my workplace have a good understanding of 
road design considerations as they relate to the road environment. 3.15 3.00 3.05 3.44 4.00 3.32 3.27 
The financial decision makers at my workplace have a good understanding of 
how to design for different types of vehicles: motor bikes, cars with caravans, 
road trains and so on. 
3.00 3.00 2.87 3.22 3.00 3.16 3.09 
The financial decision makers at my workplace have a good understanding of 
how to design for vulnerable road users: the young, the frail, the drunk, the old, 
and the physically and intellectually impaired.  
2.69 3.00 2.54 2.67 3.00 2.62 2.68 
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The financial decision makers at my workplace are aware that they reduce this 
Department's liability exposure by arranging for road safety audit reports. 3.54 4.00 3.44 3.56 4.00 3.40 3.55 
My managers always provide feedback and discuss my road safety 
recommendations with me. 2.62 3.00 2.32 3.78 4.00 3.58 3.09 
I receive encouragement to further my studies of road safety. 1.62 2.00 1.5 2.78 2.00 2.62 2.09 
I am told what actions arise from my audit recommendations. 2.23 2.00 1.99 2.89 3.00 2.37 2.50 
  TO’s   FDMs  TO & FDM 
 Average Median Mean Average Median Mean Average 
There is a set procedure to act on road safety audits at my workplace.  2.31 2.00 2.08 2.56 3.00 2.17 2.41 
Road safety audits at my workplace are written, filed and forgotten. 3.00 4.00 2.60 2.67 2.00 2.42 2.86 
I feel that my professional contribution to road safety is worthwhile. 3.46 3.00 3.38 4.11 4.00 4.07 3.73 
I pursue road safety issues with my financial decision makers to their ‘tenable 
maximum’. 2.77 3.00 2.54 3.67 3.00 3.58 3.14 
I am at ease with my work as a Road Safety Auditor. 3.31 3.00 3.25 3.89 4.00 3.74 3.55 
The outcomes of my work as a Road Safety Auditor frustrate me. 2.54 3.00 2.38 2.22 2.00 1.94 2.41 
My work as a Road Safety Auditor stresses me. 2.15 2.00 2.04 1.33 1.00 1.26 1.82 
I would feel responsible if there was a crash due to a road safety issue that I 
overlooked in one of my road safety audit reports. 3.31 4.00 3.03 2.67 2.00 2.27 3.05 
I would feel responsible if there was a crash due to a road safety issue that I 
did not pursue with the relevant financial decision maker to its ‘tenable 
maximum’. 
2.92 3.00 2.69 2.33 2.00 2.14 2.68 
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PERCEIVED NEEDS 
Average Median Mean Average Median Mean Average 
There should be a peer network for Road Safety Auditors. 3.92 4.00 3.82 3.89 4.00 3.74 3.91 
There should be special counseling facilities for Road Safety Auditors.  2.77 3.00 2.71 2.44 3.00 2.32 2.64 
Road Safety Auditors should form their own representative professional body. 3.15 3.00 3.04 3.11 3.00 2.88 3.14 
There should be standardized departmental policies and procedures to review 
road safety audits, and to document their implementation.  4.46 4.00 4.43 4.56 5.00 4.53 4.50 
Financial decision makers at my workplace should receive extra training to 
appreciate the complexity of road safety and as it relates to the road 
environment, the vehicle and the road user? 
3.58 4.00 3.46 4.33 4.00 4.28 3.73 
 
Notes:  
FDMs    Financial Decisionmakers         Rating Scale:  Strong disagreement = 1 
TO’s  Technical Officers            Strong agreement = 5 
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Attachment 2 - Data Summary from ‘Survey of Road Safety Auditors, 
working for the Queensland Department of Main Roads’ (2011 Survey 
Report) 
(Including comparison column showing 2005/06 results) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Summary Sheet 
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Attachment 3 – 2005 Ernst and Young Survey 
(Questionnaire only) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copy of Road Safety Audit Survey Questions 
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Attachment 4 – Mount Isa Pedestrian Project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4A   Email, Feedback from Consultant, dated 26.8.2013 
4B   Copy of TMR project brief to consultant including 
   survey questionnaire and  
4C   Copy of survey data summary sheet 
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Helmut Ernst  
 
From: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
Sent: Monday, 26 August 2013 9:43 PM 
To: helmuternst@bigpond.com 
Subject: Re: Road safety project in Mount Isa 
 
Dear Helmut, 
What a pleasant and very lovely surprise hearing from you and Susan after such a long time. That is 
not good to hear about Susan's cataracts and imminent eye operation. I hope that she receives good 
care before and after her operation. I can't believe you are still studying. That is so wonderful. You 
know Helmut, it really makes me appreciate that education and learning is a lifetime. Tasmania 
sounds like a beautiful place. Do your children and grandchildren live nearby? 
 
My family is doing well. I have a little shop opened up to continue my community work with the 
Indigenous people. The elders that worked with me through the Road Safety project continue to stay 
connected with me talking still about the subject and many others that concern them. Their focus at 
the moment takes in varying issues like education, employment, cultural heritage and so on. So don't 
ever feel guilty about not being around because your investment in my little consultant business really 
helped to bring forward many voices from the community who felt like they were heard for the first 
time. You did a wonderful thing and it will never be forgotten. 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ,  
 
I am also running the business full-time and manage another project for Government to deliver 
training to Indigenous parents on the topic of Education. I wrote a little program called "Home to 
School to Community" and through this program express to parents that the stability and success of 
any child begins with home. The child's transition from home to school and then to community is 
largely dependent on the efforts of the parents. Anyway, it is going great. Parents are quite 
disadvantaged because of their low educational achievements and the group usually consists of 
members who never did graduate at school because they just didn't get it. So with 
careful precision and cultural sensitivity I try to coach and mentor the parents to find the value within 
them because all of them survived this far. 
 
Thinking about Susan…XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXX  
Please do stay in touch. Let Susan know I will be thinking of her. Take care Helmut and thank you 
one more time for the encouraging email. 
 
XXXXXXXX 
 
 
 
On 26/08/2013, at 9:12 PM, <helmuternst@bigpond.com> wrote: 
2 
Dear XXXXXX, 
By now Susan and I have settled down well in Tassie. Today we are in Launceston, a town 220 km 
from Waratah, where we live. Susan has problems with cataracts and is having her second eye 
operated on. I am still 'going to school' - studying. 
 
How are you going; are you still doing road safety and is the aboriginal road safety group still 
operating? I sometimes I feel guilty about leaving the area and the group without my support. But then 
the group has you; and its members have far above average capability (compared with any ethnic 
group). 
 
 
All the best, 
 
Helmut 
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1 General 
 
There have been two pedestrian fatalities on Camooweal Street in Mount Isa within 
the last five years. Both fatalities occurred after dark involving pedestrians of 
Aboriginal descent, who were asleep on the carriageway. 
Funding has been granted for street lighting and to address other road 
environmental issues.  
The purpose of the proposed stakeholder engagement of the Aboriginal 
communities of Mount Isa is to derive culturally acceptable counter measures to the 
behavioural aspect of this problem, which on this road has cost the lives of two 
indigenous persons.  
In order for these counter measures to be sustainable they need to be owned and 
driven by the local indigenous community. 
 
The project will be conducted in two stages: 
 
A survey, interviewing elders of the various indigenous groups asking for their 
opinion, how the road environment of Camooweal Street between Isa Street and 
Twenty-Third Avenue could be improved, and how unsafe behaviours could be 
monitored and modified. The aim of the survey is to identify a culturally acceptable 
solution, to help prevent similar future pedestrian casualties. 
A public meeting of participating stakeholders, initiated and facilitated by the 
consultant after the survey phase will provide opportunity for indigenous 
stakeholders to rate and to decide on culturally appropriate counter measures and 
on mechanisms for their implementation 
 
. 
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2 Consultancy Services 
 
 
2.1 Cultural sensitivities / Confidentiality 
 
In order to overcome potential cultural sensitivities, it has been decided to engage 
an Aboriginal consultancy service, which understands and is capable to operate with 
discretion and in observance of those sensitivities.  
To publicise or divulge details of the processes adopted for this engagement to non-
indigenous stakeholders (except scheduled feedback to TMR) is not permitted; as it 
would compromise principles of confidentiality. As a consequence processes and 
outcomes of the collaborative action would be jeopardised. 
  
2.2 Staff Selection 
 
It is imperative for the success of this project that the Consultant employ 
appropriately experienced individuals as interviewers. Reference is made to Section 
8 of the Supplementary Conditions of Offer, which states details of consultancy staff, 
which have to be made available to the principal. 
 
 
2.3 Elder Selection 
 
It is important to provide (where possible) opportunity for all Aboriginal groups in the 
Mount Isa region to contribute to the project. It is for that reason that the proposed 
questionnaire needs to contain a reference to which tribal group each interviewed 
elder belongs. 
Any potential conflicts between tribal groups, which could be counter productive to 
the successful facilitation of a combined meeting, will need to be addressed prior to 
such meeting. This, however, is not meant to disqualify any tribal group to provide 
advisory input via the initial questionnaire. 
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3 Project Details 
 
3.1 Time Frame 
 
It is expected, that the Consultant will complete the project within 85 working days. 
The Consultant will provide his own detailed timeline, the start of it being the date of 
written offer approval by the Principal. 
 
3.2 Cost Management 
 
The consultant is to submit a schedule of rates estimate for the proposed services. 
That estimate shall form the basis of negotiation for the final contract price. Progress 
payments will be monthly with the relevant pro-rata claim to be validated by the 
project manager prior to payment. Variations to the contract will have to be 
confirmed and approved by the principal. 
 
3.3 Quality 
 
The Consultant is not expected to provide a quality system. However, the consultant 
commits by signing the “Offer for Supply of Goods and Services” to comply with this 
specification and all other documents referenced in the “Invitation to Offer for Supply 
of Mid-range Goods or Services”. 
 
3.4 Scope 
In Scope:  
Liaison with and survey of sixty Aboriginal stakeholders, provision of written 
updates, and submission of reports to a format specified by the principal.  
Reporting and discussing survey information with the Main Roads Project 
Manager. 
Arranging and facilitation of a public meeting of Aboriginal stakeholders. 
Provision of a report of that public meeting to the Principal. 
 
Out of Scope: 
Liaison with or survey of non indigenous stakeholders 
Engagement of media 
Passing on of survey information to other but indigenous stakeholders.  
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3.5 Risk 
 
Issues, which have the potential to jeopardise the project will need to be 
communicated by telephone to the Main Roads Project Manager immediately. For 
recording purposes a written exceptions report will need to be lodged within one day 
with the Project Manager. A suitable format is an e-mail providing a short description 
of the issue, risk management measures taken, and countermeasures proposed to 
manage project risk. 
 
 
3.6 Communications 
 
 
Internal Communications: 
 
Ethical research: 
A participant information sheet, outlining ethical survey principles is part of 
the proposed questionnaire. That form will be part of every survey 
questionnaire and will be left with every survey respondent.  
During the survey period the Consultant will provide fortnightly progress 
reports, stating the number of elders interviewed, their survey responses 
and their tribal affiliation.  
A suitable format for the progress report is an “Excel spreadsheet”, which 
will summarise weekly survey data, together with any special comments by 
the interviewer. 
 
External Communications: 
Some elders might consider certain issues discussed as confidential. Some 
of the elders might want to keep knowledge of the whole of the project within 
the Aboriginal communities.  
The consultant and consultancy staff is to restrict discussions regarding the 
project to indigenous stakeholders, and the Main Roads Project Manager. 
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3.7 Human Resources Management 
 
The success of this project is dependent on the ability of the interviewers to address 
in a culturally sensitive manner the issue of Aboriginal pedestrian fatalities on the 
Mount Isa – Duchess Road; and to obtain feedback regarding culturally appropriate 
countermeasures. It is the responsibility of the consultant to select appropriately 
qualified indigenous staff and to provide additional training for that purpose as 
needed.  
 
3.8 Procurement 
 
The consultant is to provide all staff, materials and equipment to complete this 
project within the agreed timeframe in accordance with this specification and all 
other project documentation referenced in the “Invitation to Offer for Supply of Mid-
range Goods or Services”. 
 
 
3.9 Desirable Outcomes 
 
This project has been funded by the Department of Transport and Main Roads to 
help prevent the occurrence of future pedestrian fatalities similar to the two which 
happened during the last five years on Camooweal Street. 
 
In addition to this targeted outcome, this project has the potential to provide positive 
outcomes in the following areas: 
 This project has the potential to address Road safety in general in the Mount 
Isa Region. 
 This project has the potential to unify Aboriginal interest groups by 
supporting a common goal. 
 As such this project has the potential to set a benchmark for future combined 
Aboriginal action in other areas. 
 
The Department of Transport and Main Roads acknowledges and supports the 
cultural framework of traditional leadership and seeks to work together with 
Aboriginal elders on this goal of mutual concern. 
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3.10 Information for Survey Participants: 
 
Purpose of this Survey 
There have been two pedestrian fatalities on Camooweal Street in Mount Isa within 
the last five years. Both fatalities occurred after dark involving pedestrians of 
Aboriginal descent, who were asleep on the carriageway. 
Funding has been granted for street lighting and to address other road 
environmental issues.  
The Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads also granted funding to 
consult the elders of Aboriginal Communities, to help find a solution to the 
behavioural aspect of this problem, which on this road resulted in the needless loss 
of the lives of two indigenous persons.  
The Department of Transport and Main Roads acknowledges and supports the 
cultural framework of traditional leadership and seeks to work together with 
Aboriginal elders on this issue of mutual concern. 
The Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads requests your help, 
because you are an Aboriginal Elder and as such have insight into how to derive 
culturally acceptable countermeasures to the type of fatalities, which occurred on 
Camooweal Street. The funding body will have access to the data obtained during 
the project. 
 
Participation 
Your participation in this project is voluntary. If you do agree to participate, you can 
withdraw from participation at any time during the project without comment or penalty. 
Your participation will involve a questionnaire and will take at least 10 minutes of 
your time.  
 
Expected Benefits 
It is expected that this project will not benefit you. However, your response is important. 
Please consider that your contribution is supporting the cause of road safety in the 
Mount Isa Region and could be saving Aboriginal lives.  
 
Risks 
There are no risks associated with your participation in this project. 
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Confidentiality 
All comments and responses will be treated confidentially.  The names and contact 
details of participants in the survey will be retained for the duration of this project, after 
which time the responses will be archived without the names of their corresponding 
contributors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Attachment 4 C 
168 
 
Consent to Participate 
The return of the completed survey is accepted as an indication of your consent to 
participate in this project. 
 
Questions / further information about the project 
If you need to have any questions answered or if you require further information about 
the project please contact: 
Helmut Ernst (Project Manager Preconstruction) 
Phone: (07) 47693309,    
Fax: (07) 47693244 
Email: Helmut.Z.Ernst@tmr.qld.gov.au 
 
Concerns / Complaints regarding the project 
The Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads is committed to an ethical 
code of conduct. The interviewers were selected by the Consultant based on their 
Aboriginality and previous experience. If you have any concerns or complaints 
regarding the ethical conduct of this project, please contact in the first instance the 
consultant at: 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx  Consultancy 
Phone: xxxxxxxxxx 
Email: lxxxxxx@bigpond.net.au  
 
In case you need an impartially facilitated resolution to your concern, please contact: 
yyyyyyyyyyy (Regional Communications Officer) 
Phone: (07) 47693208 
Fax: (07) 47693244 
Email: yyyyyyyyyyyyy@tmr.qld.gov.au 
yyyyyyyyyy is not connected with this project and will help resolve your concerns or 
complaints. 
 
 
(This sheet is to be left with the survey participant) 
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3.11 SURVEY: 
 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 
   
Name:  
Contact phone number:  
How long have you been living in Mount Isa  (Years)?   
What is your tribal connection?  
Were you aware of the two pedestrian fatalities, which occurred within the last 
five years on Camooweal Street between the Hospital and Twenty-third Avenue? 
 
 
 
 
PROPOSED ROAD BASED ACTION 
 
1. Have you travelled as a driver or passenger in a vehicle from Woolworths to 
Topsy Harry?   
    OR 
 
2. Would you say the road from Woolworths to Topsy Harry is safe for motorists 
during daylight hours and night time hours? 
     
OR 
Why? 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
______________ 
 
 
 
 
YES NO 
YES NO 
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3. Would you say the road from Woolworths to Topsy Harry is safe for pedestrians 
during daylight hours and night time hours? 
     
OR 
Why? 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
______________ 
 
 
 
 
4. The Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads has granted 
funding for street lighting and other road works to help prevent future pedestrian 
casualties. 
 
Can you suggest any additional road works to help prevent future pedestrian 
casualties? 
 
 
 
YES NO 
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PROPOSED BEHAVOURAL ACTIONS 
 
5. Would you be interested in being a member of a Road Safety Community 
Group for Mount Isa? 
  
OR 
 
6. What in your opinion makes pedestrians go to sleep on bitumen roads? 
 
 
7. How can we stop pedestrians go to sleep on bitumen roads? 
 
 
YES NO 
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8. How can the community help save the health and lives of Indigenous people 
using the Woolworths to Topsy Harry road?  
___________________________________________________________________
_______ 
___________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
 
9. What types of things are likely to help all Indigenous people become safe 
road users?  
___________________________________________________________________
_______ 
___________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
 
 
10. As an Aboriginal Elder your recommendations are valued by the Department of 
Transport and Main Roads. Would you be prepared to attend a meeting of Aboriginal 
stakeholders to further discuss possible actions to help save the health and lives of 
pedestrians?   
 
    OR 
 
 
 
 
Signature of Interviewee:………………………………………………………….. 
 
Dated this……………………..day of…………………………….2010. 
 
 
Signature of Interviewer:………………………………………………………….. 
 
Dated this……………………..day of…………………………….2010. 
 
NO YES 
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Copy of survey data summary sheets 
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Attachment 5 – Advice from Manager – Legal Branch regarding 
Nonfeasance Legislation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Email, Feedback from Legal Branch, dated 12.4.2011 
 
 180  Attachment 5 
 
Cloncurry, 14.3.2011 
                                                                                                Phone work:   4769 3309 
Home: 4742 2275 
 
 
Good morning, 
 
 
Re:  Civil Liability Act 2010, Section 37 and its implications on Road Safety 
Audit Processes   
 
 
I am a Senior Road Designer, working for TMR and I am currently working on a 
thesis regarding the Road Safety Audit Policy. (The DG and RD have approved 
thesis topic and my studies). 
 
 
The latest version of section 37 of that act reads: 
“Restriction on liability of public or other authorities with 
functions of road authorities 
(1) A public or other authority is not liable in any legal 
proceeding for any failure by the authority in relation to any 
function it has as a road authority— 
(a) to repair a road or to keep a road in repair; or 
(b) to inspect a road for the purpose of deciding the need to 
repair the road or to keep the road in repair. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if at the time of the alleged 
failure the authority had actual knowledge of the particular 
risk the materialisation of which resulted in the harm. 
(3) In this section— 
[s 38] 
Civil Liability Act 2003 
Chapter 2 Civil liability for harm 
Part 3 Liability of public and other authorities and volunteers 
Reprint 2F effective 1 November 2010 Page 29 
road see the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) 
Act 1995, schedule 4. 
road authority means the entity responsible for carrying out any road work” 
(Queensland Government, 2010) 
This seems to absolve road authorities from all legal liabilities from failing to 
repair or failing to inspect a road for repair. However, if the authority knows about 
hazards in the road reserve, and they do cause harm, the authority is liable for 
damages. 
Does this imply, (hypothetically speaking) that if a District/Region has a 
number of road safety audits archived; without audit recommendations risk rated, 
scheduled or implemented; that district could be liable for damages resulting from of 
those non-implemented, unrated issues? RTI could make access for the public or 
their solicitors possible to those unresolved audits. 
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Note: 
Shown on the previous page is the Author’s request to Legal Practice and 
Administration Branch to clarify the indemnity provided by Section 37 of the 
Civil Liability Act 2003. 
The 12 page document outlining the Branch’s response was meant for the 
Author only. It is unknown, if that document is publicly available under the 
Right to Information Act. Please refer part of that document below. 
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Attachment 6 – The Culture Shaping Project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Staff Summary 
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